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ABSTRACT  
 
This thesis is an ethnographic study of urban development in Colombo, Sri Lanka.  
Drawing on 12 months of fieldwork, this manuscript explores the way that the city of 
Colombo is increasingly being re-imagined by policymakers, developers, government 
officials and elite residents as a “global city” similar to Singapore or Dubai.  As my 
multi-sited project demonstrates, however, these visions of the new Colombo are far 
from being the current reality. Through chapters exploring diverse corners of Colombo 
including: a suspended Chinese-funded waterfront development project; a coastal 
fishing enclave; a new marketplace opened under the former government; and the 
city’s luxury apartment buildings, this thesis offers insight both into the varied forms 
of dispossession faced by the urban poor and working class as well as the aspirational 
projects designed to appeal to the Colombo elite.  
 
I argue that the primary principle governing Colombo’s urban development is the idea 
of “hubness,” an aspirational trope which emphasizes connection and mobility, 
especially across the Indian Ocean region.  Rather than taking its island geography as 
a sign of insularity, many Sri Lankans hope to leverage what is now framed as the 
country’s “strategic location” to boost its appeal and transform Sri Lanka – and by 
extension, Colombo – into a major global hub connecting Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East.  I argue that hubness as an ideal is both a spatial and temporal claim.  Rather 
than being a self-evident statement of geography, hubness discourse is also a specific 
understanding of futurity. These complex entanglements of spatiality and temporality 
are present in each site.  
 
The ethnographic findings presented in this thesis point to the need to reconsider 
global city making as a process suffused with uncertainty, rather than as a 
straightforward, linear evolution. Global cities, I suggest, are not fixed or static 
entities, but contingent urban forms which are actively created as material and 
symbolic entities through various forms of dispossession and aspiration.    
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INTRODUCTION: THE FUTURE IS NOW 
 
“Through the renovation of cities, new political maps are drawn.” (Ong 2011:10). 
 
 
The Galle Face Green would seem a logical place to begin any story about 
Colombo.  An open, public space in the heart of the city that is bordered by the 
Indian Ocean, the Galle Face Green is one of Colombo’s iconic places.  In the 
summer of 2009, long before I conducted the fieldwork that forms the basis of this 
dissertation, and only a few weeks after the end of the Sri Lankan civil war, I worked 
as an intern not far from Galle Face, at the US Embassy.  Along with my Sri Lankan 
and American colleagues, a common practice was to close out the day by leaving the 
office and going for a walk at Galle Face to watch the sunset.  It was often crowded 
with families, young couples and schoolchildren still in their uniforms.  The wind 
always picks up this close to the water, and it would rumple your hair and sweep 
aside loose clothing, bringing with it the unmistakable saltiness of coastal air.  
Looking out at the vastness of the Indian Ocean from Galle Face, you might be 
rewarded with a beautiful sunset, if you were lucky and the weather cooperated. 
Another day over.      
In those months immediately following the end of the civil war, the Galle 
Face Green was not yet free of the military infrastructures that had been set up to 
protect the area from attack.  The uncertainty of hanging out on the Green rested not 
only on the chance of catching the sunset.  It was also informed by the knowledge 
that there was still a Sri Lankan Army watchtower and base set up on the northern 
part of Galle Face.  It was known that if a civilian walked too far in this direction, 
she would be alerted by sounds and gestures from the military service people 
keeping watch: my recollection of those summer evening walks was that we would 
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always start at the southern part of the Green and keep walking north, along the 
water, ever prepared for the sign that we had come too far.  Perhaps it was just my 
imagination, but somehow I was convinced that the boundary between civilian and 
military space was never the same two days in a row: one could still be caught off 
guard at the sound of soldiers indicating that it was time to turn back.  
Seven years later, in June 2016, I was concluding my ethnographic fieldwork 
in Colombo.  On one of my last few days in the city, I had an appointment at the One 
Galle Face, the planned site of a luxurious new apartment building situated just on 
the other side of the main road from the Galle Face Green, which lends the new 
complex its name.  By this time, the city’s military checkpoints were largely a thing 
of the past and the watchtower once staffed by soldiers warning off pedestrians was 
empty.  Taking an Uber from my accommodation in the southern part of Colombo, I 
arrived at the plush offices unsure of what to expect - I had asked to see the show 
apartment they advertised on their website, but was concerned my status as a student 
and researcher rather than a prospective buyer might make the staff less than 
enthusiastic about my presence.  Inside the One Galle Face offices, I was greeted 
with a mix of warmth and puzzlement at my interest in the property, but attended to 
nonetheless.  I was the only visitor on the premises. As I was shepherded through the 
complex and shown both miniature models of the planned luxury apartments as well 
as the life-sized show unit, I was struck by the juxtaposition of the highly detailed 
interiors of these luxury units, designed for an imaginary wealthy family, and the 
sight of workers, just on the other side of the glass windows, toiling in the sweltering 
midday sun.   
At the conclusion of my visit to One Galle Face, I met with one of the 
marketing directors for the project.  With a businesslike tone, she rapidly answered 
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my questions with the air of someone very practiced in these kinds of conversations.  
She told me the complex was scheduled to be completed in 2018, and explained the 
developers hoped buyers of the properties would be a mix of foreigners and locals - 
though she declined to give me further details.  Gesturing in the direction of the 
ocean, towards the construction sites visible in the distance, I asked whether the 
developers were worried some of the other major projects springing up so close by 
would be a problem, either by competing with the One Galle Face for buyers, or by 
obstructing the ocean view their promotional materials so clearly emphasized as a 
perk of living in these apartments. “No, it won’t disrupt anything,” she told me 
brusquely.  “Really?” I pushed her, finding it hard to believe.  Exasperatedly, she 
closed the interview by responding that “this area has heritage value.  It won’t ever 
change.”    
 
*** 
 I highlight my encounter with the One Galle Face complex and its staff 
because contrary to the words of the marketing director, it seems important to begin 
this study by remarking on just how much has changed in Colombo.  As my own 
experiences of Galle Face Green make clear, the end of the Sri Lankan civil war has 
had very noticeable effects on the uses of urban space in Colombo.  Though this 
dissertation focuses on ethnographic material collected and compiled after 2009, the 
implicit starting point for most of what is presented here is the end of the Sri Lankan 
civil conflict, which lasted for three decades and claimed many thousands of lives.1 
Many Sri Lankans, right up until the conflict came to its violent conclusion in May 
                                                
1 Exact figures of how many people were killed in the Sri Lankan civil war are highly 
controversial and hard to come by.  Much of this stems from the intense controversy over the 
government’s responsibility for killing civilians in the No Fire Zone at the close of the conflict. 
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2009, could not imagine that the war would actually ever end.  And yet, here we are: 
Sri Lanka now proudly declares itself a middle-income country, free of terrorism and 
conflict, and boasts a considerable tourism industry, new infrastructure projects and 
big plans for Colombo to become a global hub city.  What was unimaginable for 
many people only ten or twenty years ago is now reality.   
 This study explores the processes and projects taking place in Colombo today 
which aim to build, secure and propagate specific visions of the future related to life 
in the Sri Lankan capital.  The future is now: the civil war ended, and peace has 
held.2  But the arrival of one future quickly gave rise to even more talk about 
different futures.  The anxieties of wartime seem to have been replaced with 
different anxieties.  The World Bank, for example, speaks of the “peace dividend” - 
economic growth and foreign investment brought on by the end of the conflict - but 
warns that “going forward, economic growth will likely require continued structural 
changes towards greater diversification and productivity increases” (World Bank, 
2017).  The changes that the World Bank highlights in its writing on Sri Lanka are 
the need to transition away from an agriculturally based economy to a service 
economy; the Bank celebrates the current government’s commitment to “promoting 
a globally competitive, export-led economy with an emphasis on 
inclusion…generating one million job opportunities, enhancing income levels, 
development of rural economies and creating a wide and strong middle class as key 
policy priorities” (World Bank 2017).  The economic benefits brought on by the end 
of the war are often very quickly juxtaposed with mention of how Sri Lanka actually 
lags behind other Asian countries such as Vietnam, Thailand or Malaysia in critical 
                                                
2 It is important to note that this peace has come at a cost, and has also not meant that ethnic 
and religious tensions have been absent. 
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ways (Mills 2017, World Bank 2010).  The end of the Sri Lankan civil war has in 
many ways improved life for people from all ethnic and religious communities; it 
has also given rise to a new focus on comparison and competition as politicians seek 
to make up for lost time and accelerate the country’s development vis-a-vis 
neighboring countries.        
Colombo is currently at the center of many of these discussions about Sri 
Lanka’s future economic progress.  As the main site of industry and commerce, and 
home to most of the country’s corporate headquarters as well as the major maritime 
port, only functioning international airport, and a major railway station, “Colombo” 
often comes to stand metonymically for “Sri Lanka” in accounts of economic 
development (but not in terms of cultural “authenticity” - I will get to this later).  
Located on the western coast of the island, Colombo is Sri Lanka’s largest city and 
capital.  Home to roughly five million inhabitants when counting the entire 
metropolitan area, Colombo draws people from all over the country who migrate 
there for job opportunities.  The service-based economy celebrated by the World 
Bank and many Sri Lankan politicians will undoubtedly be centered in Colombo as 
the city expands and seeks to attract ever more diverse forms of capital.  Discussions 
about infrastructure in Sri Lanka often center on connecting Colombo to the rest of 
the island precisely because the unavoidable reality is that proximity to Colombo 
translates into greater economic opportunity (Asian Development Bank 2009, World 
Bank 2010). Importantly, the central neighborhoods of Colombo are also extremely 
diverse in ethnic, religious and class terms. Though surrounded by Sinhala-Buddhist 
suburbs and towns, Colombo’s multi-ethnic, multi-confessional identity makes it an 
exceptional place.      
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Contemporary dynamics of urban development in Colombo both reinforce 
and depart from the island’s postcolonial spatial politics.  Power, money and 
influence being concentrated in Colombo is certainly nothing new, and dates back to 
the colonial era (Roberts 1989, Dharmasena 1989, Perera 2002).  However, the post-
independence period of Sri Lankan history was also characterized by a deep concern 
for rural development, as politicians vied increasingly for the support of (particularly 
Sinhala-Buddhist) populations outside Colombo. Mick Moore (1984) has 
categorized Sri Lanka along the lines of core, inner periphery, outer periphery, 
extreme periphery, and Jaffna.  Colombo, unsurprisingly, is located in the “core” of 
Moore’s schema, along with the rest of the western province.  However, Moore also 
points to the fact that unlike other developing country economies, Sri Lanka had 
very low levels of rural-urban migration in the 1960s and 1970s (Moore 1984, 103); 
Sri Lanka’s strong record of state-provided services such as education and healthcare 
for all played a significant role in making rural and village life relatively appealing 
(Moore 1984, 103).  The current level of state involvement in marketing, beautifying 
and developing Colombo along the lines of other global cities thus represents a turn 
away from rural-focused, nationalized efforts at development and towards techniques 
of neoliberal governance which privilege cities as sites of commerce, wealth and 
knowledge (Brenner 2004, Ong 2006).  
The spatial dynamics of three decades of civil war play a further role in 
forming the contemporary regional divisions and disparities in Sri Lanka.  Though 
Colombo was affected by terrorist attacks and other forms of political violence 
beginning in the late 1970s until 2009, the city did not experience human suffering 
or destruction on the same level as the northern and eastern provinces, where most of 
the intense fighting between LTTE militants and the Sri Lankan Army took place.  
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During the 1990s, with the war still raging, most of the country’s growth and 
economic prosperity was concentrated in the Western Province (where Colombo is 
located), which saw its share of national GDP increase from 40.2 percent to 49.4 
percent in the period 1990-2000 (CBSL, various years).  Postwar analyses estimate 
about 40 percent of GDP concentrated in the Western Province (CBSL, 2016).  The 
North still lags far behind in virtually all human development indicators, which is 
unsurprising given that the population sustained nearly 30 years of civil war.  
However, while the distinction between quality of life and development in Colombo 
and the Northern Province could not be starker, spatial inequalities require more 
nuanced understanding.  Colombo was exceptional not only in its high 
concentrations of wealth and share of GDP vis-a-vis the war-stricken Northern 
Province, but it was also exceptional compared with rural, predominately Sinhalese 
areas not very far away from the capital (Venugopal 2011), and when juxtaposed 
with the central Estate areas.  In keeping with the general pattern of uneven 
development, the Western Province, while as a whole more prosperous than the rest 
of the island, also has higher levels of internal inequality than other provinces (Asian 
Development Bank 2009).  Wealth and development are never far - spatially or 
temporally - from their opposites.      
  This ethnography attends to the way that dispossession and aspiration are 
deeply intertwined in contemporary Colombo. It argues that global city-building 
proceeds through the dispossession of the urban poor, and builds a case for 
examining aspirational sites of luxury and global connection alongside spaces of 
poverty and exclusion. Through chapters exploring the different sites and spaces of 
Colombo’s rapid urban development, I offer an ethnographic examination of how 
urban elites and the urban poor experience this moment in wildly divergent ways. 
 17 
The juxtaposition of coastal fishermen and Chinese developers, marketplace vendors 
and marketing professionals working to sell luxury apartments, offers us an 
important entry point for understanding Colombo today.   
Uncertainty and incompleteness are thematic threads running through the whole 
of this manuscript, connecting the chapters on the urban poor and urban elites in 
ways that contrast with a purely class-based approach.  While the juxtapositions of 
urban experience are significant, I also emphasize throughout this ethnography that 
the project of making Colombo into a global hub city is one that is fraught with 
political debate, delays, interruptions, and uneven results.  Two of the four 
ethnographic chapters in this study emphasize the processes of dispossession which 
undergird the physical and symbolic transformation of Colombo. But, in the words 
of Abdou Maliq Simone, “the stories of the elite do not follow straight lines either” 
(2011, 112).  Dispossession is a daily and ongoing occurrence in Colombo, yet the 
aspirations of even the wealthiest are shown to be shaky, often left unrealized, as I 
highlight in the remaining chapters.  This manuscript highlights the contingent 
nature of the global city form.   
 As urban scholars increasingly turn attention to the study of “global cities” as 
well as the processes of global city-making, we see an increasing convergence of 
aesthetic standards, policy techniques and urban experiences.  The story of cities 
around the world attempting to become global cities/world-class cities or “hub” 
cities seems familiar.  And yet, while this ethnography explicitly and clearly uses the 
existing literature on global cities across the developing world to make sense of what 
is taking place in Colombo, it simultaneously makes an intervention into the study of 
global cities themselves.  Rather than view the global city model as an inevitable, 
monolithic outcome of definite processes (gentrification, speculation, dispossession, 
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financialization, liberalization) the chapters in this thesis present the global city as a 
highly contingent urban form - one that has to be actively imagined and brought into 
being.  The future represented by the global city is far from guaranteed.  
Additionally, while the dream of achieving global city status includes numerous - 
sometimes eerie -  similarities across diverse sites, I suggest that in each place the 
global city model is inflected with the specific dreams and histories of the people 
who labor to make it a reality.  As my readers join me in this ethnographic 
exploration, I invite them to consider the future of Colombo not as foreclosed by a 
single urban vision, but rather as open with myriad possibilities.   
*** 
Let me return to the Galle Face Green.  The Galle Face Green is a place that 
“sits in the midst of intense temporal meanings” (Choy 2011: 38).  That is to say, the 
Green conjures associations with Colombo’s past, present and future, often 
simultaneously.  Relatedly, the Galle Face Green also offers an evocation of other 
places even as it is the quintessential public space of Colombo: as an informant of 
mine who recalled his childhood days playing at the Green in the 1970s put it, “I 
often compare it to Central Park in New York City.”  As will be made clear in what 
follows, these temporal and geographic comparisons and cross-references play an 
important role in shaping how Colombo’s future is imagined.    
This thesis is not “about” the Galle Face Green in any explicit or structured 
way, but Galle Face figures, in big and small ways, throughout this ethnography.  
The ethnographic vignettes I offered at the beginning of this introduction manage to 
be the perfect representation of the dynamics I explore in this dissertation: rapid 
urban development, often involving competing and overlapping construction 
projects; the emergence of increasingly extravagant and exclusive residence and 
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leisure spaces alongside the declining value of public spaces; and the uses and values 
of coastal land.  All of these phenomena owe their existence to the end of the civil 
war and the de-militarization of space in Colombo; the removal of the military 
watchtowers on a prime piece of land like the Galle Face Green metaphorically and 
literally paves the way for the construction of a luxury complex like the One Galle 
Face.        
Galle Face Green is the site of construction of the Colombo Port City project, 
which I describe in Chapter 2.  The Green is a feature of the stories of the fishermen 
whom I introduce in Chapter 3.  It both differs from and shares some important 
features with the new suite of public spaces inaugurated after the end of the civil 
war, one of which – the Pettah Floating Market – I study in depth in Chapter 4.  And, 
naturally, its recent association with luxury real estate makes it relevant to my 
analysis of this topic in Chapter 5.  Incidentally, Galle Face Green is also one of the 
few spaces in Colombo today that conjures not only different temporal meanings, but 
class meanings as well: though today it is often derided as a grimy hang-out spot for 
the city’s working class and poorer residents, its photograph is frequently splashed 
across tour guides and magazines, and it remains a required stop on tourist itineraries 
of the city.  Historically, the Galle Face Green was a site of elite Colombo culture 
and sporting events (Roberts 1989) and something of its elite tinge remains even 
today as most of the descendants of the old colonial era families, along with the 
nouveaux riches, prefer to spend their time indoors in the air-conditioned malls and 
hotel lobbies of central Colombo.  As I have stated, the Galle Face Green is a logical 
place to begin any story about Colombo, precisely because it manages to be so 
central, both physically and metaphorically, to many Colombo residents’ 
understandings of their city.        
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The stark juxtaposition of the cool interior of the One Galle Face with the 
laborers working just on the other side of the glass in the hot sun indexes some of the 
larger trends in Colombo’s urban development. People of different classes are 
separated but close; luxury and labor appear as opposites but are, in fact, intimately 
intertwined. In the next section, I turn to a discussion of the dynamics of 
development and dispossession, examining how and why dispossession is so central 
to the process of global city-making.   
 
Development and Dispossession 
 
“Indeed, many … are being actively dispossessed as part of the effort to build up a 
world city based on a speculative imaginary for world-city investors who may just 
stay away, and for world-city professionals who have yet to come.” (Goldman 2011, 
577) 
 
Recent studies of Global South cities have cast critical attention on the making of 
“world-class” urban centers (Ghertner 2015, Goldman 2013, Ong and Roy 2011, 
Harms 2012).  Urban theory has historically been Eurocentric (Roy and Ong 2011), 
drawing on the experiences and histories of European and Northern cities to explain 
urban experiences throughout the world.  But with the rise of cities like Dubai, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Bangalore and Shanghai (to name a few) to increasingly important 
status in the global economy, it becomes clear that Global South cities must be not 
peripheral but central to our understandings of urban theory and urban politics.  
Despite some approaches which might characterize ours as an age (or a planet) of 
slums (Davis 2007), urban chaos and immiseration, the experiences of many 
developing country cities - particularly in Asia - have in fact been very different, 
characterized instead by strong state control and often by spectacular wealth and 
growing middle class populations.  The rise of these Global South urban centers has 
been accompanied by trends such as increasing real estate speculation (Goldman 
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2011); the partitioning and securitization of urban spaces and the rise in middle class 
enclaves of separation from the rest of the urban landscape (Caldeira 2001); the 
degradation and devaluation of public spaces (Kaviraj 1997); increasingly classed 
and gendered modes of transport through urban space (de Koening 2009); and, often, 
the reliance of the urban poor on informal or improvisational techniques for survival 
(Simone 2004).      
 This thesis builds and expands on these scholarly conversations in the context of 
Colombo.  One way in which the importance of the major Global South cities listed 
above becomes clear is through the relentless use of comparison and analogy to 
define what Colombo should be like.  My research indicated that London, Sydney 
and New York were not the main focus of Colombo residents’ urban aspirations - 
even if many of my middle class participants had family members living in these 
cities, or wished to migrate there themselves.  Instead, my ethnographic observations 
reveal the enduring and powerful hold of cities like Singapore and Dubai in the 
Colombo imagination, a finding echoed in other Asian and African metropolitan 
settings (Ong and Roy 2011; Melly 2013).  This manuscript delves into the specific 
ways that Colombo is being re-imagined, and re-shaped, in ways that aim to make it 
resemble cities like Dubai and Singapore.  The stark divide between the way most 
people experience daily life in Colombo and how they imagine things to be in other 
aspirational city spaces is the driving force behind most current efforts to bring about 
change in the urban landscape.  But how exactly does Colombo become like Dubai? 
What processes are required to make such a transformation possible?    
My ethnography points to the ways that dispossession and urban development 
are intertwined in Colombo today.  Following contemporary Marxist analyses which 
point to primitive accumulation not as an isolated, historical incident preceding 
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capitalist development but rather an ongoing process that constitutes part of 
everyday life under capitalism (Harvey 2004, Sanyal 2007, Li 2009, Glassman 
2006), I understand dispossession as a pressing topic of continued relevance for 
making sense of the way that poor urban residents are marginalized and excluded 
from the prosperity that seems to abound in Colombo.  What exactly is meant by 
dispossession? Because this term is so central to the rest of the dissertation, it 
behooves me to discuss it in some detail here. 
In later chapters of Capital Volume 1, Marx introduces the concept of primitive 
accumulation as the “original sin” of capitalism, the process which allows capitalists 
to acquire labor and capital and sets in motion a  process of shifting people from 
agricultural, rural, peasant economies to proletarian labor under capitalist conditions.  
David Harvey has famously rephrased “primitive accumulation” as “accumulation 
by dispossession” (2004) and demonstrates that the logic of accumulation by 
dispossession can be seen in multiple contemporary processes, from increasingly 
rapacious forms of speculative finance to intellectual property rights regimes to 
cultural commodification, and to “the corporatization and privatization of hitherto 
public assets (like universities) to say nothing of the wave of privatization of water 
and other public utilities that has swept the world, constitute a new wave of 
‘enclosing the commons.’” (Harvey 2004: 75).      
Following a long tradition of Marxist urban scholarship (eg. Harvey 2004, 
Elyachar 2005, Harms 2012, Smith 1984), this thesis focuses on dispossession in 
contexts both similar to and different from those envisioned by Marx himself, 
namely those happening within urban spaces - as opposed to those in which rural 
populations are forced to move to the city in order to become part of the proletarian 
workforce.  The broadly similar dynamics present in urban spaces across the world 
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today, as listed above, include in many locations the eviction and relocation of the 
urban poor to create neighborhoods that aesthetically and infrastructurally match the 
idea of what a “global city” should look like.  Colombo is no exception to this 
pattern.  A small city with rapidly increasing land prices in the central districts, 
Colombo has been the stage for many mass evictions carried out since the end of the 
civil war in which poor urban residents - often part of multi-ethnic and multi-
religious communities - have been moved from valuable land in the city center to 
housing projects constructed on the outskirts.  Through the language of 
“beautification” and “slum clearance,” such acts are justified by pointing to the 
presence of low-income communities in central Colombo as an aberration, a result of 
poor planning, and thus something to be “corrected” by moving them to less 
valuable land.  As Marx himself observed in Capital, the language of law and order 
is very effective in justifying dispossession.  
Where I differ from some accounts of dispossession is in my focus on the fuzzy 
temporalities and unclear ends of dispossession as a tactic of capitalist urban 
development (Harms 2013).  Following the insights of Tania Li (2009), I emphasize 
that dispossession and accumulation are often decoupled in Colombo. As will 
become clear in my chapters on the Pettah Floating Market and the Mutuwall fishing 
community, not all acts of dispossession in Colombo necessarily have an obvious 
aim, or can be properly said to accomplish the transformation of non-capitalist forms 
of sociality and economy into capitalist ones.  In the case of the Floating Market 
vendors, for example, dispossession takes place by transferring small merchants 
from more lucrative spaces to a less successful one.  With regards to the fishermen in 
Mutuwall, the actual moment of dispossession/eviction has not yet happened, rather 
it looms on the horizon as an imminent but not-fully-realized future.  Both of these 
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cases point to the fact that building a “world class” city, transforming Colombo into 
a global hub, is an ongoing, messy process.  It is happening, it is not complete - and 
may never be.  It is this uncertainty, this unclear endpoint, which lends a further level 
of both injustice and possibility to the dynamics I describe.  On the one hand, as in 
the case of the Floating Market, the relocation of vendors to accommodate projects 
that never happen and to place them in a space that is clearly not successfully 
attracting customers is a further reminder of the fact that forcing them from their 
original shops was a decision without much merit, as it hasn’t translated into any 
typical form of “successful” urban development.  On the other hand, perhaps, the 
fact that the building of a global hub city is still ongoing may actually mean that 
certain possibilities are still open for challenging, resisting or more subtly 
negotiating the relationships between the state and urban citizens.  Throughout this 
dissertation, I urge my readers to keep in mind that the results of Colombo’s post-
war push for urban development are still far from final.    
The ethnographic findings of this dissertation reveal a strong split between the 
aspirational images and future-oriented imaginaries of Colombo and present-day 
reality in the city.  In videos, print, digital media, and in conversations, Colombo’s 
future is quite clearly envisioned as being that of a “global” city.  What is remarkable 
in some ways is the uniformity of such images.  Very little debate seems to take place 
about the end goals of these processes of urban development, even if the methods for 
achieving it may be subject to contestation.  Despite the fact that the two major 
political parties, the SLFP and UNP, were engaged in two hotly contested elections 
during the period of my research, their agendas for Colombo’s future barely differed 
from one another.  Equally striking is the fact that Colombo residents themselves 
rarely, if ever, question the idea that their city will one day be like Singapore or 
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Dubai.  What appeared quite obvious to me as ethnographer - the enormous amount 
of labor, money, and political transformation that would be required to make this 
happen - was not a concern for most of my informants, whether they were poor, 
middle class, or wealthy.3    
My ethnographic engagement with Colombo residents made me acutely aware of 
the power beautiful images of an urban future often have over urban dwellers from 
all walks of life.  Echoing the observations of urban scholars like Erik Harms (2012), 
Asher Ghertner (2015), and Filip de Boeck (2011), I was often surprised by the 
extent to which the seemingly exclusionary talk of Colombo’s future as a “global 
hub” actually appealed to many of the same people whom it seemed would be most 
negatively affected by these exact projects.  For example, even though I met the 
fishermen in Mutuwall (introduced in Chapter 3) through social activists organizing 
them against the construction of the Colombo Port City project, I was surprised 
when, after several months of fieldwork in the community, an older fisher told me 
that despite his objections to the project it was important that fishers not be selfish, 
and “think only of their stomachs”; “if it is for the good of the country, then we must 
support it” he told me.  In general, my field notes from this research are peppered 
with references to the surprising ways in which urban residents often accepted, or 
reacted ambivalently to, development plans that would lead to their eviction, loss of 
livelihood, or otherwise have deleterious impact on their daily lives.  Dispossession 
of urban poor people becomes difficult to combat when the urban poor themselves 
see the appeal in the idea of a world-class city.  In the next section of this 
                                                
3 The only real critiques of Colombo’s “global city” aspirations that I encountered on my 
fieldwork came from activists and clergy members who had been immersed in the Leftist struggles of 
the 1970s and 1980s and who used Marxism and Liberation Theology to criticize the current forms of 
urbanization. 
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introduction, I consider how the dynamics between the Sri Lankan state and citizenry 
have shaped the way Colombo’s development is unfolding.   
 
State, Citizens and Urban Development 
  
The Sri Lankan state plays a critical role in conceptualizing, implementing and 
managing urban development in Colombo.  Despite some analyses which might 
suggest the lessening importance of the state under contemporary neoliberal 
conditions, my ethnography reiterates the findings of many scholars, particularly 
those working in Asia, who emphasize the enduring importance of the state and 
statehood as opposed to its decline (Ghertner 2015, Ong 2006, Brenner 2004). The 
Sri Lankan state is a major actor in both nation-wide development and in the 
attempts to make Colombo a global hub.  
 Sri Lanka has a long history of social democratic welfare policies and state 
interventions which have benefitted the population at large.  However, the population 
often imagined in such efforts was the majority Sinhala-Buddhist rural population, to 
the exclusion of other minority ethnic and religious groups.  Spatially, this has had 
real implications for how a map of Sri Lanka might be drawn, and how the island 
territory is understood.  The need to appeal to a rural, peasant, Sinhala-Buddhist 
majority population means that areas outside Colombo were often targeted for 
development projects (Lynch 1999, Brow 1990).  However, questions or territory 
and people are rarely straightforward; Sri Lanka is not only home to Sinhala-
Buddhists, and the northeastern edges of the primarily Sinhalese ‘core’ (Moore 
1984) border areas of the country long inhabited by Tamils and Muslims, ethnic and 
religious “others” to the nationalist imaginaries which took hold following Sri 
Lankan independence.  Projects like the ambitious Mahaweli Development Scheme 
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initiated in the 1980s were ways for the state to push Sinhalese farmers into 
peripheral areas, causing many to view it as a form of internal colonization 
(Tennekoon 1988).  The civil war itself primarily raged in areas far from the capital; 
both in terms of development and security, the view of the Sri Lankan state was, for 
many decades, trained on the hinterlands.   
 The focus on developing Colombo into a world-class or global hub city 
represents a fundamentally new way for the Sri Lankan state to “see” (Scott 1998) 
the territory under its control, and there are still tensions between different visions. 
The focus on building up a capital city as a site of wealth accumulation, foreign 
investment and luxury mirrors the worldwide trend away from the “spatial 
Keynesianism” of the mid-20th century (Brenner 2004) to the contemporary realities 
of neoliberal conditions in which cities are privileged as nodes of wealth in broader 
transnational networks (Sassen 2001, Ong 2006). In Sri Lanka, specific historical 
representations and understandings of identity make the focus on Colombo notable. 
Colombo has long been associated with moral, ethnic and religious impurity (Lynch 
1999, Spencer 2015) and it still behooves Sri Lankan politicians to invoke ideas of 
rural or peasants roots in appealing to the population (Wickremasinghe 2009).  And 
yet, despite the cultural importance of peasant-ness as a legible and sympathetic 
identity, the renewed focus on Colombo’s development as an economic engine for 
the Sri Lanka is undeniable.    
 Given the context of a state which historically provided ample healthcare, 
education and other social services to citizens, the “declarations of dependence” 
(Ferguson 2013) articulated by many of the urban poor in Colombo are hardly 
surprising.  As discussed above, urban residents frequently comply with and accept 
government projects that often seem to negatively impact their lives and livelihoods.  
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In conversations with my informants in Colombo, it became abundantly clear that 
the state was an ever-present, even intimate presence in people’s lives.   “He ended 
the war and I thank him every day for that,” a middle class housewife in Colombo 5 
told me one day, speaking of former President Mahinda Rajapakse as we sat on her 
verandah drinking tea.  “They’re changing everything, we don’t know what they’ll 
do next!” exclaimed another woman I interviewed, when I asked her about the 
various road construction and improvement projects dotting her neighborhood in the 
southern part of the city.  “He”, “they” and other intimate pronouns were often used 
in place of proper names of politicians or government agencies.  For the less well-off 
among my informants - notably the fishermen I encountered in northern Colombo 
and the marketplace vendors at the Pettah Floating Market - the state was invoked in 
similar terms of familiarity and closeness as even as these groups complained that 
“they” should be doing more to help them, to help them out of poverty.  
 Readers will note that one of the more striking absences in this ethnography is 
any kind of municipal level governing body.  My account of urban development 
unfolding in Colombo today reveals the extent to which urban residents framed and 
understood the changes happening in the urban environment around them as the 
direct result of national level state policies.  The Urban Development Authority 
(UDA), was usually the agency responsible for implementing these changes.  But as 
a sub-agency of the national-level Ministry of Defense and Urban Development, 
initially headed by former President Rajapakse’s brother, the UDA is not equivalent 
to a locally-elected urban governing body.  Though there is a Mayor of Colombo and 
municipal councils do exist, the fact that none of my informants regularly mentioned 
these institutions in repeated interviews and conversations speaks volumes about 
how scales of power and authority are understood in Colombo today.   
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 The very name of the Ministry of Defense and Urban Development indicates 
the link between the post-conflict moment and the project of urban development. As 
I describe in subsequent chapters, the end of the civil war was seen as a major 
opportunity for Sri Lanka to attain the development which had eluded it throughout 
its postcolonial history. “We’d be like Malaysia now, if it weren’t for the war,” a Sri 
Lankan acquaintance who worked for the US Embassy told me once. The idea that 
the postwar moment represented a valuable chance to get “back on track” was 
echoed by the Sri Lankan government itself, which in 2009, the end of the war, was 
headed by President Mahinda Rajapakse. Eschewing any kind of political settlement 
with the LTTE, Rajapakse brought the civil war to a decisive but bloody end, 
obliterating the Tigers once and for all. In 2010, his brother Gothabaya presided over 
the creation of the new Ministry, which was widely criticized for its heavy-handed, 
militarized approach to development.  Mass evictions of urban residents were the 
norm in the years following the end of the war, and both in and outside of Colombo, 
the government was roundly critiqued for using Sri Lankan Army soldiers to carry 
out the work of development. 
 In January 2015, to the surprise of most Sri Lankans and the rest of the world, 
Mahinda Rajapakse was unexpectedly ousted in a peaceful democratic transition 
which saw Ranil Wickremasinghe, former prime minister and leader of the 
opposition, come to power together with Maithripala Sirisena, a defector from 
Rajapakse’s own camp. Later chapters detail more carefully how this political 
transition was experienced by informants, and how it impacted various projects of 
urban development. However, here I wish to highlight the fact that the transition in 
government did not necessarily represent a shift in state involvement in the process 
of transforming Colombo into a global hub city. While the new government appeared 
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to change directions on a few specific projects (most notably the Colombo Port City, 
which I address in Chapter 2), it too employed the language of the global hub in 
laying out visions for Colombo’s future. The Sirisena-Wickremasinghe government 
eventually created a new ministry, the Ministry of Megapolis and Western 
Development, which ultimately incorporated many of the same projects into its plan 
for Colombo. At no point was the state’s role in urban development questioned, 
rather it took on different forms and names.       
 
Moving Around and Staying Still: Methodological Reflections 
 
This thesis is based on 12 months of ethnographic fieldwork carried out in 
Colombo between October 2014 and June 2016, with the majority of the research 
taking place over the course of the year 2015.  By immersing myself in Colombo life 
over a considerable period of time, I was able to gain an appreciation for how urban 
residents experienced and made sense of development projects and political change 
as they unfolded.  For example, through my long-term ethnographic engagement 
with Colombo, I witnessed not only the hopeful aftermath of the January 2015 
election but also the many months of uncertainty following it, as Sri Lankans waited 
to hear when subsequent parliamentary elections would take place, and who would 
emerge victorious.  This kind of immersion in the rhythms of city life over a long 
period of time allowed me to grasp processes that would otherwise have been 
unavailable to me had I merely conducted targeted interviews, focus groups, or 
surveys.  
My research did not focus on a single community, population, or urban 
neighborhood.  Rather, my interest lay in tracing processes of urban development 
and the kinds of discussions and debates these processes engendered.  As such, this 
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is a multi-sited ethnography that unfolds through engagement with numerous 
different places in the city of Colombo where I found such conversations to be 
particularly pressing and relevant. Four sites/topics in particular form the core of this 
study: 1) the Colombo Port City project; 2) the fishing community in Mutuwall 
(northern Colombo); 3) the Pettah Floating Market and 4) luxury real estate 
development.  The chapters of this dissertation are arranged according to these 
sites/topics.  However, as my chapters also make clear, I find it most instructive not 
to look at these as discrete, bounded, isolated “examples,” which individually 
represent a larger trend in Colombo’s urban development.  Rather, my ethnography 
points to the overlapping, blurry, sometimes confusing ways in which these various 
sites are connected.  For instance, the fishermen at Mutuwall are directly impacted 
by the Colombo Port City project, and initially many of my conversations with them 
focused on this issue.  However, it was only through repeated visits to the 
neighborhood and deepening relationships with specific informants that I came to 
see how many other things were actually happening in the area.  Most memorably, as 
I explain in Chapter 3, I initially approached the Mutuwall fishing community as one 
being negatively impacted by the Port City project.  It was only after conducting 
fieldwork there for some time that I discovered the fishers were in fact living under 
the threat of eviction by state agencies, a process which had begun before - and 
would likely continue independently of - the Port City construction.     
  It is worth remarking that the portions of the dissertation dealing with the urban 
poor are also those that are most clearly anchored in specific places, while the 
portions focused on elite visions of Colombo are more about tracing conversations, 
ideas and concerns.  When I wanted to speak with one of the fishermen or market 
vendors, I knew exactly what to do: I would get in a three-wheeler, bus, or taxi and 
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travel to their neighborhood, hoping to find them in their usual spot.  It usually 
worked.  By contrast, when my research called for a meeting with a business 
executive, an urban planner or government official, I often had to go through the 
time-intensive process of getting their phone number or email address (usually by 
asking around to see if a contact I already had could give me this information), and 
typically had to make repeated attempts to reach the person in question.  Once they 
agreed to meet me, I might meet them in any number of places (their office, a 
restaurant or one of the major hotels), and almost always had to do so at their 
convenience - that is, I knew that these informants were busy, often meeting me 
between other obligations, and I was lucky to catch them at all.   
This simple description of how I contacted different informants makes 
uncomfortably vivid a seeming distinction between the urban poor as anchored in 
place and the urban middle classes and elites as freed from the constraints of locality 
- mobile, flexible and always traveling.  I say seeming because of course such a 
distinction is misleading: poverty does not stop mobility, in fact it often encourages 
it.  As I allude to in my chapters on these low-income communities, many of the 
urban poor in Colombo have their own forms of connection to other places, their 
own histories and patterns of migration, their own cosmopolitanisms.  By the same 
token, elites too belong to places and neighborhoods, congregate in specific 
locations, and are rooted in local histories.  I do not wish to overstate the divide 
between elite mobility and working-class stasis.  However, the difference in the ways 
that my wealthier and poorer informants emerge in this text - and the way in which I 
engaged with them in the course of my research - speaks, I believe, to some 
interesting facts about how Colombo is developing.   
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The idea of Colombo as a “global hub” (which I discuss in detail in Chapter 1) 
implicitly conjures images of movement, circulation and mobility.  But the kind of 
hubness that official discourse about Colombo celebrates is not the kind in evidence 
on crowded flights to the Gulf states, for instance, where hundreds of thousands of 
Sri Lankans are employed as laborers, nannies, housemaids, drivers or other working 
class professions. Desired hubness is implicitly that of the elites.  As I make clear in 
the subsequent chapters of this ethnography, the conflation of mobility and 
“hubness” with elite or middle class identities has profound implications for the kind 
of development taking place in Colombo today.  
By looking at Colombo more broadly, neither from the perspective of an 
individual neighborhood or specific project, I sometimes worried that I was missing 
out on the experience of conducting more “traditional” ethnography. I was concerned 
that I moved around too much, and stayed still too little. Very few ethnographies I 
have encountered offer candid descriptions that match my experiences of zooming 
around the city frantically trying to meet an informant before the onset of traffic, of 
being in multiple neighborhoods all on the same day, traversing Colombo from north 
to south, and crossing over between distinct ethnic, religious and class spaces all in 
the space of a few hours.4  
  However, any ethnography is also a product of the circumstances in which it is 
produced; the multi-sited nature of my own study, its broad focus on processes and 
conversations about development, reflects the fact that while I was doing my 
fieldwork, it was truly impossible to focus on only one place, or one project 
happening in Colombo. My sometimes jarring experiences of moving fast and 
                                                
4 Of course, my ability to do this was contingent upon many factors including my income, 
flexible schedule and whiteness. It was made more difficult by my gender and age. 
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getting stuck, of chasing, rushing, changing course, allowed me to grasp the jagged 
contrasts between different realities that I attempt to highlight in this thesis. Rather 
than conforming to common journalistic tropes in writing about Global South cities 
in which the lifestyles of rich and poor are superficially juxtaposed for western 
readers, my aim in drawing out these contrasts is to inquire more deeply into ways 
that aspirational projects and dispossession are intertwined in the project of building 
a global hub city.   
My wider perspective on Colombo’s development allowed me to see that the 
change in government had, in some ways, had very little impact on the actual 
substantive work of urban development.  As I show at various points throughout this 
manuscript, the goals and plans of the new 2015 government and those of the 
Rajapakse government were remarkably similar.  The drive to create a world-class 
city (Ghertner 2015), a global hub attracting wealthy tourists and foreign investors, 
was larger than any single political party or leader.   
Finally and perhaps most importantly, my approach to research reflects the fact 
that over the course of 2015 in Sri Lanka, no one - not even the experts in 
government agencies, NGOs, or international institutions - really knew what was 
going on.  And, even more importantly, very little work was actually occurring; as I 
discuss in my chapter on the Colombo Port City project, for example, the change in 
government led to long period of stasis in which even high up people at the UDA, 
within the CHEC, etc. did not know what was actually happening. The ethnographic 
method, by definition, involves the researcher’s immersion into the world of her 
informants and sites. I was just as confused as everyone else in Colombo about what 
was going to happen with regards to national politics, urban development and 
foreign policy. Like my informants of all classes and ethnicities, I was frequently 
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caught up in the confusion of the moment, in which talk of the future was ample but 
understanding of the present seemed out of reach. In each of my chapters, these 
tensions between future vs. present and official knowledge vs. on-the-ground 
realities are explored more deeply.      
  
Chapter Summaries 
 
This thesis contains five chapters.  Four of the chapters are associated with one 
of the sites or topics which formed the basis of my multi-sited ethnography.  The 
remaining chapter is a conceptual exploration of the implications of Sri Lanka’s 
aspirations to hub city status. Because the chapters do not proceed temporally but 
rather are organized by site, readers will note that timelines and events described in 
each often overlap.  In some cases the events described at one site are interpreted and 
recounted differently at another.   
In Chapter 1, “The Politics of Hubness,” I provide a discursive analysis of the 
way that Colombo is symbolically imagined as an emerging hub city in the Asia-
Pacific region.  Drawing on media reports, politicians’ speeches and blog posts, I 
show the persistence of hub imagery in representing Sri Lanka’s postwar future and 
its cosmopolitan past.  Based on these and scholarly debates about Sri Lankan 
history, I offer a lens for reading Sri Lankan history as one of (dis)connection.  I 
explore the way that Colombo and Sri Lanka’s location form the basis for hubness 
discourse, and show that what often appear to be straightforward accounts of 
geographical “facts” are often political moves which in fact serve to frame Sri 
Lanka’s future as linked with an “Indian Ocean” identity rather than a more narrow 
conception of Sri Lanka as belonging to “South Asia.” Such geographical reframings 
are in fact laden with significance, as they suggest different futures linked to distinct 
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spatial locations.  Whereas a South Asian identity becomes understood as provincial 
and lacking, an Indian Ocean or broadly “Asian” identity instead is construed as a 
sign of progress, wealth and development.  Hubness, therefore, is both a spatial and 
temporal claim.    
The Colombo Port City project is the basis of Chapter 2. Informed by my 
ethnographic engagement with anti-Port City activists, middle class Colombo 
residents, government officials and corporate representatives of the Chinese 
corporation funding the project, I discuss the Port City controversy surrounding the 
project and the debates it engendered about Sri Lankan sovereignty. The Port City 
controversy revealed different forms of nationalism at play among my informants.  
Ultimately, both the uncertainty surrounding the specifics of the Colombo Port City 
project and the new forms of nationalism it seems to have elicited highlight the fact 
that the transformation of Colombo into a hub city in the Indian Ocean region is a 
fraught and uncertain process.  Hubness does not proceed smoothly, but rather can be 
interrupted at various points.  
The Colombo Port City has major implications for the fishing community I 
introduce in Chapter 3. The slow, messy process of dispossession of the fisher 
community in Mutuwall offers new ways of thinking dispossession in general, not as 
a clear linear process with defined outcomes, but rather as a complex and 
occasionally contradictory set of intersecting moments, plans and projects. My 
ethnographic engagement with the fishermen of Mutuwall suggests new ways of 
thinking the temporalities and spatialities of emerging global cities.  The presence of 
the fishermen, I argue, troubles both Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist and liberal 
cosmopolitan perspectives which would assume the strict division of village and city 
life.  Rather than relegating the fishermen to the role of provincial pre-capitalist 
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subjects, this chapter considers the possibility of a politics of “coevality” (Choy 
2011) which acknowledges the simultaneous (coeval) existence of different forms of 
labor and life in the heart of a global city.  
 Chapter 4 shifts its focus away from the Colombo coastline to another 
neighborhood of the city, Pettah, where I explore a new but unsuccessful public 
space opened by the previous government and occupied by primarily working class 
vendors who were relocated (against their will) into the new marketplace.  In this 
chapter, I ask what it might mean when global city plans and projects go awry. My 
ethnographic engagement with the marketplace vendors highlights that confinement 
- feeling trapped in the unsuccessful and economically unviable space of the Pettah 
Floating Market - is central to the experiences of the urban poor who have been 
relocated by the former government.  This provides a sharp contrast with the ideals 
of “hubness” which emphasize mobility and smooth movement of people and 
commodities.   
 Chapter 5 turns attention to the phenomenon of luxury real estate 
development in Colombo. With skyrocketing land prices and ongoing construction 
visible everywhere in central Colombo, real estate is a topic of everyday 
conversation and interest. My analysis focuses on the incomplete, partial nature of 
luxury buildings and what they represent, and on the behind-the-scenes labor of 
those who work in this field. I suggest that the luxury real estate boom in Colombo is 
best understood as an ongoing and deeply uncertain project, an example of what 
Arjun Appadurai refers to as “dreamwork” (2015).  By highlighting problems such 
as potential oversupply of luxury units and widespread fears of an impending 
economic crash, this chapter underscores that the aspirations and optimistic 
projections of developers are far from becoming reality.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE POLITICS OF HUBNESS 
 
When I was conducting my fieldwork in Colombo, Sri Lanka, the atmosphere 
was alive with talk of location.  Government officials, business people, media 
sources all seemed to be repeating the same refrain: “Sri Lanka is positioned to 
become a global hub,” or “a regional hub” or “a gateway to South Asia.” The notion 
of Sri Lanka as a site of exchange, flow and transit – as a node in a larger network, a 
connecting point between some places and other places – was emerging as both an 
understanding of the current state of affairs and a wish for the future.  Colombo 
becoming a global hub, I soon realized, was an idea that had to do not only with 
leveraging its location in the middle of the Indian Ocean, but it was also about 
conjuring an aspirational vision of the future.  In this chapter I develop an idea which 
I refer to as “the politics of hubness.” By using this term I highlight the contested, 
uncertain and ongoing nature of these diverse claims and imaginaries of Sri Lanka 
and Colombo as global “hubs.” My interest lies not in assessing whether or not 
Colombo is or can actually become an international hub, but rather in interrogating 
how and why this vision is so powerful to many residents of the city, and to 
politicians, businesspeople and planners. 
 Hubness is both a spatial and temporal claim.  In acknowledging both 
elements of aspirations towards hubness, the temporal introduces contingency into 
our understanding of the spatial.  After all, the center of the world is a relative 
concept: today’s center may be tomorrow’s periphery and vice versa.  The intense 
desire to make Colombo a hub city rests on referencing and recalling the success of 
cities like Singapore and Dubai that have achieved the indicators and benchmarks of 
development which many people in Colombo see as beautiful dreams.  Hubness 
speaks to a certain vision of the future, a vision which borrows heavily from the 
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already-existing present of other places.  This is tied up with the relentless optimism 
which characterizes much journalistic and policy discourse on the emergence of 
Asian cities and economies, the repeated assertion that we are entering a so-called 
“Asian century.” As urban theorist Ananya Roy has pointed out with regards to this 
notion of an “Asian century,” temporality comes to matter in new ways: “instead of 
positioning the Asian century as the future, or even as one vector in the multiplicity 
of capitalism’s futures…futurity itself becomes a mode of governing (Roy 2016: 
318).  In other words, to say that hubness is both a spatial and temporal claim is to 
acknowledge that aspirational imaginings of Colombo and Sri Lanka draw not only 
on the seemingly self-evident and immutable fact of its location, but also on a 
specific vision of the future.   
 Hubness as a concept connects different sites and topics across the city of 
Colombo, including the ones that form the bases of subsequent chapters in this 
dissertation.  The Colombo Port City project, the relocation of coastal communities, 
the failure of new public spaces to draw visitors and the troubles faced by the luxury 
real estate industry, all represent, in different ways, the possibilities and limits of 
hubness.  The Port City and the luxury real estate phenomenon both rely on 
aspirational ideas about Sri Lanka’s importance in the Asia-Pacific/Indian Ocean 
region, and on the supposed “inevitability” of foreign visitors and commercial 
connections as sources of wealth and progress.  By contrast, the ramshackle fishing 
shanties of northern Colombo or the empty and dilapidated spaces of Pettah 
represent forms of connection that are less valued.  The people who live and work in 
these spaces are deemed “quintessential locals” (Subramanian 2009) and assumed to 
be insufficiently cosmopolitan vis-a-vis the grander ambitions of politicians, the 
middle class and elites.  However, connections of other kinds exist. As I show in the 
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chapters corresponding to these sites, the urban poor have their own forms of 
connection which escape the gaze of zealous planners.  And there are other forms of 
local, trans-island connection that matter.  A neighborhood like Pettah carries with it 
negative associations of poverty and crime, but it also functions as an important 
locus of commerce and trade for the whole island - people and commodities from the 
rest of Sri Lanka travel to and from Pettah, connecting it with the world beyond 
Colombo.   
 Connection itself is both highly politicized and an object of intense longing 
and desire.  For many of my middle and upper class informants, Colombo’s former 
greatness was expressed through the number of residents who claimed European 
heritage (either Europeans born abroad who had come to Sri Lanka, or burghers), 
and through its shipping links with other cities in Asia.  People often shook their 
heads in wonderment at the idea that they used to go to Jaffna or other parts of 
formerly LTTE-controlled territory for weekend getaways.  Connection and mobility 
were things many people I came to know actively aspired towards, or they were 
powerful memories of better times in the pre-war past. The end of the war 
represented not only the beginning of a better future, but specifically a better future 
that might reinstate some of the more pleasant memories of the past.  The influx of 
foreign tourists to Sri Lanka was seen as a hopeful sign that some measure of peace 
and normalcy had returned; on the other hand, this flow was unidirectional, and 
many of my informants would very much have liked to make the reverse journey, 
from Sri Lanka to somewhere far away like Australia, Europe or North America, in 
search of a better life.  Connection exists not only through material links, but also 
through imaginative labor that values and celebrates certain kinds of connections 
over others.               
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 There are some key questions that I invite readers to keep in mind as they 
read through this chapter, and also through the dissertation as a whole.  Rather than 
present concrete answers, I introduce these questions here as a source of tension that 
help frame and add complexity to our understanding of the idea of hubness.  The 
first question concerns the difference between global/international and 
domestic/local hubs.  How can we think about the relationship between Colombo’s 
externally-oriented hubness (I.e., as a peer of Dubai or Singapore) and its internally 
oriented hubness as Sri Lanka’s major city and capital of commerce, finance, 
education and political institutions (I.e.a peer of Kandy, Galle and Jaffna)? The 
second question has to do with inequality.  Who or what gets left out of narratives 
about Colombo becoming a global hub? What subjects and relationships are 
privileged by such a narrative, and what might be erased? Finally, a third question 
relates to academic knowledge production and challenges a hard distinction between 
theoretical work and policy: how might we think about the occasions in which the 
work of scholars actually dovetails with and supports the efforts of policy-makers? 
Specifically, how might a newfound interest in Sri Lanka’s connected-ness on the 
part of geographers, historians and anthropologists be taken up in ways that reinforce 
or lend credence to specific regimes of development, geopolitics and trade? In other 
words, what is at stake in our understandings of Sri Lanka’s (dis)connectedness?  
 This chapter proceeds by offering a way of reading Sri Lankan history as that 
of (dis)connection.  I discuss recent historiographical debates on how Ceylon/Sri 
Lanka came to be understood as a distinct, self-contained entity separate from India, 
and suggest that connection and separation be viewed as lenses through which to 
understand all phases of recent Sri Lankan history.  I then seek to ask two important 
questions about Colombo: where is it? And when is it (Roy 2016)? In answering 
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these questions, I address the spatial and temporal facets of hubness.  I problematize 
geography, showing that the issue of Sri Lanka’s location, far from a simple 
assessment of its physical arrangement in space, is in fact an intensely political one.  
Different actors might thus answer the question “where is Colombo?” in very 
different ways.  I interrogate both middle class nostalgia and planners’ optimistic 
projections for the future as a way of addressing the question of when Colombo is, 
showing that the city’s temporality is uniquely tied up with questions of what might 
have been had history proceeded differently.  Finally, I consider the different scales 
and scopes of Colombo ambitions to be both a global and national level hub. 
 There is some slippage between “Colombo” and “Sri Lanka” in this chapter.  
The difficulty of separating out these terms and what they represent is a testament to 
the way the politics of hubness plays out in day-to-day life.  Within Sri Lanka, 
Colombo is understood as a unique space, often seen as exceptional - that is, no one 
would consider Colombo representative of the cultural, political or economic life of 
the rest of the country.  And yet, the enthusiastic projections of real estate developers 
and government officials often elide the differences between “Colombo” and “Sri 
Lanka.” Promotional materials celebrating new infrastructure projects or plans for 
urban development frequently alternate between claims that the project in question 
will be good for Colombo and the idea that these things will make Sri Lanka a hub.  
In other words, the politics of hubness includes many acts of erasure: erasure of Sri 
Lankan realities outside of the major city, and also erasure of that within Colombo 
that does not fit with a more internationally-minded vision of hubness.  As 
understandings of Sri Lanka’s place in the world zoom out from South Asia to 
emphasize its connections with a more expansive notion of the Indian Ocean/Asia 
Pacific region, what lies outside Colombo on this small island disappears from view.  
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My aim in this chapter is to offer another way of seeing that might hold in sight both 
Colombo’s relationship to a world outside of Sri Lanka, and to the rest of the island 
on which it stands.      
 
Histories of (Dis)Connection  
 
Sri Lanka’s history can be read as a history of connection and disconnection.  
One of the central contentions of this section and this chapter as a whole is that in 
fact all of the phases and periods of recent Sri Lankan history carry with them 
certain associations about the level of connected-ness and cosmopolitanism of the 
island, or associations with the opposite: times of disconnection, provincialism and 
inward-lookingness.  By reading the history of Sri Lanka as a history of 
(dis)connection, I offer a way of understanding the history of the entity known as 
“Sri Lanka” that rubs up against both academic narratives and nationalist rhetoric.  
To read Sri Lankan history as a history of (dis)connection is not to privilege either 
connection or disconnection as more important; it is not to label certain moments, 
places or people as uniformly “provincial” or “cosmopolitan.” Rather, it is to look at 
the tensions between these forms of disconnection and connection as they play out in 
different moments.    
Roughly speaking, the history of Sri Lanka is typically thought of as the pre-
colonial, the colonial, the post-independence, civil war and post-war eras.  It is 
obvious in the use of terms like “pre-colonial” and “colonial” that some form of 
connection beyond Sri Lanka’s contemporary borders becomes important for 
delineating historical phases.  But European contact and colonization is of course not 
the only story of connection that matters.  Migration of people and commodities 
between Sri Lanka and India, for example, is one of the defining features of the 
island’s pre-colonial history (Roberts 1980), and one that remains important in later 
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moments as well.  Religious linkages have brought Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims and 
Christians in Sri Lanka into dialogue with co-religionists across the world for 
centuries.  Linguistic similarities between South Indian Tamils and Sri Lankan 
Tamils have facilitated political imaginaries of a unified Tamil-speaking world.  
Connection includes but is not limited to the colonial encounter, even as colonial 
understandings of Ceylon/Sri Lanka materially and symbolically played a role in 
which connections were encouraged, and which were discouraged (Sivasundaram 
2013, Jazeel 2009).       
The colonial period offers both a history of connection and active disconnection.  
After the British consolidated rule of the island by conquering the Kingdom of 
Kandy in 1815 - something their Dutch and Portuguese predecessors had been 
unable to do - the inclusion of Ceylon in a colonial network of trade, administration 
and knowledge production was secured.  The shifts in Ceylon’s economy from 
coffee to tea cultivation, for example, are not understandable without grasping its 
wider place in the Empire.  Circuits of power and knowledge firmly placed Ceylon 
in contact with London, but also with the West Indies and other colonized locations 
in Asia and Africa (Roberts 1989, Wenzlhuemer 2007); Colombo, increasingly 
gaining importance over Galle and Kandy, became a significant imperial port city 
sharing lines of communication, commerce and capital with cities like Singapore, 
Rangoon and Madras (Frost 2002).   
However, to focus exclusively on colonial connections may obscure the 
importance of colonial disconnections.  British rule over the entirety of the island of 
Ceylon did not only involve connecting it to wider networks; it also involved active, 
concerted efforts to sever ties between Ceylon and its neighbors, reifying a long-held 
European vision of the island as a unified but also exceptional entity naturally 
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distinct from the rest of the region.  Scholars of Sri Lanka have, recently, begun 
questioning this set of assumptions about Sri Lanka (Jazeel 2009, Sivasundaram 
2013, Spencer 2014).  As Jonathan Spencer asks, “how did Sri Lanka get to drift 
away from the land mass to which it seems so almost-attached? Indeed why is Sri 
Lanka a separate place, a different country, a different anthropology?” (2014: 2). The 
land mass to which Spencer refers is India, which in the opening of his essay he 
points out is “missing” from maps of Sri Lanka.  Spencer’s question asks not only 
about land mass and political institutions, but also about knowledge production (“a 
different anthropology”) of Sri Lanka.   
 In his historical study of British colonial rule in Sri Lanka, Sujit 
Sivasundaram offers some answers to Spencer’s question.  As suggested by the title, 
Islanded, Sivasundaram’s monograph posits “islanding” as an active process rather 
than assuming Sri Lanka’s inherent separation from the South Asian mainland.  
Governed by the British Crown rather than the East India company, there were 
political and economic motivations for keeping India and Sri Lanka separate in the 
19th century, along with actual material efforts to separate the two landmasses by 
dredging the channel between Sri Lanka and its northern neighbor (Sivasundaram 
2013: 14).  As Sivasundaram puts it: “To understand ‘islanding’ it is important not to 
take the physical geography of islands at face value, or to assume that the localness 
and boundedness of the island is natural” (2013: 25).  To represent Sri Lanka as an 
“island” then is not simply to recite simple facts, but to implicitly emphasize certain 
aspects of what both the terms “Sri Lanka” and “island” can possibly represent.  The 
colonial emphasis on Sri Lanka’s island-ness brings to the fore attributes such as 
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isolation and uniqueness, cementing its status as a “laboratory” (Sivasundaram 2013) 
for various experiments of colonial rule.5 
 While Sivasundaram’s argument is particularly memorable for its 
demonstration that separation was a key technique of British rule, he - along with 
other historians - does not neglect the importance of specific forms of colonial 
connection.  Much of this connection hinged on the importance of Indian labor 
fanning out through the British Empire in the 19th and 20th centuries.   For example, 
Ceylon was one of the few locations for which Indian labor migration remained 
“free,” meaning that workers could migrate there without regulation or interference 
from the British authorities (who put in place such regulations for other destinations 
of Indian labor) (Wenzlhuemer 2007).  At one point, there was even a ferry system 
established by the Government of Ceylon to facilitate the passage of laborers from 
India to the island (Wenzlhuemer 2007); this stands in stark contrast with the efforts 
to dredge the channel to create greater physical separation between the two.  
Institutionally and politically, Ceylon was distinct from India in that it was already 
governed as a crown colony while India still lay under control of the East India 
Company.  In this way, Ceylon was different from India, but shared important 
commonalities with other crown colonies like Mauritius and the Cape Colony.  As 
Sivasundaram observes, Indian labor and “imperial careering and traveling also 
linked Mauritius, the Cape, and Ceylon” (2013: 25).   
 This discussion of Sri Lanka’s colonial history helps illuminate the 
importance of a history of (dis)connection.  As the preceding discussion 
                                                
5 In an earlier article on the subject of Sri Lanka’s island-ness, geographer Tariq Jazeel makes many 
points similar to those advanced by Sivasundaram, however he also warns against viewing the 
colonial vision of Sri Lanka as a unified, separate entity as overly dependent on British rule and the 
overthrow of the Kandy Kingdom in 1815.  Drawing on sources from American and British travelers 
to the island before 1815, he skillfully shows that even pre-1815 western visions of the island heavily 
implied an understanding of Ceylon that assumed it to be a unified entity. 
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demonstrates, connections and separations of various kinds interrupt, overlap and 
compete with one another.  The island land mass of Ceylon became imagined and 
visible as distinct - but its inclusion in the British Empire facilitated important 
connections of labor and commerce.  The connections formed, however, did not only 
tie Ceylon to India, its geographic neighbor, but to other much farther away colonies 
and crown possessions.  All of this is facilitated and shaped by the increase in 
informational and communications links which emerged as highly important across 
the British Empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Frost 2002). 
 Thinking carefully about (dis)connection allows for different interpretations 
of more recent and contemporary Sri Lankan issues. For example, if one takes the 
civil war period (1983 to 2009), a common-sense interpretation is to see the 
hostilities between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government as exemplifying a 
moment of profound disconnection.  Political violence and human suffering led 
many Tamils as well as remaining Sri Lankan citizens of European descent 
(including Burghers) to leave the country en masse, never to return (Daniel 1996, 
Thiranagama 2011 and 2014).  Tourism to Sri Lanka plummeted as foreigners began 
to doubt their safety.  To many, the civil war represents a time of total isolation in 
which Sri Lanka lost many of its most cosmopolitan, well-educated citizens, and 
failed to attract much positive interest from the outside world.  This view of the civil 
war as a disconnecting moment is reinforced by contemporary discourse on Sri 
Lanka, for instance in tourist industry marketing materials that describe Sri Lanka as 
“emerging” or “opening up” after decades of violence.  However, it is also possible 
to look at the civil war as a moment of profound connection, albeit of a different and 
less hopeful kind.  The political struggle of the LTTE for all its violence did propose 
a vision of connection with a world of Tamil speakers beyond the island of Sri Lanka 
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(Jazeel 2009).  The civil conflict also led Sri Lanka to be inserted into circuits of 
humanitarian aid, peace building efforts and disaster management that carry a 
different kind of importance; the Rajapakse government’s crackdown on foreign 
NGOs and demand that UN agencies evacuate the north at the closing stages of the 
war can then be seen as a violent displacement of one form of connection in favor of 
the more “global” aspirational connections brought on by the end of the war.            
(Dis)connection as a lens through which to understand questions of politics and 
development in Ceylon/Sri Lanka makes an understanding of Colombo more urgent 
and necessary, highlighting the coastal capital’s role as both a symbol or metonym 
for Sri Lanka as an entirety, but also its actual, material importance as a place that is 
dense with connections of various kinds.  Thinking about the history of 
(dis)connection makes it possible to fully explore, and take seriously, the 
implications of contemporary efforts to re-imagine Colombo as a “hub city” in the 
Indian Ocean region.  What I call the “politics of hub-ness” is a concept 
understandable only through a reading of Sri Lankan history that centers connection 
as a contingent, conflicted, and constantly negotiated process, rather than a “natural” 
outcome of colonization, island geography, religion or culture.  Colombo’s status as 
a “global” or “hub” city is far from assured; this study centers the ongoing 
imaginative and material labor that is involved in trying to make it so.   
 
Where is Colombo?  
  
 As mentioned at the opening of this chapter, location plays an important role in 
the way that Sri Lanka’s future is discussed.  The optimism and hopeful rhetoric 
about Colombo becoming a major urban center is very often accompanied by 
comments on the spatial position of Colombo/Sri Lanka in relation to the rest of the 
region.  Talking about location is more than just an observation of geographical 
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“facts”; it is a way of recasting Sri Lanka as central rather than peripheral, modern as 
opposed to underdeveloped.  In short, location talk is political.  It underpins much 
hopeful rhetoric about development and the future of the country by framing 
strategic location as an asset that can be channeled in the project of making 
Colombo/Sri Lanka developed, desirable and relevant.  
 So where exactly is Colombo? Where is Sri Lanka? It depends on who you 
ask.  Framed one way, the answer to this question might be that Colombo is the de 
facto capital city of Sri Lanka, located in the western province along the coastline.  
Following this, one might answer that Sri Lanka is a small island located near 
Southern India.  It might seem that these answers are obvious, objective and 
incontrovertible facts.  They are “only” about simple geography, after all.  In some 
ways, however, this misses the point.  Understanding of geography and location is 
actually far from simple; there is never “only” geography.  Geography and location 
are intimately entangled with political questions about what forms development and 
progress should take in Sri Lanka.  While the geographic facts listed above might 
initially appear as “obvious” they also obscure other ways of answering the question, 
“where is Colombo?”. For example, an alternative way of answering this question 
might be to say that Colombo is a city in the Indian Ocean, right in the middle of 
routes connecting Africa, Asia and the Arab Gulf.  The difference between these 
answers, and the political implications of how one responds to “where is Colombo?” 
are made clear in this section as I explore how corporate figures, mainstream global 
media, policy-makers and bloggers interpret this seemingly obvious but actually 
highly charged question.     
 The Economist, one of the more authoritative mainstream media platforms on 
current affairs and global politics (and, of course, a reliable champion 
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and neoliberal policies) has reported on Sri Lanka on a number of occasions, but a 
piece from February 2014 on the “Post-Tiger Economy” is particularly revealing 
with regards to Sri Lanka’s aspirations of hub-ness.  Speaking with Kapila 
Chandrasena, chief executive of Sri Lankan Airlines, the national carrier, the author 
of the article explains that efforts are being made to orient Sri Lanka towards a 
“new” kind of economy, one based increasingly on tourism - which obviously 
necessitates greater air connections with other parts of the world.  In the eyes of The 
Economist, this turn to tourism is “emblematic of the country’s desire to re-integrate 
with a world that has often regarded it as a pariah” (2014).  The article concedes that 
“indeed, the speed at which tourists seem have flocked back may even seem 
tasteless” in light of the human rights situation, but this is weighed against the 
obvious progress in the tourism sector.  The author draws our attention to the 
startling fact that “in July 2009, just two months after the war came to its grisly 
denouement, the Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority (TDA) recorded a 28% 
increase in tourists stays compared with the same month a year earlier” (The 
Economist 2014). 
 If tourism, an example of global connection and a turn away from status as 
“pariah” is to form the foundation of Sri Lanka’s new economy, then the actual 
means of connection themselves, in this case air travel links, are worth some 
consideration. The Economist article goes on to discuss these in detail with 
Chandrasena, and I reproduce a key excerpt here:         
 
More ambitiously, Mr Chandrasena wants the capital to become a bridging 
point between China and Africa. “We see major high-volume traffic flows 
between Asia and Africa, and especially China and Africa,” he says. “From a 
geographical point of view, the shortest route is above Sri Lanka.” The jury is 
still out on this latter goal. Sri Lankan Airlines may serve four points in 
China, but it serves none in Africa (notwithstanding a new route to the 
Seychelles, which is offered by Mihin Lanka, its low-cost affiliate). Mr 
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Chandrasena is keen to add one or two big African hubs to his network, but 
he admits that a local partner will be required to “fan out across the 
continent”. Wooing this partner may prove tricky. Ethiopian Airlines already 
flies to four Chinese destinations and is adding a fifth in March; Kenya 
Airways has its own partnerships with two Chinese carriers; and South 
African Airways is likely to favour Etihad, with which it has signed a 
codeshare agreement, to improve its connections with China. [The 
Economist, 2014] 
 
The “high-volume flows” referenced here of course are due to the much talked about 
spike in Chinese development in sub-Saharan Africa, which has probably gotten 
more press than similar Chinese initiatives in other parts of Asia.  Here, Sri Lanka is 
positioned as an actor that should somehow find a way to channel these flows, 
directing them to favor the country’s development and become a “bridging point 
between China and Africa.”  The flows already exist - but Sri Lanka needs to figure 
out a way to take advantage of them.  
 Mr. Chandrasena’s observation that “from a geographical point of view, the 
shortest route is above Sri Lanka,” is undoubtedly true; what this sentence reveals, 
however, are the discrepancies between the “geographical point of view” and 
another point of view.  What might this second point of view be called? The tone of 
the passage is clearly one of pragmatism and caution juxtaposed with the quixotic 
aspirations of Mr. Chandrasena: “the jury is still out” on the idea of Sri Lanka 
becoming a connection point between regions.  Alongside the “geographical point of 
view” sits a point of view that emphasizes not geography but economic power and 
significance; not position and potential but what is already there.  In this other, more 
sober, point of view, Sri Lanka is not exactly a hub but rather a latecomer to the 
connection game.  The juxtaposition of Sri Lankan Airlines with Ethiopian Airlines, 
Kenya Airways and South African Airways has the effect of reminding readers that 
Sri Lanka is in fact very much behind in the race to connect Africa with China.  So 
in juxtaposition to the “geographical point of view” another picture emerges - one in 
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which, Sri Lanka’s advantageous position and location are not enough to render it a 
global player on the scale that many Sri Lankans would wish.   
 The interview with Chandrasena emphasizes an aerial view of Sri Lanka’s (and 
by extension, Colombo’s) location.  Connection and hubness are things floating in 
the air “above Sri Lanka.” However another dimension of Sri Lanka’s location is 
significant, that is its position in the ocean and proximity to important maritime 
routes. As many scholars of maritime worlds and materiality have observed, the 
ocean often figures as a stand-in for concepts of fluidity, flow, exchange.  But this 
conception of the ocean is not limited to academics. Different parties with a material 
interest in Sri Lanka’s geopolitical position are engaged in discussions that make 
reference to the actual Indian Ocean on which it sits, but in doing so conjure all the 
same themes of the ocean as a space of constant movement, traffic and “flow” of 
important commodities for the global economy.   
 Consider this portion of a speech by US Secretary of State John Kerry 
delivered in Colombo in May 2015:  
Sri Lankans should take enormous pride – I’m sure you do – in what has 
been happening within your borders. But every nation also has to look 
beyond its borders as well.  For Sri Lankans, that’s nothing new. Your 
country sits at the crossroads of Africa, South Asia, and East Asia. And for 
centuries, it’s served as a gateway for merchant ships. The Indian Ocean is 
the world’s most important commercial highway. Today, 40 percent of all 
seaborne oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz and half of the world’s 
merchant fleet capacity sails through the Straits of Malacca. And with its 
strategic location near deep-water ports in India and Myanmar, Sri Lanka 
could serve as the fulcrum of a modern and dynamic Indo-Pacific region. (US 
State Department, 2015)  
 
Secretary Kerry’s remarks gesture towards Sri Lanka’s historical hub-ness, with talk 
of looking beyond borders as being “nothing new” for Sri Lankans, who have “for 
centuries” inhabited an island that facilitated the passage of merchant vessels.  Two 
metaphors stick out here: first, the Indian Ocean becomes an “important commercial 
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highway,” and next Sri Lanka itself “could” become a “fulcrum of a modern and 
dynamic Indo-Pacific region.” In the highway metaphor, the ocean becomes another 
version of a well-known land-based technology for conveying goods and people.  
And, it bears mentioning that in pointing to highways, Secretary Kerry manages to 
touch on an actual technology/piece of infrastructure that is itself the source of 
discussion, desire and disappointment in Sri Lanka - one of the major post-war 
developments under Mahinda Rajapakse was the completion of two new lengths of 
highway, linking Colombo to other key locations in the Southern and Western 
provinces.   
 The image of the fulcrum calls to mind a lever, or a see-saw; in this view, Sri 
Lanka is a central hinge between two disparate realms.  Interestingly, this word 
choice stands quite apart from the oceanic imagery of fluidity, porous borders and 
connection; in evoking the fulcrum, John Kerry (unwittingly?) manages to conjure a 
vision of a world divided between two oscillating or see-sawing camps.  In light of 
the growing rivalry between China on the one hand and India on the other, supported 
by the United States, for influence in the Indian Ocean realm, this is a striking 
metaphor for the Secretary of State to employ.  One might ask: what exactly is the 
role of the fulcrum, what can become of it, and the people who live on it, under these 
geopolitical conditions?  
 Some time into my fieldwork, an article began making the rounds on social 
media.  A couple of Sri Lankan friends told me about it, knowing of my interest in 
Chinese investment in the Port City project.  Entitled “Cartopolitics and Sri Lanka: 
Rereading and Repainting Twenty-First Century Asia,” and published in on the 
website of an Indian magazine, the essay begins by pointing out that geographic 
regions are imagined and constructed - so far, so good.  The author goes on to 
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suggest that Sri Lanka could be considered either a “South Asian” or “Indian Ocean” 
state and explains the difference between the two identities:   
 
Although Sri Lanka can be thought of as either a South Asian state or an 
Indian Ocean one, the associations and images that our mind conjures in each 
case, seemingly sub-consciously, are quite different. One is perhaps the 
diversity, rich history, creaking bureaucracy and poverty of the Indian sub-
continent, the other, sun-kissed beaches, global trade routes and geo-political 
jostling. The South Asian construct creates a imagined community 
comprising Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, while 
downplaying Sri Lanka’s historic community with the Arab trading states to 
the west, the Theravada Buddhist countries to the east and the south east 
Asian port cities of Penang, Malacca and Singapore. (Alphonsus 2015)   
  
In this reading, India represents “history” “bureaucracy” and “poverty,” the Indian 
Ocean stands for alluring beaches, “global trade” and “geopolitical jostling.” Which 
image sounds more appealing? Does one even have to ask? The author builds his 
case for considering the Indian Ocean identity as preferable, packing the signifier 
full of images that speak to the aspirations and desires of the post-war moment.  
Interestingly, nowhere in the article is Sri Lanka’s rocky political relationship with 
India mentioned.  The choice between identifying as South Asian or as an Indian 
Ocean state is presented as a simple matter of marketing and preference, not as a 
political move that may serve to sever connections between Sri Lanka and its large 
and highly influential neighbor.   
 At this point in reading the article, I still could not quite tell whether the author 
was merely reciting the desires and aspirations he believed others to hold, or if this 
was a statement of his own views.  The unqualified optimism associated with the 
Indian Ocean, as opposed to the “South Asian” label, gradually made it clearer, 
though, that the essay was in fact championing the supposedly new and exciting 
opportunities associated with the oceanic vs. Subcontinental identity:    
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In recent times, Sri Lanka has started to undergo a refashioning of its 
identity. The re-emergent Indian Ocean identity reflects Sri Lanka’s 
cosmopolitan, ocean-going and  mercantile heritage, making its participation 
in global affairs—particularly commerce—natural and ordinary. But to the 
world’s investors, it also underscores that Sri Lanka’s distinctiveness from 
most of the Indian sub-continent and its location at the cross-roads of 
emerging markets for trade and travel. At least within the field of strategic 
studies, the country’s heritage as an Indian Ocean state is being revived and 
many decision-makers, such as the United States secretary of state, John 
Kerry, are becoming aware of the implications and opportunities this 
presents. Suddenly, Sri Lanka is not India’s heel or even its gateway—it is at 
the cross-roads of the emerging energy, trade and air routes, linking Africa, 
the Middle East, South Asia, South East Asia and Australia. (Alphonsus 
2015)  
  
As an anthropologist, I have to pause at the words “natural and ordinary.” The 
phrase itself is only used to signify the extent to which Sri Lanka's "cosmopolitan, 
ocean-going and mercantile heritage" have been unseen and undervalued - until now, 
apparently.  Evoking the image of the "crossroads" twice in one paragraph, this 
excerpt illustrates perfectly the way that hub discourse works: there is very little in 
terms of concrete references to how Sri Lanka can make use of being at the 
"crossroads" or what the precise terms of its engagement in "global affairs" and 
"commerce." Though couched in the language of pragmatism and 21st century 
business speak (the references to "strategic studies," "decision makers" and 
"emerging energy, trade and air routes" are helpful buzzwords), this section - much 
like the entire article - is remarkably light on the details of how advantageous 
geographic position might translate into meaningful economic change.  To 
paraphrase Asher Ghertner, what matters now is the future - not the conditions of its 
making (Ghertner 2015: 25).     
 The notion of flexibility is key for the strength of the "Cartopolitics" argument.  
In reference to new strategic initiatives on the part of India and China such as the 
revived “Maritime Silk Road” and Project Mausam, the author explains that 
“interestingly, the shaping of these initiatives is not only in the hands of China, India 
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or the USA; this fluidity creates opportunities for small states as well.  The arbiters 
of the success or failure of these initiatives are as much the states along the silk and 
monsoon trade routes … as are the countries that launched them” (Alphonsus 2015).  
“Fluidity” signifies “opportunity” and smaller states are supposedly just as in control 
of the Maritime Silk Road and Project Mausam initiatives as are major powers like 
China, India and the United States.  But this proposition invites some interrogation. 
How can this be true in view of the huge disparities between a country like Sri Lanka 
and any of the three major powers listed above in terms of wealth and military 
prowess? If a project is initiated and designed by one country, how much can other 
countries really be said to influence or shape it? The more realistic assessment would 
seem to be that smaller countries like Sri Lanka have the choice to opt in or out of 
regional initiatives according to their foreign policy objectives.  But, as was made 
clear during the Cold War in much of Asia, opting in and opting out can be very 
limited, precarious sets of choices indeed.   
 Some additional research on the author of this piece, Daniel Alphonsus 
revealed that at the time the article was being circulated, he was working for the Sri 
Lankan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the new government that took power in 
January 2015.  Together with US Secretary of State John Kerry’s remarks, it is not, I 
think, out of the question to consider these opinions and interpretations of the future 
of the Indian Ocean as somewhat representative of how those in power, or with 
access to power, are thinking about Sri Lanka’s potential hubness.  Fluidity, 
flexibility and porousness are concepts easily associated with the ocean and water 
both through metaphor and straightforward description of the ocean's materiality; 
some of the same exact concepts are employed as metaphors for the movement of 
capital and serve as aspirational qualities under neoliberal regimes.  What kind of 
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political-economic futures, then, are made possible through the re/discovery of Sri 
Lanka's Indian Ocean identity?  
 Locating Colombo - that is, answering the question “where is Colombo?” is a 
much more complicated proposition than it initially seems.  As evidenced by the 
words and writings of bloggers, political figures and corporate executives, the act of 
naming Colombo and Sri Lanka as parts of certain regions and not of others, the 
process of figuring out exactly where they are, is fraught with tension.  While Sri 
Lanka is easily considered part of the South Asia region as a result of its proximity 
to India, the speakers and writers I present here are invested to different degrees in 
re-imagining this spatial relationship, foregrounding instead Sri Lanka’s connections 
to a wider Indian Ocean or Asian region.  These verbal and written acts of 
reimagining Sri Lanka’s place in the world have become intimately intertwined with 
the hopeful, aspirational post-war development discourse of which dreams of 
Colombo attaining “global city” status are part.  Asking where Colombo is is a 
question with affective, temporal and political implications.   
 
When is Colombo?  
  
 Hubness is a temporal claim.  Talk of Colombo as a “hub” city invites not only 
reflection on Sri Lanka’s geographic/spatial positioning in the Indian Ocean, but also 
on visions of its future.  As discussed earlier, the past plays a role as well - different 
visions of Colombo/Ceylon/Sri Lankan history as connected or disconnected are the 
source of much debate.  In this section I would like to consider the temporal 
implications of hub city discourse not by elaborating on historiographical debates 
about whether or not the island should be viewed as separate or connected, but rather 
by interrogating both the nostalgic renderings of a cosmopolitan, connected 
Colombo and the aspirational future-oriented discourse deployed to justify current 
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modes of urban development.  Cosmopolitan nostalgia and ambitious plans for the 
future together contribute to the temporal element of the politics of hubness.   
 The creation of global cities across the Global South and Asia in particular 
requires the enlistment of temporal tropes: ideas like “progress” and “development” 
imply teleological visions in which some cities try to “catch up” to what other cities 
have already achieved in terms of cleanliness, safety, infrastructure, commerce, etc.  
Ananya Roy captures the importance of this in her analysis of common tropes of the 
21st century as the “Asian Century”:  
    
This is perhaps most evident in the ideology of the Asian century, which 
evokes a future of economic emergence in Asia but also relates different 
pathways of development to one another through models, benchmarks, and 
milestones. It is in this sense that Asia is a project, requiring of us the 
question “When is Asia?” instead of the more commonly asked question, 
“Where is Asia?” (2016: 317).   
 
In her co-edited volume with Aihwa Ong, Roy similarly draws attention to the 
processes whereby Asian urban experiences increasingly reference and conjure 
comparison with other Asian cities.  Asia is a “place” in some sense but as the 
description of benchmarks and milestones makes clear, it is also an aspirational 
claim, a vision of something in the future.  This has real implications for how urban 
centers in Asia are being managed and governed.  Roy continues by stating that: 
“Instead of positioning the Asian century as the future, or even as one vector in the 
multiplicity of capitalism’s futures, I seek to understand how futurity itself becomes 
a mode of governing” [Italics added] (2016: 318).  Following Roy, I find it useful to 
pose the question “when is Colombo?” Such a question allows me to both take 
seriously the futurity which Roy points out does a significant amount of work in 
forming the political imaginaries of today, but it also permits me to look critically at 
the forms of nostalgia and memory I encountered among many Colombo residents.  
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“When is Colombo?” becomes, then, a question that casts a glance backwards as 
well as forwards.  By drawing nostalgia for the past and aspirations for the future 
into the same analytical frame, I am able to deepen the understanding of 
temporality’s important role in forming urban imaginaries.   
     A common trope among middle class and elite Colombo residents holds that 
had it not been for the civil war, Sri Lanka today might be like Singapore, or 
Malaysia.  Many of my English-speaking, educated informants and friends liked to 
tell me wistfully that at one time Lee Kuan Yew (the early leader of Singapore) had 
once expressed a wish that one day Singapore might become like Colombo - how 
times had changed! Others liked to mention that when Sri Lanka gained its 
independence, it had generally been assumed - including by the British colonizers 
themselves - that it would be Sri Lanka, not Malaysia, which would become a 
prosperous, peaceful multi-ethnic country free of violence.  It is noteworthy that 
these kinds of narratives - recounted to me more times than I can list, on all of my 
visits to Sri Lanka both before and during fieldwork - reveal the extent to which 
“regular” people actively engage the idea that their country’s history may have been 
otherwise and deploy this understanding on a fairly regular basis.  Why would 
people talk like this? While the answer to that question is probably more complicated 
than can be elucidated in this chapter, I would like to draw attention to two inter-
related points arising from this observation: first, that this kind of talk had important 
implications for how the civil conflict is understood, and second, that it also reveals 
a belief in the possibility that Sri Lanka could reclaim its “rightful” place in a 
community of peaceful, developed nations. “If not for the civil war” is a statement 
that brackets the conflict as an unfortunate but somehow isolated set of events; three 
decades of conflict become a kind of detour from the regular march of progress that 
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Sri Lanka should have experienced.  The LTTE are doubly “outsiders” then - 
political enemies and ethnic others who are also simultaneously responsible for 
bringing the unitary Sri Lankan state outside of its appropriate pathway towards 
development.  “If not for the civil war” is also a remarkably effective way of de-
linking politics, development and ethnic relations from one another.  When one 
positions the civil war as a very unfortunate tragedy befalling Sri Lanka which 
should have been like Singapore, the nationalism and hateful rhetoric propagated by 
Sinhalese politicians from all across the political spectrum become less significant. 
 Amidst talk of what could have been or might have been, the physical 
manifestations of connectedness - transportation infrastructures - come to be objects 
of longing and nostalgia.  The civil war severely restricted civilians’ mobility and 
effectively severed the part of the island under LTTE control from the rest of Sri 
Lanka.  Freedom of movement was something remembered from the pre-war past.  
Although this most negatively and drastically impacted Tamils, the effects were felt 
and shared by every ethno-religious community.  In Colombo and beyond, 
checkpoints became a regular feature of everyday life, particularly salient reminders 
of the ongoing militarization of Sri Lankan life (see Jeganathan 2002, Choi 2015 and 
Lehman 2013 for further discussions on this topic).  Sharika Thiranagama’s analysis 
of the attempts to re-open the Colombo-Jaffna railway line after the end of the civil 
war highlights the importance of infrastructure for national identity.  She calls the 
railway line a symbol of a “social compact in which the life of the individual, the 
community, and the state became integrally intertwined" (2012: 223).  Thiranagama 
emphasizes that the attempt to revive the Colombo-Jaffna line "has come to 
symbolize the quest for the desired normalcy of the past, an aspiration towards an 
 62 
everyday experience that the younger generations have never had and which has, as 
a consequence, become a potent force in their lives" (2012: 223).   
 Tariq Jazeel also points to the effects that interrupted, ruptured and destroyed 
infrastructure as well as militarized space have had on (particularly young) Sri 
Lankans’ sense of belonging and freedom as they move through space:  
 
Even then, the unhindered freedom of movement across island-space has 
never been a privilege enjoyed by all in Sri Lanka. The militarization of 
roads and the regulation of movement through island space via the draconian 
and racialized discrimination of the security checkpoint, severely curtail 
access to the whole island for most (especially Tamil) Sri Lankans (see 
Hyndman and de Alwis 2004). An entire generation of Sri Lankans born post-
1983 (Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims) have grown up knowing a fragmented, 
patchwork, militarized territorial ‘integrity’, where insular, exceptional and 
inviolable island-ness persists precisely as  discourse, as textual assertion, far 
more than geopolitical object.  (2009: 411)   
 
In both Jazeel and Thiranagama’s accounts, the disconnect between generations, 
especially the generation too young to remember a time before the civil war is 
emphasized as one of the main results of this long-running division and 
securitization of space. The reference to generations is of course implicitly tied up 
with temporality, as in both writers’ analyses the past was a time of greater mobility.  
In other words, spatial imaginaries become associated with specific temporalities.  
When is a unified, cohesive Sri Lanka? It exists only before and after the civil war.   
 Talk about the future justifies all manner of projects of urban development and 
beautification in contemporary, post-war Colombo.  Much future-oriented rhetoric is 
vague about when various things will be accomplished, and yet change is presented 
as imminent, constantly “just about” to happen.  Two specific projects highlight the 
way that futurity is used to affectively and imaginatively conjure a vision of what a 
better, future-Colombo should look like. In 2015 and 2016, two of the most high 
profile projects in Colombo - the Colombo Port City project and the Western Region 
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Megapolis Planning Project - produced numerous forms of digital media, images and 
other promotional materials which speak to aspirations for Colombo’s future and 
exemplify rhetoric of hubness.  The Port City and Megapolis are linked, though with 
slightly different scopes and goals.  The Port City project, which I address in-depth 
in subsequent chapters of this dissertation, was a Chinese-funded concept for an 
artificially created island that would be attached to present-day Colombo and be 
home to luxury apartments, offices, and malls.  Though the Port City project 
emerged independently of Megapolis and was the subject of significant controversy, 
it was eventually subsumed under the larger Megapolis plan, which was a more 
holistic vision for the city of Colombo and the future zoning and uses of space.  With 
its very own Ministry (Ministry of Megapolis and Urban Development), the 
Megapolis plan was the new Wickremasinghe-Sirisena government’s signature plan 
for developing the city of Colombo.  While Megapolis in theory represented a 
departure from the old Rajapakse government’s approach to urban development, it in 
fact continued some of the former administration’s plans, for example by modifying 
to include the Port City (rather than canceling it due to the controversy).  Both the 
Colombo Port City project and Megapolis use the idiom of potential and possibility 
to communicate their hopeful visions for Colombo’s future. 
 The Port City’s promotional video, viewable on its website and on YouTube, 
offers viewers a “fly through” and aerial view of digitally conjured maps displaying 
the various offerings of the Port City.  The video opens with this hopeful message: 
“Colombo is about to grow.  In size, success and prosperity” and closes with: “the 
rewards are great.  Come, be a part of it.” The construction “about to grow” lends 
some urgency to the video’s entreaty to viewers to come “be a part of” the Port City.  
However, the political debates and conflicts surrounding the project led to significant 
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delays in construction; in reality the timeline of the project’s completion was far 
from certain when the video was disseminated.  The fact that only digital renderings 
of the Port City - rather than actual photos or video footage - are available further 
underscores the disconnect between the urgency of something “about to grow” and 
the considerable work still needed for this to happen.  Colombo residents would have 
seen physical evidence of the project as nothing more than chain link fence and a 
desolate project site on which tractors and bulldozers often lay still on heaps of sand.  
The Port City video nudges viewers to consider the hopeful digital images as more 
“real” than the material foundations of the project currently on display.  
 By contrast, the Megapolis project promotional video is more wordy and more 
detailed, drawing a distinction between where Colombo is currently and what 
planners hope it will be like in the future.  Nonetheless, aspirational and future-
oriented language here too plays a central role in anchoring the video and structuring 
its narrative.  The Megapolis video, narrated in the voice of an educated, friendly 
English-speaking male, christens Colombo “South Asia’s open city,” comparing and 
then implicitly elevating it when juxtaposed with neighboring cities like Mumbai or 
Chennai.  Colombo is described as currently having “a friendly cosmopolitan 
culture, a clean and green environment, and excellent services.” Once again, visually 
the video relies not on actual images of Colombo today, but on a cartoon rendering 
of the city and its people in bright colors.  The optimistic assessment of Colombo’s 
present condition is modified by a reminder that the future is more significant, and 
promises to be greater still: “So this is Colombo today.  But more important is what 
comes tomorrow.  Not just a dynamic city but an expansive, multi-dimensional 
metropolis conceived for the world to come.”    
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    The work of re-imagining Colombo as a global hub city requires particular 
understandings of the city’s spatial and temporal location.  While calling Colombo a 
“hub” might initially appear to be a simple spatial/geographic statement, it in fact 
requires a certain understanding of temporality as well.  Hubness calls upon the 
nostalgia experienced by many city residents for whom the idea of a well-connected 
city is associated primarily with a time before 1983 (the beginning of the civil 
conflict).  It also requires faith in the optimistic projects of developers and city 
planners who regularly traffic in images of a future that they assure residents will 
soon be reality, but which remains elusive.  The reliance on digital renderings and 
drawings highlights the distance yet to be traversed between the Colombo of today 
and the longed-for Colombo of tomorrow.  By examining both nostalgia for 
Colombo’s cosmopolitan past and these images of its future, it becomes possible to 
assess the real import of everyday rhetoric positing that “if not for the civil war,” 
Colombo would, by now, be the equal of other Asian cities.  Hubness becomes the 
channel through which this imagined counterfactual can be experienced and felt as 
real.   
 
Scales of Hubness 
 
Hubness discourse as I have laid it out here tends to emphasize Colombo being a 
hub with connections to other places outside Sri Lanka like Dubai or Singapore or 
Hong Kong; what gets lost in these kinds of discussions is the fact that Colombo still 
plays a critical role in Sri Lanka itself.  Colombo’s more local connections are often 
devalued because they appear less glamorous than connections to other major Asian 
cities.  In one vision of appropriate/proper development priorities, Colombo is part 
of a network of people, things and places on the island called Sri Lanka.  In the 
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other, it is an entity struggling for recognition in a network of a very different sort, 
that of "world cities" or "Asian cities."  But Colombo is still Sri Lanka’s largest city.  
It functions as a kind of double hub: it is a hub within Sri Lanka while 
simultaneously being linked to the outside world in important ways.  Understanding 
this forces us to rethink issues of scale and what we mean by the term “hub” city.    
Colombo was not always the most important urban center in Sri Lanka.  Other 
cities on the island such as Galle, Kandy and Jaffna were important in their own 
right and it actually was a lengthy process for Colombo to “win out” over Galle in 
competition during the colonial period over which port city the British should favor 
(Dharmasena 1989).  Understanding this helps us recast Colombo as one of many 
possible Sri Lankan hubs, rather than the obvious choice.   
Contemporary post-war talk of developing other cities in Sri Lanka abounds, but 
it is clear that Colombo has won the majority of the attention and effort aimed at 
urban development.  Rajapakse’s efforts to bring major infrastructure projects to his 
home city of Hambantota in the South amounted to nothing and are widely 
considered examples of failure - the airport, port and cricket stadium lie unused 
years after their completion.  Colombo is now home to the only functioning 
international airport in Sri Lanka, the most important shipping port, the largest 
railway station and bus depots.   
Disparities between Colombo and the rest of Sri Lanka are a major source of 
anxiety for citizens, planners and policy-makers.  My interview with Mr. Senaratne, 
a business leader, the former head of the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce and a 
supporter of the new government, revealed some of the tensions surrounding 
Colombo’s situation vis-a-vis not only other regional cities but also the rest of Sri 
Lanka.  When the subject of our discussion turned to the Chinese-funded Colombo 
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Port City (which I discuss at length in Chapter 2), Senaratne surprised me by being 
openly very critical of the project.  As a senior member of the business community, 
Senaratne repeated to me several times that he and the Chamber were of course 
"very much for FDI (Foreign Direct Investment)" - it was as if he was anxious that I 
might take his criticisms of the Port City as indications of not being sufficiently pro-
investment or pro-free market.     
 More than the criticism itself, the reasons for Senaratne’s opposition were what 
stuck with me.  According to Senaratne, in addition to the financial issues with the 
project (he, like many others, worried that Sri Lanka was acquiring too much debt as 
a result of ambitious infrastructure spending), the Port City was an example of 
Colombo-centric development that ignored regional disparities.  In his view, many of 
these disparities were embodied by the poor links between Colombo and other 
regions: "connectivity is not up to the mark," Senaratne said, pointing to the poor 
quality of the roads and railway lines.  He told me that he himself was originally 
from the hill country, a town that was about 200km from Colombo but which 
required an 8 hour train ride to reach.  This exemplified, for Senaratne, how far Sri 
Lankan infrastructure had to go in connecting Colombo with the rest of the country. 
Turning to the northern and eastern provinces, the majority Tamil regions most 
affected by the civil war, Senaratne framed their problems not in terms of ethnic 
tension or militarization but in terms of connectivity: they were not particularly 
badly off, according to him, the problem was that they were not well-connected to 
the rest of the country through highways and rail lines.  "We need to improve 
regional disparities, [we] have to do so in a systematic manner," he explained.   
Senaratne mixed pro-business ideals with a measure of social consciousness - "there 
are slums and underprivileged people [here], [we] need to uplift that infrastructure" 
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he said, arguing that "the sequence does not seem to be right" in prioritizing projects 
like the Port City over things like basic sanitation, housing and road construction.  
 Senaratne’s comments represent a striking shift in scale from the rhetoric 
which compares Colombo with cities such as Singapore, Hong Kong or Dubai.  In 
his framing, Colombo’s proper role is as a hub city not for Asia or the Indian Ocean 
region as a whole but for the rest of Sri Lanka; the lack of links between Colombo 
and the rest of the country became, in his analysis, an indication of what was wrong 
with the kind of development being pursued.  His contention that projects like the 
Port City were “out of sequence” posits national and regional development as the 
foundation upon which more globally-oriented projects are built.  Without sufficient 
local and national level infrastructure, a project like the Port City would never be 
successful.  This kind of thinking stands in stark contrast with the relentlessly 
hopeful projections of real estate developers and government officials who, as 
evidenced in the previous section, often use glittering images of possible 
infrastructures as a way of shifting conversations about Colombo’s development into 
a permanent future tense, drawing attention away from current lacunae in the urban 
landscape.   
 Rethinking Colombo as the capital of Sri Lanka rather than as a competitor of 
Dubai has the effect of pulling attention back to the inequalities plaguing Sri Lanka 
as a whole.  The articulation of inequality through spatial realities is a feature of 
contemporary capitalism as Neil Brenner observes:  
    
Thus, within a capitalist political-economic system, inequalities are not only 
expressed socially, in the form of class and income stratification, but also 
spatially, through the polarization of development among different territories, 
regions, places, and scales. (Brenner 2004: 13)  
 
And later:  
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The goal of national, regional, and local state spatial policies is no longer to 
alleviate uneven geographical development, but actively to intensify it 
through the deployment of urban locational policies designed to strengthen 
the place-specific socioeconomic assets of strategic, globally linked city-
regions. (Brenner 2004: 16) 
 
As Colombo is actively transformed into a “globally linked city-region,” 
infrastructures, jobs and business opportunities are increasingly concentrated there.  
Colombo acts as a representative of Sri Lanka to the outside world - to the foreign 
investors and big corporations that politicians and planners hope to draw to the 
island.  The rest of Sri Lanka lags behind Colombo.  The rest of the country is 
disconnected from Colombo due to poor infrastructure links, and as a result 
disconnected from the rest of the world.  Re-imagining Colombo as a hub city not 
only involves efforts to transform the urban landscape, but it requires a re-molding 
and re-thinking of Sri Lanka in which the city becomes the privileged, exclusive 
gateway to the global.   
 Colombo’s hubness is best conceived of as fractal.  By fractal, I mean that it 
recurs at different scales. It is simultaneously a national capital and important center 
of commerce, knowledge and transportation within Sri Lanka as well as a city whose 
residents, planners and politicians increasingly cast it as global, an analog of other 
important Asian metropolises outside of Sri Lanka.  In response to claims that 
Colombo is becoming a “hub” perhaps the most important question is: what kind of 
hub? A hub for what, for whom? In paying close attention to these questions and 
their many possible answers, it becomes possible to de-naturalize, and critically 
engage with, the hubness talk put forth by private and state interests.   
 
Conclusion  
 
 The discourse surrounding Sri Lanka and Colombo’s “strategic location” in 
the Indian Ocean is inherently political and suffused with meaning beyond simple 
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geography.  As I have shown, what I term “hubness” is both a spatial and temporal 
claim.  Spatial in that it suggests a specific way of reading Sri Lanka’s place in the 
world, not as a South Asian state but more broadly as part of “Asia-Pacific” or the 
Indian Ocean.  This kind of claim implicitly devalues connections to South Asia, 
specifically India, by suggesting that belonging to the broader category Indian 
Ocean/Asian is connected with progress, prosperity and modernity.  Hubness is also 
a temporal claim.  It draws on nostalgia for colonial and pre-civil war era 
cosmopolitanism, as well as aspirational images of what the future holds.  
Connected-ness becomes associated with specific time periods, and in particular with 
speculation of what Sri Lanka might have been like had the civil war never taken 
place.   
 Talking about Colombo becoming a “global hub” leads to some confusion, 
some slippage between terms.  As evidenced throughout this chapter, hubness 
discourse blurs the line between “Colombo” and “Sri Lanka.”  The perspectives I 
present in the “When is Colombo” section speak of Sri Lanka, not Colombo, when 
they re-think and re-cast the island’s role in the global economy and geopolitics.  But 
Colombo is understood to be the urban center that facilitates the achievement of 
hubness.  Without Colombo achieving the kind of urban development envisioned by 
planners, politicians and real estate developers, the project of leveraging Sri Lanka’s 
unique location falls apart - after all, Colombo is home to the only international 
airport, the major railway station, and is home to most of the Sri Lankan political and 
cultural elite.  Colombo is valued because it represents the cosmopolitan, 
metropolitan future after three decades of civil war.  But discussions about Colombo 
becoming a “global hub” are strikingly circumspect about what, if any, the relation 
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of this international hub to the rest of the island should be, and what happens to 
places outside of Colombo that lack the distinction of hubness.    
 Jonathan Spencer has theorized Sri Lanka’s connections to South Asia and its 
island geography through ethnographic engagement with the multi-ethnic eastern 
part of the island.  Writing about an ambitious, but ultimately unsuccessful, harbor 
construction project in Oluvil, a small fishing town in the Eastern Province, Spencer 
concludes his article as follows:  
Far from providing shelter, the builders had contrived to channel dangerous 
currents into the harbor itself. Even the local fishermen couldn’t use it. In 
many ways, the harbor is typical of much post-war development across the 
island—a high-capital project of little immediate utility to the people who 
live in its shadow. As such it can serve us as a final, very concrete, metaphor, 
this time of the ambivalence that marks Sri Lanka’s relationship to its 
neighbors —superficially a gateway to the world around, which turns out to 
be too hazardous for anyone to use (2014: 11).   
 
Spencer’s account of the Oluvil harbor highlights failed infrastructure of “little 
immediate utility,”; the harbor he describes was an effort at forging connection 
between a “provincial” location within Sri Lanka and the rest of the world.  As 
Spencer suggests, the harbor was wasteful and ultimately unsuccessful, but it is 
hardly exceptional: many such unnecessary or incomplete projects litter the Sri 
Lankan landscape.  Two points are striking about this passage: first, the depiction of 
deficient, badly planned development projects, which are just as present in Colombo 
as they are in Oluvil.  Second, the image of a “high capital project” that is 
“superficially a gateway to the world around, which turns out to be too hazardous for 
anyone to use.” “Gateway” can of course be understood as another term for hub - a 
connecting point, facilitating exchange between different places.  The failed Oluvil 
port speaks to the challenges of trying to build connections between “provincial” 
locations in Sri Lanka and “the world around” without some link through Colombo.  
On the one hand the failed port can be easily read as another example of overzealous 
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and ambitious politicians overestimating the importance of whatever provincial 
location to which they owe allegiance.  But this anecdote - when read alongside the 
different texts and perspectives I have presented in this chapter - says something 
about Colombo’s importance too, even though the city does not figure in Spencer’s 
account.  The Oluvil Port debacle reveals the limitations of attempts at achieving 
“hub” status that try to circumvent Colombo.  Understanding the politics of hubness 
requires not only unpacking the political, historically-contingent understandings of 
connection/disconnection at work in contemporary Sri Lanka, but also urges greater 
attention be paid to the inequalities that inhere in post-war spatial arrangements.         
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CHAPTER 2: PUTTING COLOMBO ON THE MAP: THE COLOMBO PORT CITY 
PROJECT 
 
Transforming a city into a global hub is not a smooth or frictionless process.  
Rhetoric about Sri Lanka’s advantageous geographic position often moves 
seamlessly between a romanticized reading of the past in which the island was more 
cosmopolitan and enmeshed in global networks than it is now, and optimistic 
projections about the future in which the city of Colombo will be a global hub for the 
Indian Ocean region.  But how do we get there? What needs to take place in order 
for Colombo to reach this coveted status? Between nostalgia for the pre-war past and 
excitement for a better post-war future, the present is frequently overlooked.  This 
chapter uses the example of the Colombo Port City project to argue for a processual 
understanding of the work of building Colombo into a hub city.  I draw attention to 
the debates, controversies and disagreements about the Port City to foreground the 
messy, non-linear nature of urban development, using my ethnography to highlight a 
moment of suspension and pause in the project’s progress.  I argue that the Port City 
project also provides an entry point for understanding contemporary forms of what I 
call “unitary” Sri Lankan nationalism, distinct from either Tamil or Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalisms, and focused instead on a broad, multi-ethnic, all-island form of 
identification and solidarity. While official narratives about Colombo’s development 
tend to actively ignore the civil war, framing it as a thing of the past, I suggest in this 
analysis that the effects of the conflict still linger in the tone and content of the 
debates around urban development schemes. Ultimately, I suggest that both 
nationalist and hubness discourses are underpinned by specific spatial imaginaries of 
Colombo’s relationship to the rest of the island.      
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In chapter one, I argued that “hubness” is the overarching logic through which 
development in Colombo is structured.  Hubness is an aspirational discourse which 
prizes connection beyond South Asia, highlighting both historical and future 
possibilities for Sri Lanka’s imbrication in wider regional and global networks.  
Dovetailing with the recent emergence of the Indian Ocean region as an object of 
fascination in academic, policy and media narratives, hubness is a set of both spatial 
and temporal claims which employs Sri Lanka’s apparent “naturally” advantageous 
location to suggest that geography can be leveraged to bring about desired 
contemporary capitalist visions of urban development.  My discussion of hubness in 
chapter one centered on unpacking these spatiotemporal claims.  In this chapter, I 
turn from a consideration of hubness discourse in the abstract to the concrete 
example of the Colombo Port City, a project which exemplifies the material and 
symbolic labor involved in building a global hub city.  
The Colombo Port City project, a joint initiative of the Sri Lankan government 
and a Chinese corporation, became the source of a major controversy during the 
period of my fieldwork.  Hubness as a mode of approaching and thinking about 
urban development is most acutely exemplified in this hotly-debated waterfront 
development scheme, which would involve dredging sand from the Indian Ocean 
floor to create a new island opposite the existing Fort business district and connected 
to the core of the city by bridges and walkways.  The Port City would eventually 
include luxury apartments and high-rise buildings, shopping malls and other sites of 
leisure and consumption aimed at attracting wealthy Sri Lankans and foreigners. 
However, designed, funded and implemented by a Chinese company, the China 
Harbor Engineering Corporation (CHEC), the Port City project became the subject 
of highly contentious debates over Sri Lankan sovereignty and the appropriate role 
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of foreign - specifically Chinese - influence in Sri Lankan politics.  Proponents of the 
project, employing the language of hubness, suggested the Port City would “put Sri 
Lanka on the map,” making it a more appealing destination for elite global 
businesses and consumers, while detractors cited environmental concerns, fears of 
excessive entanglement with China, and the supposed wastefulness of the project 
vis-a-vis other development priorities. At a value of $1.4 billion USD, the Port City 
represented the largest foreign direct investment (FDI) in Sri Lanka.6  The question 
became: could Sri Lanka afford not to go ahead with it?         
The Port City project exemplifies not only the value placed on global and 
transnational forms of connection, but also reveals the fraught nature of certain 
connections being forged. The Sri Lankan civil war, which lasted nearly three 
decades, came to a dramatic and violent conclusion in May 2009 with the Sri Lankan 
government, under then-President Mahinda Rajapakse, electing to end the conflict 
through a pure military victory, crushing the LTTE rebels and killing thousands of 
Tamil civilians in the process.7 Following this display of military force, the Sri 
Lankan government was criticized heavily by western powers - most notably the 
United States, United Kingdom and Canada - for human rights abuses.  In response, 
the Rajapakse regime grew increasingly anti-western in its rhetoric, seeking out a 
closer alliance with China, which did not openly criticize Sri Lanka’s human rights 
record. With expectations running high for a triumphant Sri Lankan economic 
                                                
6 Though the Port City is the most significant Chinese investment in monetary terms, Chinese 
money poured into Sri Lanka in the post-war period through investment in railway lines, a new and 
ultimately unsuccessful international airport in Hambantota on the southern coast, and other projects. 
7 The controversy surrounding civilian deaths at the end of the civil war continues to be a highly 
charged issue, with exact numbers of civilians killed usually reported as significantly lower by the Sri 
Lankan government (9,000) versus the estimate of up to 40,000 by the UN and international human 
rights groups (BBC News, 2012).  Some of these issues are explored in a documentary broadcast on 
the British television network Channel 4 entitled “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields.” Many Tamil families 
still have no information about what happened to their relatives in the final days of the war.  On the 
other hand, many Sri Lankans argue that delving too deeply into the end of the conflict only 
exacerbates ethnic tensions. 
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miracle following the end of the war, Chinese support came in handy for financial 
reasons as well.  As China seeks to expand its sphere of influence in Asia through its 
One Belt One Road8 initiative, the appeal of investing in Sri Lanka was clear.  Many 
Sri Lankans who supported Mahinda Rajapakse’s presidency believed the Port City 
and tighter alliance with China were positive steps forward for the country and 
would combine to assert Sri Lanka’s independence from the west as well as prove 
that the country was capable of rapidly modernizing. However, to others more 
critical of the Rajapakse government, the Port City and attendant rapprochement 
with China came to represent increasing alienation from the West, excessive debt, 
and misplaced priorities.9 Might some costs be too high to pay in the effort to 
become a global city? This chapter highlights the fact that hubness discourse often 
fails to account for the specificity of the connections being created. While many Sri 
Lankans assumed that the Port City would naturally attract plenty of wealthy foreign 
visitors and residents, others asked more pointed questions about who these visitors 
would be, and whether they should be welcomed at all.           
The Port City project came to a halt only a few months after construction work 
was initiated.  The January 2015 presidential elections saw Mahinda Rajapakse 
voted out of power in a shocking victory for the opposition.  The alliance with the 
Chinese had been forged under his increasingly personalistic and authoritarian rule.  
Without Rajapakse at the helm, it was unclear what relationship Sri Lanka and China 
                                                
8 The One Belt One Road (OBOR) strategy refers to a series of Chinese initiatives designed to 
develop trade and infrastructure partnerships with other Asian countries. The “Road” refers to a “New 
Silk Road” connecting China to land-locked Central Asian countries, while the “Belt” portion refers 
to the coastal linkages created by investing in ports and other similar developments in countries such 
as Sri Lanka and Pakistan. This is also sometimes referred to as the “Maritime Silk Road.” 
9 During my fieldwork, the enormous amount of debt incurred by the Rajapakse government was 
a source of major concern for many of my interlocutors who worked in policy and the private sector; 
many criticisms of Rajapakse also centered on allegations of massive corruption and personal benefits 
to his family and associates as a result of costly infrastructure development projects. Many of these 
projects, including several major initiatives which took place in Rajapakse’s home district of 
Hambantota, were seen as personal vanity projects with little use to the citizenry. 
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might have; as a result, the fate of the Port City remained unclear as well. The new 
coalition government, in response to brewing discontent and public criticisms of the 
Port City, put the project on hold in March 2015, suspending construction entirely.     
Nationalism is a crucial part of the story that this chapter seeks to tell.  As my 
ethnographic material makes clear, both pro and anti-Port City Colombo residents 
made use of nationalist rhetoric in framing their opinions about the project.  
However, as I explain in subsequent sections, the nationalism on display from both 
camps was not a narrowly defined nationalism based on notions of purity or ethnic 
belonging. Instead, informants displayed what I term “unitary Sri Lankan 
nationalism,” an island-wide re-imagining of the relevant community as being not 
Sinhalese, Tamils or Muslims, but potentially all Sri Lankans.  Framed in opposition 
to the Chinese businessmen who conceptualized the project or other foreign powers, 
this unitary, all-island nationalism relied primarily on juxtapositions of local versus 
foreign/cosmopolitan.    
This chapter approaches the uneasiness of the present ethnographically, that is 
through observations, conversations and repeated interactions that happened over a 
sustained period of time.  This provides a sharp contrast to the dominant, future-
oriented focus of the CHEC and many Sri Lankan supporters of the Port City.  The 
Port City controversy was one of the constant threads running through my fieldwork 
in Colombo; sometimes it surged to the foreground, as evidenced by the animated 
debates and protests it inspired, several of which I relate in this chapter. But, often, 
the Port City was present in fragments of everyday life in Colombo over the course 
of 2015: snippets of conversation, day-to-day gossip and chats with tuk-tuk drivers, 
housewives, various friends and acquaintances; in glimpses of a pro-Port City sticker 
affixed to the back of a three-wheeler careening down Duplication Road; in the sight 
 78 
of the construction zone completely at a stand-still next to the crashing waves of the 
ocean. The long period of the project’s suspension gave rise to many rumors and 
conflicting pieces of information about its true purpose, many of which I relate in 
later sections.  But the pause in the Port City’s construction not only highlighted the 
social divisions and debates which colored Sri Lankan politics, it also served as a 
powerful reminder of the labor and time required to transform Colombo into the 
global hub city envisioned by government officials, planners and real estate 
developers.  
 
The Politics of the Colombo Port City Project  
  
The Colombo Port City project has little to do with Colombo's working, 
industrial port.  If the “real” port of Colombo is a major location of intense capitalist 
activity, a place for loading and unloading of goods circulating from around the 
world in one of Asia’s major shipping hubs, the Port City is supposed to offer a 
spectacular capitalist vision of a different, but related, kind.  By dredging sand from 
the ocean floor and transporting rocks from the Sri Lankan interior, the Port City is 
to be built on a new island of reclaimed land which will sit right next to its main 
business and commercial district, Fort. Promotional videos and images for the 
project show a gleaming, hyper-modern city, floating on the Indian Ocean.  Plans for 
the Port City include: luxury condos in high rise apartment buildings, shopping malls 
housing international brands, a network of canals lined by pedestrian walkways, a 
race course, and a dedicated transportation hub.  The ads for the Port City 
interpellate viewers with encouragement not to miss out on what promises to be a 
major new addition to Colombo’s urban landscape: “the rewards are great, come, be 
a part of it.”  
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The Colombo Port City project was officially inaugurated, with much 
fanfare, in September 2014.  President Xi Jinping of China shook hands with Sri 
Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse, as a crowd looked on, with traditional 
Sinhalese drummers in attendance.  A plaque was ceremonially unveiled, 
commemorating the event.  The two heads of state exchanged words: "I have seen 
prosperous signs in the development of Sri Lanka and feel happy for you," said 
President Xi (China Daily 2014).  For his part, Rajapakse commented that "With the 
help from Chinese friends, the Sri Lanka people are able to make their dream come 
true," (China Daily 2014).  At the time of the event, the project was expected to be 
finished by 2022, and in the words of President Xi, would ensure Sri Lanka’s place 
as an “important transportation hub on the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” As the 
China Daily reported, the occasion was marked by the blaring of nearby ships’ 
sirens, and the coordinated dumping of sand and rocks into the water by a group of 
bulldozers. Less than six months later, the project was on hold; the bulldozers and 
ships were still, and it was unclear whether the Port City would ever be completed.    
 
These images of the Colombo Port City have been removed as the copyright is 
owned by another organisation 
 
Image 3: Computer animations depicting the Colombo Port City.  Source: Colombo Port 
City/China Harbor Engineering Corporation 
 
For the majority of my fieldwork, the Colombo Port City project was in a state of 
suspension.  The construction site baked under the hot afternoon sun, looking as if it 
could spring back to action at any moment.  Party politics had intervened, bringing 
the Colombo Port City construction to a grinding halt.  President Mahinda 
Rajapakse, who joined President Xi in inaugurating the project, was voted out of 
power in a historic election in January 2015.  Head of the Sri Lanka People’s 
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Freedom party (SLFP), Rajapakse had long presided over a hyper-nationalist, 
populist and authoritarian government characterized by extreme corruption and 
nepotism. Chinese financial and political support did much to bolster Rajapakse’s 
government in the face of international criticism and alienation.  With Chinese funds, 
new highways and improved railway lines and cars were built; Chinese tourists 
flooded Sri Lanka, boosting the local hotel, restaurant and shopping industries.  
Accompanying other far-reaching projects of beautification and re-organization of 
urban Colombo, the Colombo Port City was praised by many as a decisive new 
addition to the urban landscape that would elevate Colombo to the status of 
Singapore, Dubai, or Hong Kong, and derided by others as a symbol of Sri Lanka’s 
servility to new Chinese patrons.     
 
 
 
Image 4: "I think we should see other people" magazine advertisement alluding to the Port City 
controversy.  Source: Author Photograph, August 2015. 
 
 The government that came to power in January 2015 was faced with a 
difficult decision: maintain the Port City project, one of many ambitious projects 
carried out by the Rajapakse government with Chinese aid, or suspend it, in keeping 
with election promises.  The new government, a hybrid comprised of a President 
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(Maithripala Sirisena) formerly of Rajapakse’s own SLFP party who defected, and a 
Prime Minister (Ranil Wickremasinghe), longstanding leader of the opposition 
United National Party (UNP), faced an unenviable dilemma.  The UNP, just as guilty 
of fomenting nationalist unrest in the past as the rival SLFP,10 nonetheless appeals to 
a voter base made up of ethnic and religious minorities, as well as Sinhala-Buddhist 
urbanites spanning the class hierarchy.  Generally seen as pro-business, pro-Western, 
and cosmopolitan (where the SLFP is socialist, Sinhala-Buddhist, and, under 
Rajapakse, anti-Western), the UNPs own politics came into conflict regarding the 
Port City.  A UNP-led government would be loathe to be seen rejecting a billion-
dollar investment that could become a major landmark for post-war Colombo. And 
yet, given the source of the money, and the UNP’s traditional cooperation with 
western and Indian interests, presiding over the construction of a major Chinese 
project with strategic and even military implications could be problematic for Sri 
Lanka’s geopolitical position.  
 The Colombo Port City project came to represent an overarching conflict 
between different visions of Sri Lanka’s post-war future.  The question was not 
whether the future would be capitalist, but rather what kind of capitalism would be 
embraced.  The two major parties, the SLFP and UNP were actually quite similar in 
their expressed goals of bringing about rapid development, improving Colombo’s 
infrastructure and drawing more FDI.  The question was really about where this FDI 
should be coming from, and whether or not the Chinese specifically were reliable 
allies and partners for 21st century Sri Lanka.  The intensity of Sri Lankan (Sinhala-
                                                
10 This is one of the enduring puzzles of Sri Lankan politics.  The UNP was actually the party in 
power at the start of the civil war, and presided over the 1981 burning of the Jaffna Library as well as 
the outbreak of anti-Tamil riots in Colombo in 1983.  Yet despite this historical record of ethno-
nationalist violence, the UNP of today has many voters from Colombo’s Tamil and Muslim 
communities. 
 82 
Buddhist) nationalism is well-known; both of the major parties deploy nationalist 
rhetoric regularly in order to exercise affective pull on would-be voters.  What the 
Port City issue brought to light was how very different, competing claims could 
adapt nationalist tropes to suit their positions either for or against this major project. 
Various marketing efforts on the part of the CHEC and Sri Lankan supporters of the 
Port City reveal the importance of appeals to national identity in justifying the 
project.  
 In the spring of 2015, during the time that the Colombo Port City project was 
on pause, the CHEC embarked on a set of concerted efforts to render the project 
more appealing to the population.  Hoping to cultivate support among Sri Lankans 
who might in turn pressure the new government to keep going with the Port City, the 
CHEC became bolder in marketing the project. Beginning in April, I and several of 
my Sri Lankan friends noticed a significant increase in their social media presence 
with suddenly active Twitter and Facebook accounts regularly sharing alluring 
images of the project specs.  Around the same time, a group of Sri Lankan bloggers 
was invited to tour the Port City site and speak with staff, and subsequently to write 
up their impressions of the project.  An early promotional video for the Port City had 
depicted only racially ambiguous or European people strolling through the malls and 
promenades of the new city; now, images circulated by the Chinese company 
replaced some of these with photographs of Sri Lankan faces superimposed onto the 
computer animated inhabitants and shoppers of the future project.      
The efforts of the CHEC to sway public opinion reached their apex with the so-
called “Ranbumi rallies for unity.”  These were events held in towns and cities across 
Sri Lanka with much fanfare, often with religious figures in attendance, whose stated 
purpose was to promote “unity” between ethnic groups - tacked onto this goal was 
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that of advancing the Port City as somehow constitutive of this new Sri Lankan 
inter-ethnic unity. The rallies were partially funded by the CHEC, which also 
pledged money to construct schools in the places where the rallies stopped.  At each 
location, a brick with the name of the city or town engraved was given by the 
townspeople to the itinerant rally, with the eventual aim of putting all the bricks 
together to make a Ranbumi monument in Colombo.    
All of these efforts had the goal of swaying public opinion in favor of the project, 
re-casting the Port City as something friendly and Sri Lankan rather than as 
something foreign and menacing.  What emerges in the videos and media accounts 
of the Ranbumi rallies is their strategic use of multi-ethnic, multi-religious symbols 
and visual cues to suggest a link between the Port City and the cause of island-wide 
unity.  In one video produced by the television network NewsFirst (which gained 
notoriety during this period for its staunch support of the Port City) cameras follow 
the Ranbumi rally to Jaffna, the northern cultural capital of Sri Lanka’s Tamil 
population.  Describing the Ranbumi rallies as part of an attempt to build  “a nation 
devoid of communal and religious differences,” the video depicts the convoy 
traveling to Jaffna over the Sangipuddy bridge which the narrator refers to as yet 
“another endeavor connecting the North and the South” (NewsFirst, 2015).  The 
video then shows cheerful imagery of a crowd of Muslim and Tamil citizens - as 
well as some Chinese engineers from the CHEC - congregating and celebrating the 
Ranbumi ceremony outside of the Nallur Kovil in Jaffna, one of the most sacred sites 
of Sri Lanka’s Tamil Hindu population. The sight of minority citizens in Jaffna 
waving Sri Lankan flags and welcoming representatives of the Colombo Port City 
project is a powerful example of the kind of all-island nationalism that was important 
in building a case for the project to go forward.    
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 In subsequent sections of this chapter, I examine more carefully what the 
grounds for opposition to the project were among Colombo residents.  Overall, the 
reasons people objected were often quite dissimilar, but there were a few broad 
categories that organized dissent: (1) environmental concerns, specifically that 
dredging sand for the Port City would erode the coastlines, destroy beaches and 
enhance the risk of flooding; (2) geopolitical concerns, about China’s influence on 
Sri Lankan politics and fears of Sri Lanka becoming isolated from India and western 
powers; (3) social concerns about the elite character of the project, its exclusionary 
nature and the fear that it would favor wealthy foreigners over locals.  However, 
some Colombo residents were very much in favor of the Port City project and I also 
attend to their explanations and justifications for the project’s legitimacy.  In the next 
section, I examine how those critical of the project organized their dissent, and how 
they deployed notions of Sri Lankan culture and values to bolster their critiques.   
 
Hub: Interrupted 
  
 On a sweltering, oppressive day in early March 2015, I joined a group of 
protestors as they made their way from the main railway station in downtown 
Colombo, through the city’s main business district.  Their trajectory aimed 
westwards, towards the Indian Ocean, near the iconic Galle Face Green where the 
city meets the waves.  Flanked on either side by policemen on horseback, the 
protestors – students, Buddhist and Christian clergy members, fishermen, trade 
unionists, environmentalists – shouted chants and slogans in the form of accusation: 
“all thieves!” (horu okkoma) and “foreign octopuses!” (videshika bowallaya).  
Despite the insults and epithets, the mood of the march was generally friendly and 
carnival-like: street musicians wearing colorful capes played instruments and sang, 
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people were smiling and joking as we walked.  But by the time the protestors wanted 
to make the critical turn which would take the march towards the ocean and past the 
Hilton Hotel, things changed.  Suddenly, we were met by armed policemen standing 
in front of metal barriers.  An imposing black vehicle, the kind that dispenses teargas 
as one of my companions told me, loomed just beyond the partition.  
I was with the protestors at this critical juncture, just a few steps away from the 
metal barriers and the Hilton and World Trade Center only a bit beyond. Colombo’s 
business district still buzzed around the surreal scene, almost as if nothing out of the 
ordinary were happening: men and women in collared shirts and tailored suits were 
filing out of their offices in the World Trade Center, casting curious looks from time 
to time, but otherwise carrying on with their days.  Some of the protestors began 
arguing heatedly with the police: why could we not pass in front of the Hilton? Why 
were we being stopped? Members of one of the trade unions, wearing identical black 
vests, decided to stop traffic – after much commotion and deliberation, they simply 
walked into the center of the busy street right behind us and plopped down, cross-
legged, in front of the buses and cars. The stand-off continued, a mix of boredom 
punctuated by occasional moments of tension.  The only other person I knew on the 
march, an ecologist who had invited me to join, turned to me and said sarcastically: 
“the real question is, who sent the police? The new government, or the Chinese?”   
***         
The anti-Port City activists who I joined on the protest march in March 2015 
were actually a loose coalition of students, environmentalists, and clergy (primarily 
Christians of various denominations) who opposed the Port City for numerous 
reasons, including the damage it could do to the Sri Lankan coastline, and the 
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dispossession of fisher people living along Colombo’s beaches.11 The anti-Port City 
activists tended to be widely involved with other generally progressive causes and 
social justice issues, many of which had brought them in direct conflict with the 
former Rajapakse government.  For example, two of my primary contacts in the 
movement, Father Thomas and Sister Jane, were heavily involved in organizing Free 
Trade Zone workers in the towns just north of Colombo, and also regularly attended 
memorial services in the north for Tamil civilians killed by the Sri Lankan Army at 
the end of the war.  Many of the older activists (Father and Sister included) had been 
involved with, or sympathetic towards, the 1971 leftist youth insurrection against the 
SLFP government of Srimavo Bandaranaike; others had been threatened by the UNP 
government’s campaign of disappearances and torture of youths in the 1980s, and 
some had lived in exile outside Sri Lanka as a result of direct threats they had 
received during this time.  The Rajapakse government’s white vans - the primary 
mode of transportation used to kidnap and torture dissidents - were only the latest in 
a long line of oppressive state mechanisms which the activists had encountered in 
their lives.         
I was often struck by how the activists relied on nationalist, sometimes outright 
xenophobic tropes to make their points, even as they embraced causes of social 
justice for ethnic minorities.  Even though the activists worked with a variety of 
marginalized and minority groups, they still tended to make a dichotomous 
distinction between what they termed “our culture” and “our values” and foreign 
values, which were always coded as elite, cosmopolitan, pro-business and pro-
                                                
11 While the activists were not part of any specific NGO or formal organization before the 
protests started, they did eventually link their efforts with those of Transparency International, a 
global NGO with a focus on fighting corruption; the concern over the mystery and lack of publicly 
available information on the contracts signed with the CHEC provided a clear shared focus between 
the activists and the local office of Transparency. 
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capitalist.  By contrast, Sri Lankan “culture” was understood to be one of self-
sufficiency, close relationship with the land and nature, religiosity and kinship-based 
community structure.  Sometimes these essentialist views of Sri Lankan culture were 
important for mobilizing people to fight for their rights, and were also useful in 
overcoming inter-ethnic and inter-religious divisions; but at other times, this sort of 
rhetoric implicitly played on existing xenophobia and suspicion of outsiders.     
The activists were aware of the significant efforts on the part of CHEC and other 
pro-Port City interests to sway public opinion in favor of the project.  The Ranbumi 
rallies were a source of particular ire.  To my activist informants, the rallies 
represented not a hopeful message of Sri Lankan unity, but rather the ultimate 
cynical ploy to use Chinese money to influence Sri Lankan politics.  “They claim to 
be bringing peace,” Sister Jane said exasperatedly, “But if this will bring peace, why 
did we go into this crazy war?” Her question points to a contradiction between the 
rhetoric of peace and unity and the recent civil war, fought precisely over the issue of 
maintaining Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity.   
Sister looked with suspicion on the presence of the CHEC managers and 
engineers attending the Ranbumi rallies in poor communities throughout Sri Lanka.  
To her, the presence of these Chinese corporate representatives was only a way of 
pressuring poor Sri Lankans to accept the Port City project in exchange for financial 
support, which, she and Father Thomas believed, would only be used to in service of 
deepening Chinese influence to lay the groundwork for future harmful projects. She 
and Father claimed that the Chinese were using the Ranbumi rallies to promise large 
sums of money to support schools in each community they visited, and with this 
would fund “Chinese language training, culture and capacity training.” With a sad 
shake of her head speaking of the teachers and religious figures eagerly welcoming 
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financial donations from the CHEC and Ranbumi, Sister sighed “they don’t know 
that they betray their own country.”      
*** 
One morning in April, the anti-Port City coalition held an event, a “People’s 
Tribunal” in which they staged a mock trial for the Port City; as part of the conceit, 
various speakers went up to a podium and acted as “witnesses” delivering their 
“testimony” about the effects the project would have. As I listened to the speeches 
and noted down what people said, I could not help but be struck by the quantity of 
testimonies that drew on crude anti-Chinese sentiment.  In one testimony, the 
speaker cited historical events supposedly going back to the 15th century. He told the 
audience that China had been engaged in nefarious dealings in Sri Lanka for a long 
time.  This speaker dated the start of Chinese intervention to 1408, when, he alleged, 
a Chinese emperor had sent ships to Sri Lanka and attempted to steal the sacred tooth 
relic, one of the holiest artifacts in Sinhalese Buddhism.  This seemed to open the 
floodgates for testimony that had very little to do with environmental issues or 
geopolitics.  Later, another speaker at the same event referred to the influx of 
Chinese visitors to Colombo – “look at how they dress” he said, gesturing 
disdainfully at his legs to indicate the short skirts he associated with Chinese women. 
In a separate interview with one of the layman activists of the anti-Port City 
coalition, I was surprised to also hear him draw a link between sexual mores and the 
Port City: “the Chinese will be bringing more prostitution,” he told me with grave 
confidence.  “They are not respecting Sri Lankan culture, they bring their culture 
here and their women.”    
The dichotomy between so-called “local values” and outside influences builds on 
strong nationalist sentiment which has been well-documented as a feature of Sri 
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Lankan politics and life for decades.  The association of foreigners with sexual and 
moral laxity has been documented by other ethnographers (for example Amarasuriya 
2013); the linking of ethnonationalism with patriarchal control over women’s bodies 
and policing of their sexuality is hardly exceptional.  However, while the more 
extreme elements of Sinhala-Buddhist and Tamil nationalism are well-known, it is 
worth noting that the activists I describe here were largely Sinhalese Christians; the 
anti-Port City movement did not necessarily employ classically Sinhala-Buddhist 
tropes in its appeals to solidarity against the project for the simple reason that this 
would not draw much support from Colombo residents, who are primarily ethnic and 
religious minorities, and particularly would not go far with the mainly Catholic 
coastal fishermen who are most likely to be dispossessed and negatively effected by 
the project.  Instead, what I observed when speaking to this particular group of 
activists was an appeal to a slightly different form of nationalism, one which 
positioned all Sri Lankans as potential holders of “local values.”  
Let me return to the scene with which I opened this section, that of the protest 
trying and failing to complete its march towards the Galle Face Green.  As I 
explained, this moment was revelatory of the deep suspicion of Chinese influence in 
Sri Lanka.  My companion’s wry remark wondering who sent the police (the 
government, or the Chinese?) and the chants against “foreign octopi” speak to the 
enduring importance of nationalist rhetoric in political spaces such as protests.  
However this ethnographic vignette is significant not only because it reveals deeply-
held suspicions of foreign influence, but also because it suggests the intensity of 
resistance the Port City encountered, and by extension speaks to the charged, 
difficult nature of bringing about this particular expression of hubness.  While the 
optimistic talk of urban development and beautification that abounded in post-war 
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Colombo often portrayed the city’s transformation as smooth, uncomplicated and 
inevitable, the scenes of the protest and the People’s Tribunal suggest that it was 
anything but.  Rather than a neatly unfolding linear timeline of conception- design-
implementation, the Port City project’s progress was interrupted by the messy 
realities of Sri Lankan politics.    
The content of people’s chants and comments during the march was relevant, but 
so was the setting.  As I mentioned, the protest march was making its way from the 
Fort Railway station to the Galle Face Green, and was stopped before getting past 
the Hilton.  As we waited in the hot sun amidst a tense stand-off between police and 
protestors, workers from the financial district tried to make their way around us, on 
their way home for the evening.  Union activists blocked traffic, sitting cross-legged 
in front of buses filled with people.  For a short time, those who professed “local 
values” and opposed capitalist projects of urban development were able to physically 
insert themselves into one of places in Colombo most emblematic of finance capital, 
wealth and power.  
The protest stopping in front of the Hilton represented a disruption of the normal 
weekday flow of people and vehicles in Colombo’s most important business district.  
Hubness as an ideal rests on free movement and circulation.  The disruption caused 
by the anti-Port City protest was a physical manifestation of the larger disruption to 
the project plans presented by citizens’ resistance and suspicion.  Interruption, 
disruption, things not going quite as planned - all of these things, I suggest, might be 
extrapolated from this one ethnographic moment to the broader moment of trying to 
transform Colombo into a global hub city.  Political maneuvering, social conflict and 
constraints all played a role in limiting the possibilities for the Colombo Port City 
project. 
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Cosmopolitan Rumors 
 
I quickly learned that rumors and speculation about the Port City were easier to 
come by than concrete details or facts about the project.  During the uncertain period 
of the project’s suspension, the Colombo air was thick with different interpretations 
of its potential effects.  Colombo residents wondered both about the Port City’s 
potential impact on the cityscape and their own day-to-day lives, as well as the 
impact it had for Sri Lanka’s standing internationally. Rather than viewing these 
discussions and rumors as pointing towards a partial understanding of the “true” 
nature of the Port City, I instead consider these rumors as valuable in their own right. 
Many of the rumors and uncertain claims about the Port City revolved around the 
fact that no one knew for certain what legal arrangements had been forged between 
the CHEC and the Sri Lankan government.  Because the project had been 
conceptualized and initiated under the Rajapakse government, at a time when 
transparency was minimal, radically different accounts emerged of who would 
ultimately own the land being dredged to create the surface area of the Port City, and 
under what kinds of conditions.  Estimates of the Port City’s size were given in 
hectares, and though it eventually became public knowledge that the newly created 
land would amount to 269 hectares, it was never made clear what proportion of that 
total, if any, would be given outright to the Chinese, and what would remain under 
Sri Lankan control. Typically, in Sri Lanka, foreigners are not allowed to own land 
but are only allowed to acquire it in the form of 99-year leases.  Some were 
convinced that this same rule would be applied to the CHEC, which would merely be 
leasing the land from the Sri Lankan government; others insisted that no company 
would accept this, and opined that the CHEC must be given some land on a more 
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permanent basis as compensation.  What would it mean for Sri Lanka going forward 
if a foreign entity owned part of the island? 
Colombo residents did not draw a distinction between the CHEC as a corporation 
and the Chinese government.  As evidenced by the ecologist’s remark at the protest 
about “the Chinese” “sending” the police, in everyday talk the boundary between the 
corporation and the Chinese government was blurry at best.  For those concerned 
about the Port City, the potential for the CHEC to own land in Colombo was 
understood as a ceding of Sri Lankan sovereignty to Chinese interest. One genre of 
rumor about the Port City presented the new landmass as a kind of exclusive enclave 
that would be off-limits to Sri Lankans.  This was a step beyond the common-sense 
observation that the Port City, if constructed, would be likely to cater to the wealthy 
and that many of these people would be foreigners. In this particular narrative, the 
Port City would actually be off-limits even to well-to-do Sri Lankans.  It would be a 
kind of country of its own, floating parallel to the city of Colombo, but governed by 
foreign laws.  Another variation on this rumor was that the Chinese would instate 
their own passport control mechanisms, policing people who came in and out the 
same way as if one were entering a foreign country.   
These kinds of rumors, even with small variations, underlined the same overall 
fear: that Sri Lankan people would be kept out, on the basis of their citizenship and 
color, and that the Port City would be regulated by a totally separate set of laws, 
placing it outside the Sri Lankan state’s jurisdiction.  “The Port City will be for the 
Chinese! You’ll need a passport to get in!” said Rashid, a young Muslim professional 
I spoke with about the project.  “It will spoil the whole aspect of Colombo.  You 
wouldn’t like it if they came to the US and did this,” he said confrontationally.  The 
reference to my own country, the United States, was meaningful.  Not only was 
 93 
Rashid referring to the US in order to gauge my own individual reaction and 
communicate what he saw as the high stakes of the Port City project, he was also 
abstractly referencing the differentials of geopolitical power that made this situation 
unimaginable in a wealthy country, like the US, but very much imaginable in Sri 
Lanka by contrast. 
In part, those who were suspicious of the Port City and the Chinese influence on 
Sri Lanka grounded their fears in the idea - never confirmed, but never satisfactorily 
denied - that the enclave would be more than just a center for leisure and commerce, 
but that it would have military importance as well.  One engineer I interviewed, who 
anxiously asked that I not quote him or tell others we had spoken, told me he had 
been on an advisory board of scientists, engineers and other professionals under the 
old government, and had been tasked with reviewing documents about the project.  
He claimed that the plans had included a partial naval installation, but that perhaps 
the new government would disallow this, even if the project as a whole were to go 
forward.  Asking me not to record the interview, and also expressing discomfort to 
see me writing hand-written notes during our talk, the engineer asked me to close my 
notebook. While we chatted, he grew more casual and visibly at ease - but eventually 
expressed fear of Chinese retribution for his scientifically-informed criticisms of the 
project, saying he had been intimidated and threatened during a meeting with the 
CHEC.  After seeing evidence of a naval base, he was concerned that he would be 
targeted for “knowing too much” about the project.  Among activists against the Port 
City (who did not have access to the same sensitive material as the engineer), a 
central concern was that of airspace - if the Chinese were given Sri Lankan land, 
might this also translate into the air above Sri Lanka, and not just the land on which 
the Port City was constructed?  
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All of these fears, anxieties and suspicions speak to the continued importance of 
hard, geopolitical realities.  Informants who expressed these kinds of concerns were 
not only critical of the project because they disagreed with particular aspects of its 
construction, but because they worried about its impact for Sri Lanka’s standing in 
the world and relations with other countries.  The anxiety that would one need to 
“show a passport” to get into the Port City speaks to a difficult reality many Sri 
Lankans face as citizens who need visas for all kinds of international travel, and are 
often faced with barriers to their mobility that people from the Global North can 
hardly imagine. The idea that the Chinese might own a small part of Colombo and 
rule it as their own territory was a testament to the deep uncertainty of the post-war 
future.  Allowing the Chinese these kinds of privileges would be a very permanent 
commitment to the foreign policy forged under Mahinda Rajapakse, which also 
involved increasingly hostile relations with countries like India, the United States 
and Great Britain.  For many religious and ethnic minorities, as well as more liberal-
minded Sinhala-Buddhists and the business community, this was untenable.  Rumors 
about the Port City’s “true” purpose as either a zone governed by foreign laws and/or 
a military installation were direct expressions of the geopolitical anxieties of the 
post-2015 election era.      
Rajesh Venugopal’s analysis of the “grease devil” episode of 2011 offers an 
interesting counterpoint for thinking about rumors in the Sri Lankan context.  He 
discusses a set of incidents in which women (primarily in Muslim and Tamil 
communities in Eastern Sri Lanka) were sexually assaulted by unidentified men 
slathered in an oily substance (hence “grease” devil), causing widespread panic.  
While this might initially seem to be a world away from the raging debates over the 
Port City, one striking similarity is the fact that both the Port City controversy and 
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the grease devil scare to different degrees touched on the relationship between Sri 
Lanka and China.  Venugopal reports that in some accounts, the grease devil was 
thought to be the creation of Chinese doctors looking to harvest the blood of virgins 
in order to conduct a secret medical treatment on the President. This suggests the 
anxiety with which many Sri Lankans viewed the relationship between their own 
government and that of China; the image of stealing the blood of innocent local 
women is rife with symbolism about inappropriate exploitation and theft of the 
country’s resources.  Other explanations for the grease devil crisis sometimes 
included blaming western powers seeking to destabilize the Sri Lankan government 
(Venugopal 2015, 628).  In both the grease devil and Port City debates, we see the 
enduring power of xenophobic tropes in shaping political debate in Sri Lanka.   
  The grease devil and Port City rumors can be read together as examples of the 
way that foreign policy and geopolitics came to inform how Sri Lankans made sense 
of the world in the postwar period.  Many Sri Lankans are aware that their country’s 
small size and relative lack of geopolitical clout make it particularly reliant on 
alliances with larger regional neighbors to determine its standing internationally.  I 
have named this section “cosmopolitan rumors” because I wish to highlight the fact 
that the suspicion, uncertainty and mixed messages surrounding the Colombo Port 
City project were born at the epicenter of Sri Lanka’s largest city, and were powerful 
among people with high levels of education, political engagement and access to 
diverse forms of media. The rumors themselves required some level of 
understanding and concern for foreign policy, and gained currency in a context in 
which people cared deeply about Sri Lanka’s reputation worldwide, either because 
they traveled frequently or believed strongly in the promise of traveling in the future.  
The controversy over the Port City revealed that what might be generally called 
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“nationalism” was deployed by both the pro and anti-Port City camps.  Rather than 
pitting abstract concepts of “nationalism” and “cosmopolitanism” against one 
another, looking at the Port City rumors allows me to consider how nationalist 
rhetoric informed many different kinds of discussions about Colombo’s urban 
development.  
 
“The Chinese Will Arrange”: Pro-Port City Perspectives 
 
Not everyone shared in the critiques of the Port City that were circulating around 
Colombo.  To some of my informants, friends, and acquaintances, the Port City was 
a big opportunity for Sri Lanka, and calls to halt the project were merely standing in 
the way of much-needed progress.  In this line of thinking, the Port City would “put 
Sri Lanka on the map,” a phrase I heard repeated many times.  Another common 
refrain was that it would help Colombo become like Singapore or Dubai, not only in 
the well-rehearsed idea of it becoming a powerful, significant city in the Indian 
Ocean region, but in having a particularly well-developed waterfront and skyline, 
which would help it appear aesthetically similar to these model cities.  Sri Lankan 
nationalism came to the fore in these narratives as well; development and progress 
were framed as worthy goals for the nation as a whole.  If Chinese investment could 
propel Colombo towards greater standing internationally, if it could attract greater 
wealth and prosperity to the city, then the Port City was good for the country.     
It was not at all uncommon for politically savvy, young Colombo residents to 
simultaneously express excitement about the prospect of the Port City and to be 
anxious about China’s influence on the country.  Consider this blog post from a 
popular Colombo blogger, Yudhanjaya Wijeratne, who was among a group of 
journalists and writers invited to tour the Port City, and who shared his thoughts in a 
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post.  It is worth quoting at length, as it exemplifies the arc of many conversations on 
the Port City that took place in Colombo during the course of 2015:   
I personally have no doubt that economically, this is going to be a huge thing. 
People will live here. There’ll be 3.5 kilometers of public beaches. Actual 
malls will set up shop, and not just micromalls like Majestic City and 
Crescat. International companies will set up offices here – retail spaces are 
enough; it’s the offices that will really drive change. Sri Lanka has a skilled 
IT / BPO industry; that will probably blossom.  Sri Lanka badly needs this 
kind of investment if it’s to become anything like the massively 
important hub of the world every full-blooded Sri Lankan seems to think it is. 
We don’t have the money ourselves, and nobody is willing to give it to us. 
 
I was honestly reassured by how utterly profit-oriented the CHEC people 
seemed to be: between businessmen and politicians, it’s the latter that have 
problems with honesty. However, make no mistake: China is building this 
port. They’re say they’re not here to settle, but they have the right to; there’s 
plenty of space in there for everyone. And I don’t know what’s in that 
contract, but I don’t think Sri Lanka pulling out will be a painless process.  I 
also don’t think that everyone is playing with a straight bat. 
 
For better or the worse, Chinese influence is coming. Whether we end up 
turning into Singapore or into Hong Kong remains to be seen. (Wijeratne, 
2015)  
 
Wijeratne perfectly captures the attitude of many who saw the Port City as a 
generally good thing, even with some reservations. The idea that “Sri Lanka badly 
needs this kind of investment” if it is to become a “massively important hub” was the 
basic foundation of most pro-Port City rhetoric.  Both in this text and in my various 
interviews and conversations, the causal link was never exactly specified between 
the construction of the Port City and the transformation of the island into a “hub”; 
Wijeratne makes the most specific link between the two by citing the importance of 
more office space, though it is unclear why more offices necessarily need to be 
bundled along with the Port City development.  The appeal to “full-blooded Sri 
Lankans” is noteworthy.  Here the politics of “blood” are not employed to index 
racial or ethnic purity or membership of one particular group, but rather apply to the 
broader, more spacious label of “Sri Lankan.” Allegiance to a “Sri Lankan” identity 
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in this reading, however, rests on one’s loyalty to development projects like the Port 
City.   
 The last two sentences are perhaps the most telling and significant argument of 
the pro-Port City line: Chinese influence is cast as inevitable, and Sri Lanka’s only 
choice is to determine what form and to what extent this influence will be felt on the 
island.  The mention of Singapore and Hong Kong reference both an ideal outcome 
(the idea that Colombo would become like either of these cities) but also an 
important difference: Singapore is an independent city-state with high levels of 
development, while Hong Kong is a globally important financial center coming 
under ever-greater Chinese control.  Wijeratne’s blog post indicates not only the uses 
of Sri Lankan nationalism in framing the debate around the Port City, but also 
suggests the challenges and anxieties surrounding Sri Lanka’s geopolitical position 
and its future alliances.    
The rhetoric in Wijeratne’s blog post was echoed numerous times in real life 
conversations I had around Colombo.  For example, Ashan, a husband of one of my 
friends, the scion of an extremely wealthy and prominent family of lawyers, 
politicians, and other white collar professionals, surprised me with his simultaneous 
concern over Sri Lanka’s independence and sovereignty and his support for the Port 
City project.  One evening, as I drove with him and his wife through Colombo’s 
darkening streets, he began flipping through radio channels and paused on one; the 
crackling sound was that of Sri Lanka’s new Chinese-language radio station.  “Every 
time I hear it, I can feel a bit of our sovereignty leaving us,” he said mournfully.  I 
initially took this to mean that he was against the Port City, and made a mental note 
to check in with him later about his views on the project.   
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When eventually the topic came up more explicitly in conversation, I was 
surprised that my friend was actually not against the Port City at all; as we chatted 
about it, he asked me my own views.  I expressed some doubts over the Port City’s 
actual ability to attract more foreigners, suggesting that most tourists I knew would 
rather spend time elsewhere in Sri Lanka.  To my surprise, Ashan strenuously 
objected to this and told me that I was overlooking “all the Indian and Chinese 
tourists who want to hang out in malls.  The Port City will give them that.”  Ashan 
was making a subtle distinction between the perceived tastes and styles of western 
tourists versus visitors from neighboring Asian countries.  But he also, like many 
pro-Port City Colombo residents, was suggesting that the Port City would naturally 
be an attraction pulling visitors from across the region.  He too saw it as a way of 
“putting Sri Lanka on the map.”  
While many were ambivalent about Chinese influence on Sri Lanka but thought 
overall the Port City was a good idea, others outright welcomed it.  Unsurprisingly, 
this point of view tended to be taken by those who identified either as strong 
supporters of former President Mahinda Rajapakse as an individual, or as long time 
members of the SLFP more broadly (Rajapakse’s party).  Discussions in this vein 
tended to draw a link between the Port City project and abstract moral and ethical 
questions.  For example, when I spoke with an upper middle class housewife in 
Colombo 5, a long time SLFP supporter and member of a politically active family, 
about the project, she surprised me with her explicit support of Sri Lanka’s 
rapprochement with China.  Her reasons were based on the notion that the Chinese 
were overall more honest in their dealings with other countries, unlike the United 
States which “forces other countries to do what they say, and only on that basis they 
will give.” By contrast, according to her, the Chinese offered low interest rates on 
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loans and no conditions at all.  “The Chinese are successful because they worked 
hard to get what they have, India [is also] like that,” she told me.  Americans on the 
other hand “have always had everything and so they have too much…they developed 
systems like ‘work from home’ they are lazy.” In the course of our conversation, I 
was surprised that this woman drew on all the well-known stereotypes of the Chinese 
in Colombo - their supposedly inherently commercial nature, their hard work, 
“expressionless” (her words) affect and disciplined lifestyle (“they wear the same 
clothes everyday”) - but cited them not as any reason to distrust them, but rather as 
evidence of the Chinese being good business partners and reliable investors.   
Sri Lankan suspicion and resentment of western powers like the United States, 
Canada and Great Britain - along with India - was partially a product of what many 
perceived to be unfair criticism of the country’s human rights record.  To many Sri 
Lankans who saw the end of the civil war as an unequivocally positive step forward, 
the outcry over the Rajapakse government’s treatment of Tamil civilians was a form 
of sanctimonious hypocrisy on the part of these foreign countries, which devalued 
the victory over terrorism.  As a result, some in Colombo praised China for never 
having raised such challenges to Rajapakse’s administration, and saw giving them 
some land on the Port City territory as “returning the favor.”  
 As I have mentioned, those who supported the Port City project tended to be 
rather vague about exactly how the project would accomplish the advertised aims of 
making Colombo a more important regional and global city.  While the CHEC’s 
advertising and the words of government officials who had worked under the 
previous administration were full of tropes about the Port City being what Sri Lanka 
“needed”, the actual causal mechanism between the project and enhanced status for 
Colombo was unclear.  This was made particularly clear to me when I had the 
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opportunity to interview a high-level official at the UDA who had been in his 
position during the Rajapakse government, and was an unabashed supporter of the 
former president as well as of the Port City project.  When I asked him to talk to me 
more about the Port City, he said proudly that his agency had done the initial studies 
for the Port City; when asked about any possible concerns regarding the Chinese 
ownership of the land, he simply said that “if the Chinese can give all the money the 
Chinese can have a project here. It will bring Colombo to a higher standard.” He 
went on to describe the Port City as  source of “development” for Sri Lanka, which 
would bring more investment from other countries.  He described it as being similar 
to the Jumeirah complex (in Dubai) but “in Sri Lankan character.”   When I pressed 
him for details, he answered nearly all of my questions with a single confident 
answer: “the Chinese will arrange.”  
While those who opposed the Port City project sometimes drew on 
unsubstantiated rumors to make their points (eg. the Chinese checking passports at 
the entrance) my ethnographic research suggested that pro-Port City Colombars also 
relied on a mix of facts, rumors, opinions and hearsay to explain their positions.  
Being for the Port City was often a result of people’s attitudes towards the former 
government or China.  Even those who feared Chinese influence believed that the 
Port City would bring about development and progress often without very sound 
explanations of exactly how this would happen.  As I have shown in this section, 
unitary Sri Lankan nationalism came to the fore not only in critiques of the Port City 
project but also in the accounts of those who supported it.  Both sides of the Port 
City debate had to contend with limited information and facts about the project, and 
as a result tended to refer back to crude stereotypes, abstract geopolitical claims, or 
pre-existing social and party allegiances as a way of justifying their positions.  
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Hub and Nation: Spatial Imaginaries of Development 
 
The debates over the Colombo Port City offer a way of thinking together the 
spatial politics of hubness and nationalism. In chapter one, “the Politics of Hubness,” 
I observed that hubness discourse tends to involve some slippage in terms between 
“Sri Lanka” and “Colombo.” It is often unclear, in official discussions on national 
and urban development, exactly what relationship Colombo should have to its 
hinterlands or the rest of the island of Sri Lanka.  In nationalist terms, Colombo has 
long been considered an exceptional space - populated by ethnic and religious 
minorities, lacking any significance in Buddhist religious writings (Spencer 2015), 
and often seen as the home of Europeanized, “un-Sri Lankan” elites. This very 
exceptionalism is reinforced in hubness discourse, but rather than positioning 
Colombo outside an imagined mono-ethnic, mono-religious polity, it makes 
Colombo central to dreams of modernity, development and progress.  Both the 
discourses of hubness and nationalism position Colombo as unique and distinct from 
the rest of the island of Sri Lanka. I would like to suggest that by looking at the 
nationalist discourse which animated the Port City debates together with the 
aspirational rhetoric of turning Colombo into a global hub city, we are able to see the 
contradictions, gaps and occasional overlaps in the various spatial imaginaries 
shaping urban and national development in contemporary Sri Lanka.  Rather than 
seeing the pro and anti-Port City camps as either nationalist or cosmopolitan, their 
positions can more clearly be seen as mapping onto different understandings of the 
spatial politics of development.    
The debates over the Colombo Port City highlight the emergence of a unitary - 
that is, an island-wide, multi-ethnic - Sri Lankan nationalism in contemporary 
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political discourse.  Importantly, my analysis of the Port City controversy suggests 
that this unitary nationalism was not being invoked only by one side of the pro or 
anti-Port City division, but rather was deployed creatively by both sides.  The unity 
of the island of Sri Lanka as a territorial entity has been central to colonial and 
nationalist imaginings, with different effects and valences (Rampton 2011, Jazeel 
2009, Sivasundaram 2013).  Tamil nationalism presented an existential threat to 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism precisely because it suggested the territorial 
fragmentation of the island space typically understood to be a unified whole.  The 
Port City project seemed to some people to suggest a similar, but spatially distinct, 
fragmentation of the unitary island.  As one fisherman’s wife in Mutuwall, northern 
Colombo, put it when asked her thoughts on the Port City, “why give the land to the 
Chinese if it couldn’t be given to Tamil people in this country?” Her question was 
provocative in its flippant reference to the civil war and Tamil separatism.  It 
positioned the Port City as a threat to Sri Lankan unity as severe as that posed by 
Tamil rebels.  Intriguingly, by describing the Tamils as “in this country” the quote 
hints at greater sympathy for their claim as Sri Lankans, part of the country, than for 
the alien, outsider Chinese. On the other side of the debate, those who supported the 
Port City made also made this claim through appeals to national unity (as in the case 
of the Ranbumi rallies) and by suggesting that ultimately the project would be 
beneficial to the country’s development as a whole. How to make sense of these 
different spatial-developmental imaginaries?       
In Neoliberalism as Exception (2006), Aihwa Ong writes about the concept of 
“graduated sovereignty,” a way that states in Asia divide their territories and 
populations, offering different forms of citizenship, regulation, opportunity and 
forms of sovereignty in the same national territory.  Ong traces the shift in 
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sovereignty from the era of developmental states focused on the national economy to 
what she terms postdevelopmentalism, “a more dispersed strategy that does not treat 
the national territory as a uniform political space” (2006, 77).   She continues:     
Market-driven logic induces the coordination of political policies with the 
corporate interests, so that developmental decisions favor the fragmentation 
of the national space into various noncontiguous zones, and promote the 
differential regulation of populations who can be connected to or 
disconnected from global circuits of capital (2006, 77).   
 
The Port City project is a quintessential example of a “zone” introduced into the 
urban landscape of Colombo. Note, also, the resonance between Ong’s description of 
graduated sovereignty and the fear that Sri Lankans would have to “show a passport” 
to enter the Port City expressed by my informant in a previous section.    
 The pro-Port City camp in Sri Lanka explicitly champions it as a project that 
will offer connection to the “global circuits of capital” Ong mentions.  Rather than 
viewing the Port City controversy as an obvious case of nation or nationalism versus 
capital, the concept of graduated sovereignty allows me to consider these debates as 
a conflict over what kind of sovereignty model the Sri Lankan state should exercise 
over its territory. Under a system of graduated sovereignty, the integrity of the 
nation-state need not be set in contrast to the flows and requirements of capital. 
 The differentiation and fragmentation of space within states described by Ong 
echoes trends identified by geographers and scholars of urbanism more broadly.  As 
states broadly move away from a focus on national economies and national 
development - what Neil Brenner refers to as “spatial Keynesianism” (Brenner 
2004), increasingly we see extreme concentrations of wealth and capital in specific 
cities.  One could understand these as “frontier zones” (Sassen 2000) within national 
territories - in other words, cities become increasingly de-nationalized and “opened 
up” to global capital.  However, unlike Saskia Sassen who speaks of the 
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deterioration of the national spatiotemporal order in favor of a transnational one, 
Ong’s concept of graduated sovereignty allows us to think through the ways in which 
the accumulation of wealth and opportunity in cities does not contradict but rather 
reinforces new forms of statehood and sovereignty in much of Asia.    
Activists’ appeals to notions of local values or “our culture” were an expression 
of unitary Sri Lankan nationalism and an implicit critique of graduated sovereignty.  
Rather than attempting to sow divisions between Sri Lankans based on religion, 
ethnicity or language, activists against the Port City project framed their struggle as 
one of all non-elite Sri Lankans against the intertwined threats of neglectful and 
greedy elites, domineering Chinese and rapacious global capitalism.  The very same 
language of inter-ethnic unity and multi-religious cooperation that was used by the 
Ranbumi rallies was employed by the activists to precisely opposite ends: instead of 
viewing the Port City as bringing different groups together, for the anti-Port City 
coalition, Sri Lankan culture, broadly understood, was the most solid basis of 
resistance to such a project. It would be most productive, I think, to see the anti-Port 
City activists not so much as nationalists, which hardly distinguishes them from their 
opponents, but rather as proponents in other terms of what Brenner calls spatial 
Keynesianism. Just as I suggested in the preceding chapter that hubness is both a 
temporal and spatial claim, this section has highlighted the intertwining of spatial-
temporal imaginaries in understanding various development trajectories.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Shortly after my fieldwork in Sri Lanka concluded, the coalition government 
decided to reinstate the Colombo Port City project, and construction work resumed.  
Re-christened as the “Colombo Financial City,” the project now had the full support 
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of the new political leadership and was folded into the Western Province 
“Megapolis” plan, a comprehensive blueprint for the development of Colombo into a 
major economic center.  Official proclamations around the reinstated project were 
optimistic and ambitious, betraying no sign of the political turmoil which had led to 
the Port City being put on hold. Fittingly, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe 
invoked quintessential hubness imagery in his assertion that “the Financial City 
being built in Colombo will fill the vacuum for offshore financial services between 
Singapore and Dubai,” (The Island, 2016). Wickremasinghe’s comment, in keeping 
with the ideals of hubness, makes much of Colombo’s geographic position 
“between” two major financial centers, suggesting the importance of seizing on any 
available gaps in the already-existing flows of the global capitalist economy.  
Financial flows are rendered in explicitly spatial and geographic terms.   
 In the preceding chapter, “the Politics of Hubness,” I highlighted the fact that 
nostalgia for a pre-war Sri Lankan past combined with excitement and anticipation 
for a connected, cosmopolitan future manages to relegate the period of the civil war 
to a kind of detour on the path to development.  Hubness discourse draws a 
connection between the pre and post war moments, leaving a gap, an uncomfortable 
silence about the conflict itself. As this chapter has demonstrated, however, the 
project of rapid urban development cannot be fully delinked from the legacy of 
separatist conflict and ethno-nationalism. Planners and government officials may 
champion the cause of moving full steam ahead into the postwar future, but both the 
pro and anti Port City perspectives were influenced by the violence and turmoil that 
racked Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009.  In suggestions that the Port City might 
promote ethnic unity and in uncomfortable comparisons between Chinese and Tamil 
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ownership of Sri Lankan land, in the persistent anxieties about compromised Sri 
Lankan sovereignty, the echoes of the civil war can be still be heard, however softly.  
As my ethnography has shown, nationalism played a significant role in framing 
discussions around the Port City. What my engagement with these debates 
demonstrates is that rather than strictly Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, the Port City 
issue has brought to light the importance of unitary Sri Lankan nationalism, a form 
of nationalism relying on island-wide identification as Sri Lankan rather than as 
Tamil, Sinhalese or Muslim.  Paradoxically, it seems that debates over the Port City 
go a longer way towards accomplishing inter-ethnic unity than so many efforts on 
the part of politicians, NGOs and international organizations to promote a sense of 
harmony and understanding between groups.  My ethnography has highlighted some 
of the dangers of this unitary nationalism, especially in its reliance on crude 
xenophobic tropes and essentialist visions of what Sri Lankan “culture” is or should 
be.  And yet, somewhere amidst these perils are also moments of possibility, 
opportunities for rethinking what it means to be Sri Lankan, what forms of political 
organization and solidarity might be possible as the country moves into its postwar 
future. 
This ethnography has highlighted the labor and uncertainty that surround the 
project of bringing hub cities into being - the process of “putting Colombo on the 
map,” to borrow my informants’ hopeful phrasing.  In the following chapters, I turn 
to how such efforts are experienced by Colombo’s urban poor.  Dispossession lays 
the groundwork for accumulation, but this is a temporally and spatially uneven 
process.  Projects such as the Port City may experience interruption and disruption in 
their implementation, but they simultaneously disrupt the lives of coastal residents 
whose livelihood depends on unfettered access to Colombo’s maritime space.  
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Global cities do not appear, they are built.  This chapter has highlighted one aspect of 
this controversial, uncertain and ongoing endeavor.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE UNSTABLE COASTLINE: TEMPORALITIES AND SPATIALITIES OF 
DISPOSSESSION IN NORTHERN COLOMBO 
 
 
Ambitious plans for the development of Colombo into a world-class, global city 
are quite effective in erasing the presence of urban dwellers who do not fit the image 
of a city trying to compete with Singapore, Dubai or Hong Kong.  The dominant 
spatial and temporal imaginaries of post-war Colombo position the city as a site of 
luxury, wealth and cosmopolitanism offering a “modern” face of Sri Lanka to the 
world.  But what happens to urban dwellers who do not easily conform to these 
ideals? What futures are possible for those who inhabit a Colombo that does not 
match the aspirational images promoted by planners and developers? In this chapter, 
I explore this question through my ethnographic engagement with the fishing 
community of Mutuwall, northern Colombo.  Ultimately, I argue that through multi-
faceted and varied forms of dispossession that unfold over long timescales, such 
urban residents are gradually being denied a role in the future of this emerging hub 
city.  I consider the ways that the fishermen of Mutuwall constitute a challenge to 
dominant temporal tropes which center linear progress and development; often 
considered vestiges of the pre-capitalist past or of a non-urban way of life, the 
fishers’ presence only moments away from the center of Colombo draws attention to 
a “field of simultaneous, coeval spaces” (Choy 2011, 50) at the heart of the city.  In 
considering different temporalities suggested by the fishers’ inconvenient and 
awkward presence in Colombo, I am also able to offer a different temporal and 
spatial understanding of dispossession itself.   
 110 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the debates and political struggles surrounding 
the Colombo Port City project, the yet-to-be-completed development project which 
would change the face of Colombo by adding a new artificially created island to the 
city's waterfront.  The Port City would be a site of leisure, luxury and business 
activity befitting Colombo’s status as a “global hub.” In this chapter, I travel not far 
from the proposed site of the Port City, a short distance up the coast to a very 
different part of Colombo. The neighborhood of Mutuwall is a fishing enclave in a 
ramshackle, dilapidated part of northern Colombo. Mutuwall is home to a diverse 
community of fishermen and their families, port laborers, garment workers and other 
members of the urban poor and working class.  In the afternoons, the waves of the 
Indian Ocean lick the boats and even houses of Mutuwall residents, who have built 
their dwellings right up to the edge of the water.  Walkways and narrow paths 
between the houses are often strewn with garbage and fishing nets in the midst of 
being repaired for upcoming excursions out to sea.  Depending on which direction 
one turns while standing in the middle of this agglomeration of shacks, houses and 
boats, it is possible to take in with one sweeping look the sight of the open water, 
fishing boats and houses, industrial appendages of the Colombo Port complex, and, 
far in the distance, even the twin towers of Colombo’s World Trade Center.  
Mutuwall is both metaphorically and literally an important vantage point from which 
to observe the ongoing transformation of the city of Colombo.   
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Image 5 - Houses and fishing boats in Mutuwall, August 2015. Source: Author Photo. 
 
 
 
 
This image depicting Colombo as seen from Mutuwall from the 19th century has 
been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation 
 
Image 6 - View of Colombo Harbour from Mutwal: Capt. O’Brien’s Lithograph, 1864.  Source: R. 
K. de Silva, Early Prints of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 1800-1900, London: Serendib Publications, 
1985: 247. 
 
The striking visuals of Mutuwall - a place that manages to evoke the look of a 
rural fishing village in the midst of a quintessentially urban landscape - speak to the 
contradictions and inconveniences of urban development in Colombo.  In 
contemporary Sri Lanka, village life is cast as temporally and spatially distinct from 
the rhythms and realities of the capital.  Both Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist and more 
liberal and cosmopolitan discourses underscore this separation between village and 
city life: in nationalist imaginaries, Colombo is a space of ethnic, religious and 
linguistic mixing, lacking the piety and religious significance of other Sri Lankan 
towns (Spencer and Amarasuriya 2015).  Liberal cosmopolitan narratives, on the 
other hand, also imply a strong division between village and city, because 
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Colombo’s exceptional status and progress vis-a-vis the culturally “backwards” 
countryside represents an opportunity for Sri Lanka to compete globally with other 
countries and the city-states of Dubai, Singapore and Hong Kong. I would suggest 
that for those who subscribe to neoliberal visions of Colombo’s future development, 
the anxieties caused by the existence of a seemingly rural, and poor, enclave like 
Mutuwall only a short journey from the center of Colombo operate similarly to the 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist’s anxieties about overlapping, fuzzy boundaries of 
ethnicity, language and religion.  In both cases, there is little room for a fishing 
village at the heart of Colombo.  Mutuwall represents a collapsing of spatialities and 
temporalities widely assumed to be separate and distinct from one another.   
This chapter offers a fine-grained look at the daily, lived experience of 
dispossession as it unfolds, slowly, from the vantage point of a peripheral urban 
community.  Urban scholars and especially those concerned with the development of 
world-class or “global” cities in Asia, Africa and Latin America have long pointed to 
dispossession as one of the cornerstones of the formation of such urban spaces (eg. 
Goldman 2013, Roy and Ong 2011, Ghertner 2015), as poor urban residents are 
increasingly displaced by state agencies enacting agendas of beautification, “slum 
clearance” or “upgrading” and securitization of city spaces.  Evicting and relocating 
Mutuwall residents is a step towards making Colombo match the ideal images 
already circulating in marketing materials and urban planning documents which 
celebrate the city as an Asian metropolis. The use of future-oriented ambitions as a 
mode of justifying urban evictions and dispossession is well-documented (Roy 2016, 
Goldman 2013, Ghertner 2015); this chapter draws from my ethnographic fieldwork 
to analyze how such futures are experienced in the present by urban residents.          
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In this chapter, I consider the patterns of dispossession in Colombo as creating 
urban surplus populations (Li 2009), rather than necessarily incorporating the urban 
poor into the labor of building the new global city.  Drawing on debates in 
contemporary Marxist theory which position primitive accumulation not as a one-off 
historical moment preceding capitalism’s emergence, I understand accumulation by 
dispossession and primitive accumulation as ongoing processes which occur 
simultaneous with other phases of capitalist urban development.  I question the 
formulation “accumulation by dispossession” and focus instead on the second part of 
that construction - dispossession - as not necessarily leading to accumulation.  Like 
Li (2009), I consider the disjointed spatial and temporal effects of dispossession.  In 
other words, I take seriously the idea that while capitalist accumulation is facilitated 
and underwritten by acts of dispossession, the disconnect between where and when 
accumulation and dispossession are experienced is a major part of how global cities 
are brought into being.       
In what follows, I offer context for the situation of fishermen in contemporary 
Sri Lanka, showing the ways fishers contradict Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism which 
values agrarian - but not necessarily maritime - forms of labor.  In the following 
section, I draw on various strands of Marxist theory to suggest that the fishers of 
Mutuwall are best understood as a form of “surplus population” (Li 2009) at the 
heart of Colombo.  Next, I present context about Mutuwall specifically, explaining 
its situation as a community “on the edge” socially, financially and spatially.  The 
following section explores the threat of eviction posed by various government plans 
for the area, and describes Mutuwall residents’ reactions to these schemes.  In the 
subsequent section, I explore fishers’ discourses over the limited, foreclosed futures 
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experienced not only through the loss of land and dwelling place, but also with 
regards to economic activity and forms of work.  In the penultimate section, I 
consider the fragmented temporalities and spatialities implied in my ethnography, 
and I discuss how this contradicts the dominant way of understanding Colombo’s 
development.  I conclude by reiterating the non-linear nature of accumulation and 
dispossession, arguing for an understanding of these dynamics that takes seriously 
their disjointed nature.    
Ultimately, I suggest that the ethnography presented here offers a way of 
thinking dispossession not as a linear, organized process with clear outcomes but 
rather as a complex and occasionally contradictory set of intersecting moments, 
plans and projects.  An ethnographic look at the slow, sometimes confusing nature of 
dispossession allows for a nuanced understanding of how urban residents actually 
experience life at the spatial and affective edges of today’s emerging global cities.  
 
Situating Sri Lankan Fishermen 
 
Fishermen (divera or malukariya)12 in Sri Lanka occupy precarious and marginal 
positions.  This is due to a number of different factors: questions of ethnicity, 
religion and caste; the uncertain nature of the livelihood which gives them their 
name; and the growing threat of dispossession and eviction from their lands by the 
                                                
12 Sinhala offers at least two words for those who practice fishing as their main occupation.  
Divera is a more polite way of referring to fisherpeople, I was told, and when speaking Sinhala this 
was the term I used throughout my fieldwork.  Malukariya translates literally to “fish guys” and I 
never heard any fisher people speak of themselves using this term – it was only used by others to refer 
to them.  In her ethnography Shorelines (2009), Ajantha Subramanian uses the term “fishers” – I 
interchangeably employ the term fishers, fishermen and fisher people here, as well as simply using the 
Sinhala words.  While I appreciate Subramanian’s use of the non-gender specific “fisher,” most of my 
informants were men and thus where appropriate I still refer to specific men as “fishermen.” 
“Fishermen” and “fisher people” were the English terms I used throughout my fieldwork when 
speaking to others about the community I was interviewing.  I keep these terms here in the spirit of 
maintaining a connection to my own field notes and to the actual conversations I was having while in 
Colombo. 
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state and by private corporations.  At one of my weekly Sinhala lessons I told my 
tutor, a middle class housewife, about a trip I had recently taken to a beach town in 
the south.  She asked me whether I had seen any fishermen – “they’re frightening 
aren’t they?” She went on for some time about their unpleasing, rough appearance: 
dark, burned by the sun perhaps, and wild, she mused that “no one could help them.”  
They liked to live by their own rules which, she made sure I understood, were wrong 
somehow – but it was in their nature to live this way, and they had to be left to carry 
on as ever.  In the Western Province, of which Colombo is part, fishermen are 
largely Catholic; stereotypes about Catholics merge with stereotypes about the lower 
classes to produce an image of fisher people as friendly, rough, big drinkers, 
irresponsible, and somehow constitutionally disposed to unpredictable, roving ways, 
not easily brought into the fold of middle class respectability and stability.    
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism does not hold a clear place for fisherpeople in its 
mythos.  The central images of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist ideology are the 
symbols of agriculture and the peasantry – what my informants in Mutuwall might 
call “land jobs.”  The glorification of rice (paddy) cultivation in particular forms the 
cornerstone of much nationalist discourse in Sri Lanka (Brow 1990; Woost 1993; 
Tennekoon 1988).  Writing about the end of the Sri Lankan civil war and the 
reactionary forces at work in the new post-war political scene, Nira Wickremasinghe 
observed that these images of peasant-ness were mobile – they could be evoked and 
channeled by urbanites as much as by the rural classes:  
Nostalgia for the rural way of life was harnessed as a winning political strategy 
that the ruling party gradually made its own.  In recent years, the peasant as 
projected and represented by state institutions became not simply a man who 
cultivated the soil expecting help or redress from the state. In the vision of more 
recent Sinhala ideologues, ranging from those in the regime in power to the JVP, 
the “peasant” could very well be a businessman who sells his products in rural 
areas or even a city dweller who empathizes with the life of the paddy cultivator 
and yearns for rural values. (Wickremasinghe 2009, 1051) 
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And yet the nostalgia Wickremasinghe describes here is only ever useful as nostalgia 
particularly for the agricultural, the land-based, never for the maritime.  While some 
of the businessmen or city dwellers she describes may wish, for political purposes or 
from some sort of genuine identification with “the rural” to present themselves as 
“peasants” no one would actively try to channel the identity of “fisherman.” The 
political currency of fisher-ness is non-existent, and makes no sense in a context 
fixated on land cultivation as the vehicle of national glory and source of Sinhala-
Buddhist identity.     
The economic and material bases of Mutuwall’s precarious position are also 
worth noting.  Most of my fishermen informants were very clear with me that they 
saw no future for their profession, and they did not want their children to become 
fishermen if they could help it.  Catches are declining and the coastline is eroding.  
August is supposed to be the time of greatest abundance and most generous hauls 
from the ocean.  And yet every one of the fishermen I interviewed during this time 
said this year had been bad, worse than any they could remember.  Fishermen try and 
sell their catch at local markets, or to merchants (mudalali) who buy the whole catch 
and re-sell to customers.  The mudalali could easily be a “local thug” (in the words 
of the fishermen) and they would be forced to sell their catch to him at a price of his 
choosing, with no option of finding other buyers.  Given that fish rapidly spoil and 
need to be sold quickly, fishermen have limited choices when it comes to selling off 
their catch.     
Many avenues for upward mobility, or at least towards greater stability, are 
closed off.  For example, despite being practicing Roman Catholics many of the 
fishermen and their wives complained - to me and also directly to my priest and nun 
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companions, Father Thomas and Sister Jane - that their children were being turned 
away from some of the better Catholic schools in northern Colombo.  They told of 
how the teachers and principals at these institutions made prejudicial comments 
about the fisher children, worrying that they would be bad influences and too unruly 
compared to the students from more elite Catholic families.  On top of this, the cost 
of attendance was prohibitive: Father Thomas told me that the entrance fee for a 
good Catholic school could be between Rs.200,000 and Rs. 500,000 (roughly $1,400  
- $3,400 USD), more than the monthly cost of renting a luxury apartment in some of 
Colombo’s wealthiest neighborhoods.13  
Once when I was interviewing an older fisherman, I concluded our conversation 
by asking whether he had anything else he’d like to say, any opinions, thoughts, 
stories? How did he feel about participating in my research, was it alright with him? 
He replied by saying that he was just happy I was here asking questions, that he 
wanted me to write about Mutuwall because in his estimation “no one cares.  No one 
even knows about us.” The comment struck me, and its veracity was borne out in my 
discussions with basically everyone else I knew of higher class status in Colombo.  If 
a middle or upper class Colombo person thought about Mutuwall and the 
surrounding area at all, then they would likely have something negative to say about 
the inhabitants (as in the case of my tutor).  But it was altogether more likely that 
residents of Colombo’s wealthier central and southern neighborhoods simply 
wouldn’t have heard of the fishing enclave at all, and wouldn’t know the community 
there existed in the first place.  Fishers were thought to be people who lived much 
                                                
13 To give an idea of budgets and earnings in the area, families regularly spoke to me of 
receiving loans or aid amounting to around Rs. 20,000 or Rs. 30,000 – this was understood to be a 
significant amount, given that fishermen could buy a used boat for Rs. 40,000.  I was told by one of 
the most successful fishermen in the area that under favorable conditions, he could earn up to 
Rs.50,000 over the course of three days.  However, I came to understand that this was very much out 
of the ordinary – most of the fishermen earned far less and had access to less sophisticated equipment. 
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farther away, not inside the city.  This kind of attitude speaks to the particular 
marginality of this set of informants: not seen as “slum dwellers,” the prototypical 
figures of urban poverty, they manage to escape both notice and consideration. 
While fishers in Sri Lanka are generally a marginalized population and face 
numerous challenges (Menon et al. 2016), this chapter takes seriously the particular 
ways in which the northern Colombo fishers of Mutuwall face specific forms of 
erasure, marginalization and dispossession precisely because of their unexpected 
location in an urban area.  Fishers become "bodies out of place" (Puwar 2014), 
seemingly rural subjects who challenge the aspirational logic of projects like the 
Colombo Port City, which market themselves by invoking the idea of a fully urban, 
sophisticated and clean metropolis which naturally must house middle class and 
wealthy residents who can make use of its services.  Even at the level of academic 
knowledge production, most scholarly work on Sri Lanka that mentions fishers tends 
to focus on fishing communities in the east, the north, or in parts of the western 
province outside Colombo (Stirrat 1989, Menon et al. 2016, Lehman 2013, Walker 
2010).  Colombo fishermen pose a contradiction and challenge not only to Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalist imaginaries which center agricultural labor, but equally to the 
contemporary vision of a world-class, global city.     
 
Urban Fishermen as Surplus Population 
 
 My ethnographic engagement with the Mutuwall community initially 
emerged from a series of encounters with two social justice activists, a Catholic 
priest and nun (whom I refer to here as Father Thomas and Sister Jane) who were 
organizing the fishers against the Colombo Port City project.  I will return to the Port 
City in subsequent sections, but here I recall a comment that Sister Jane made to me 
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one afternoon as we were driving through the streets of northern Colombo on our 
way to an activist gathering.  Sister told me that the government was intent on using 
up “every bit of land” that was anywhere near a body of water.  “Any piece of land 
with a lake or water on it, they put a hotel on it!” exclaimed Father, exasperated with 
the developers who built extravagant hotels and resorts which sometimes stayed 
empty, failing to attract many visitors.  As they spoke, Father and Sister situated this 
over-use of coastal and lakeside land within the larger political economic transition 
happening in Sri Lanka.  In their estimation, the government was only interested in 
industry, not in agriculture and not even in helping the plantation sector, historically 
one of the most important sectors of the Sri Lankan economy.  The state, they 
explained, was more interested in building big cities and helping the tourism 
industry.  Speaking of the fishermen, Sister Christine told me mournfully, “these 
poor [fisher] boys and girls will become the room boys and girls for the tourists.”  
 Father and Sister’s comments revealed their long-held leftist political 
commitments and their suspicion of the Sri Lankan state’s economic policies.  When 
Sister spoke of “room boys and girls,” she referred to a process whereby youth from 
fishing communities would no longer be able to ply the trade of their parents, but 
would instead be folded into the growing service and tourism industry.  Instead of 
living and working by the ocean, they would work in hotels along the coastline.  
These images of alienated labor and separation of formerly rural workers from the 
natural world naturally brought to mind the notion of primitive accumulation 
advanced by Marx ([1887] 2005) in the first volume of Capital.  In what follows, I 
discuss this Marxian concept and the importance of spatial politics for how we 
understand this concept in relation to development processes in Colombo.     
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 In Capital Volume 1, Marx introduces the notion of primitive accumulation 
as the “original sin” of capitalism (Marx [1887] 2005: 507) in which peasants are 
expropriated from their land and as a result have to sell their labor power to 
capitalists in order to survive: “The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the 
peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole process.”  (Marx [1887] 2005: 508). 
Primitive accumulation is 
the process which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of 
production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of 
subsistence and of production into capital, on the other, the immediate 
producers into wage labourers. The so-called primitive accumulation, 
therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer 
from the means of production. It appears as primitive, because it forms the 
prehistoric stage of capital and of the mode of production corresponding with 
it. (Marx [1887] 2005: 508)  
 
Though he writes that “the history of this expropriation, in different countries, 
assumes different aspects, and runs through its various phases in different orders of 
succession, and at different periods,” (Marx [1887] 2005: 508), Marx famously used 
the example of the enclosure of agricultural land in England beginning in the 15th 
century as his primary case study for investigating the dynamics of primitive 
accumulation.  Numerous Marxist scholars have shown, however, that the concept of 
primitive accumulation is a fertile one for understanding capitalist processes beyond 
the specific historical moment analyzed in Capital.   
 David Harvey has most famously re-framed primitive accumulation as 
accumulation by dispossession, noting that it is an ongoing feature of capitalist 
systems, rather than a phenomenon particular to only one historical moment (2004: 
74).  Harvey demonstrates that the logic of accumulation by dispossession can be 
seen in multiple contemporary processes, from increasingly rapacious forms of 
speculative finance to intellectual property rights regimes to cultural 
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commodification, and to “the corporatization and privatization of hitherto public 
assets (like universities) to say nothing of the wave of privatization of water and 
other public utilities that has swept the world, constitute a new wave of ‘enclosing 
the commons.’” (Harvey 2004: 75).  Harvey’s broad application of the term 
“accumulation by dispossession” has been echoed in anthropological and 
ethnographic studies which show how the concept is relevant beyond Marx’s 
original usage, in current situations of dispossession across different contexts (e.g. 
Harms 2012, Elyachar 2005).    
 Though Harvey’s important repurposing of “primitive accumulation” into 
“accumulation by dispossession” is critical in showing the wide variety of 
contemporary processes - financial, institutional, cultural - that echo the original 
concept of primitive accumulation, for the purposes of my analysis, I wish to return 
to the original spatial framing inherent in Marx’s own account.  A specific 
understanding of what constitutes the “rural” and the “urban” is at play in the 
description that Marx offers in Capital.  While accumulation by dispossession is a 
major intervention and allows us to think more flexibly about the forms that 
dispossession might take, it is critical to remember that processes very similar to the 
original ones described by Marx are still taking place in much of the developing 
world.  Marx was clear about the links between proletarianization and urbanization; 
the expropriated peasants in his account would need to find work in urban centers in 
which they could sell their labor power.  The ethnography presented in this chapter 
suggests that while spatially the dynamics of dispossession may be compressed - that 
is, the “rural” may in fact be part of the “urban” or at least located very close to it - 
Marx’s original focus on loss of land continues to be relevant, even for the poor 
living in the heart of major cities.  
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 Colombo’s urban fishermen, I argue, are best understood as a form of surplus 
population; their situation offers a unique example of how the dynamics of 
accumulation by dispossession play out in contemporary cities in the Global South 
among populations that are not easily classed as either fully “rural” or “urban.”  I 
borrow the term surplus population from Tania Li, who has applied to it rural 
communities in Southeast Asia and India who are dispossessed from their land but 
who are not readily absorbed into capitalist projects.  Li argues against those who 
take an overly functional view of the dynamics of accumulation by dispossession; 
the populations who lose their land do not automatically find jobs in service 
industries, in fact it is not uncommon for the capitalist projects doing the 
dispossessing to draw on reserves of labor quite distinct from the populations they 
have expropriated (2009: 71).  It is only in acknowledging this disconnect between 
who gets dispossessed and who gets jobs that we can confront the true costs of 
capitalist accumulation, and the fact that states need to actively “make live” certain 
populations - otherwise they will perish.  As Li puts it, “to assume a link between 
dispossession, and the (re)production of a labour reserve is not just too linear, it is 
dangerously complacent” (2009: 70).        
 Returning to Li’s account of accumulation by dispossession and surplus 
populations, I situate my analysis of the Colombo fishermen within a dynamic she 
describes: “one in which places (or their resources) are useful, but the people are not, 
so that dispossession is detached from any prospect of labour absorption”  (Li 2009: 
69).  The distinction between places and people that Li advances is precisely at the 
core of what I observed happening in Colombo over the course of my fieldwork.  
Colombo’s small surface area means that space is a valuable commodity, more so - 
as evidenced by Father and Sister’s remarks - when the space in question affords an 
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ocean view.  Indeed, field notes from my first visit to Mutuwall reveal surprise on 
two levels: first, that this small fishing shanty still “counted” as Colombo, given its 
visual incongruity with the urban landscape of Colombo - seen from a certain angle, 
it looked more like a far away fishing village than a neighborhood right next to the 
large industrial port, and, second, that the fishers were actually still there at all.  
How, I wondered, could fishermen be permitted to occupy what was clearly such 
valuable coastal land?  It was not long before I understood that their very presence in 
northern Colombo was under threat from numerous directions, something I discuss 
in the rest of this chapter.  
 As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, accumulation by 
dispossession is an ongoing process which retains its relevance for understanding 
dynamics which continue apace beyond Marx’s own historical account of them.  
When applied to the acquisition of valuable land occupied by poor and marginalized 
populations, one effect of these dynamics of accumulation is the creation of “surplus 
populations” (Li 2009) whose utility is not evident for capitalist expansion.  Seen in 
this light, even the mournful words of Sister Jane with which I opened this 
discussion may appear too optimistic: urban fishermen would be lucky to find 
employment in the tourism sector.  Their futures may not lie in thankless wage labor, 
but in forms of destitution and marginality that are harsher still.  
 
On the Edge 
 
The unique position of the Mutuwall fishing community is best understood in 
relation to the wider spatial politics and practices of post-war Colombo.  First, it is 
critical to emphasize just how close Mutuwall is to the downtown core of Colombo, 
including the city’s World Trade Center, Fort, and other sites of wealth and 
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accumulation.  Its proximity to these locations only serves to makes the comparison 
between Mutuwall and the iconic spaces of the Colombo elite even more stark, and 
jarring.  The increasingly extreme social fragmentation of space within the tight 
confines of central Colombo today was always rendered particularly striking on my 
brief tuk-tuk rides from where I lived in the inner districts of the city to the northern 
coastal stretches where Mutuwall is situated.     
The northern neighborhoods of Colombo 13 and 15, those closest to the Port, 
were once areas where elite Europeans and Sri Lankans lived.  As the city grew 
under British rule, however, the wealthy moved farther away from the Port and the 
more southern and central areas such as Cinnamon Gardens and Bambalapitiya.  
Today the northern reaches of Colombo are generally inhabited by low-income and 
working class families; the houses, some of them quite large and clearly once owned 
by well-to-do families, are dilapidated and run-down.  These neighborhoods are 
typically home to ethnic and religious minorities such as Muslims, Tamils and 
Christians - it is not uncommon to see Hindu kovils right next to mosques or shrines 
to Catholic saints.  Perhaps because of these diverse religious sites, the area 
surrounding Mutuwall was known by some of my Sinhala-Buddhist informants as a 
site of black magic and witchcraft.  Other negative associations emerged as well: 
many of my middle class friends and acquaintances had a hard time believing I went 
to this area regularly, and cautioned me about organized crime and drug-use in the 
area.  Even among working class people from different parts of Colombo, the area 
surrounding Mutuwall suggested danger - I regularly traveled to the neighborhood 
with the same tuk-tuk driver, who would prefer to drive elsewhere while waiting for 
me to complete my interviews, rather than linger nearby. 
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    Residents of Mutuwall told me that the beach had started to be settled in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s; of the families that had been there longer, most told me 
that when they arrived the beach had been pristine, with far fewer houses.  These 
families tended to complain that the current state of affairs was very different from 
what they had encountered when they had first come to this area multiple decades 
ago.  Mutuwall was considered something of an ideal location for fishers in this part 
of the country.  Unlike other parts of the western coast where tidal patterns led to 
rough waters at different times of year, in Mutuwall, one could count on relatively 
calm waves all year round, which meant it was easier to get in and out of the fishing 
boats.  Because of this, fishers from elsewhere in the Western Province would often 
travel to Mutuwall and either leave their boats there, commuting there for daily 
fishing excursions, or they might set up temporary accommodation and stay there for 
a whole season before returning to their own villages.         
Residents of Mutuwall made a distinction between those who were fishermen 
and those who worked “land jobs.” “Land jobs” often included activities like 
masonry or carpentry; working to unload goods or drive trucks at the Port of 
Colombo; manual labor for local firms; or - for women - garment work.  There was 
no discernible status difference between the general situation of those who worked 
land jobs and those who made their living by fishing, but my fisher interlocutors 
were generally proud of their status as fishermen.  Fishing was understood to provide 
a favorable contrast to other jobs in which one had to obey instructions and listen to 
a boss; by fishing, one was engaged in a more independent form of economic 
activity that effectively made fishermen their own bosses.  While fishers worked 
together in various ways and often went out with multiple men on one fishing boat, 
they understood it as an occupation that was both inherited through a family history 
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of fishing, and which conferred more independence and prestige than a “land job.” 
Women did not fish.  In keeping with the observations of other Sri Lanka scholars 
concerned with fishing (eg. Stirrat 1989), I did see women helping with various tasks 
related to fishing, such as the mending of nets, but not with the actual act of catching 
fish.  When I interviewed fishermen’s wives, they typically spoke of a desire to work 
but a need to balance work with other responsibilities like looking after children and 
elderly family members.  If they could earn income by doing something at home 
while they attended to these household tasks, they explained, that would be the ideal 
arrangement.  The women I came to know who did earn income independently of 
their husbands tended to be those married to men with “land jobs” - through 
preparing and selling food, mending clothes or moneylending, some women in 
Mutuwall were able to earn their own money. 
Fishing was simultaneously described as a dying profession and one that was 
being transformed by technology, with both positive and negative effects.  There was 
a divide in Mutuwall between those who used GPS devices to fish and those who 
couldn’t afford them or did not know how to operate them.  In general, I found that 
those who owned their own GPS were also the ones who were more successful 
financially; however not all those who had access to a GPS were able to translate this 
into economic stability.  Fishers sometimes commented that the widespread use of 
GPS technology was actually lowering the barrier to entry into the fishing profession 
and making it so that anyone could fish; this was contrasted with older forms of 
knowledge about the ocean and intuition that had been the only guiding forces for 
their fathers or grandfathers to catch a sufficient amount of fish.  GPS devices were 
also blamed for overfishing - because fishers shared the coordinates of locations with 
abundant fish amongst themselves, this caused a lot of competition for fishing in the 
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same spots and some fishers worried that this left insufficient time for the fish 
populations to breed, lay eggs and renew themselves.  
Mutuwall is steeped in debt.  Many of the families I interviewed owed money on 
their fishing boats, engines, and other equipment; on ongoing home improvement 
projects; and in some cases had gone into debt to pay for basic utilities like 
electricity.  Because most people in Mutuwall lacked assets to use as collateral when 
requesting loans, they rarely got bank loans for these expenses; instead, they turned 
to moneylenders, or borrowed from friends and relatives in the area.  I interviewed 
one of the local money-lenders, a woman whose first husband had been a fisher, but 
had died, and was now married to a former soldier.  She had turned to moneylending 
due to her own precarious economic position; when she was first widowed, she 
earned an income by selling marijuana, but as her children got older she was 
concerned that this line of work would bring shame on them, so she began giving out 
small loans instead.  Some of the more successful fishermen in the area also 
practiced moneylending as a side job along with their fishing.  By charging what 
were considered to be low or reasonable interest rates - five or six percent per loan - 
and by lending selectively to those who seemed capable of paying back, these men 
and women told me they still had cordial relationships with their neighbors in the 
community.  The use of such personal networks as opposed to reliance on bank loans 
or other formal channels speaks to the self-contained nature of the Mutuwall 
community. 
 Despite the negative associations attached to fishermen as a social group, 
conversations with Mutuwall residents made it clear that fishing as an occupation 
was understood as prestigious.  While those who worked “land jobs” never indicated 
shame or disappointment at the fact that they did not fish, fishers and their families 
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did positively value the work of fishing - even as they said repeatedly that they saw 
no future for this kind of work, and did not wish their own children to follow in their 
footsteps.  Fishing was understood to be simultaneously a noble, admirable, skillful 
occupation and also one that was disappearing and offered very little in terms of 
future prospects.   
 Fishing offered freedom.  Several Mutuwall fishermen stated that they were 
proud of their profession because it meant following their own schedule and not 
having to report to a boss.  Land jobs, by contrast, involved work that was less 
independent, and in which one was accountable to a boss and to a regimented 
schedule.  In some ways, the fishermen of Mutuwall channeled and celebrated the 
very same negative stereotypes that non-fishers held of them, taking pride in the 
ability it gave them to come and go as they pleased.  In one interview with a group of 
itinerant fishers who regularly came to Mutuwall for seasonal work, I asked if they 
might ever consider taking on land jobs, as a way to gain more stability and earn 
more money if fishing was in fact as endangered of a profession as many fishermen 
themselves seemed to imply.  The group answered vehemently that they would only 
ever consider such a move if fishing became completely impossible.  Otherwise, 
they preferred to eke out an existence fishing while it was possible, even if it was 
difficult.  This was the only skill they possessed, they told me, and they were willing 
to fish until they died.    
 Mutuwall is a place on the edge.  As this section has shown, precarity is an 
enduring feature of life in this part of Colombo - financially, materially, socially, 
Mutuwall’s residents are “on the edge” in that fishing as occupation is an unstable, 
unpredictable livelihood, one which situates fishers outside of normal rhythms of 
capitalist production even as they inhabit an urban environment only minutes away 
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from some of the most emblematic sites of commercial life in Colombo - the port, 
and the downtown financial district.  Mapping onto a spatial imaginary of Sri Lanka 
in which the agricultural heartland is the core of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist myth, 
Mutuwall is also on the edge by virtue of its coastal location.  Mutuwall inhabitants 
occupy an edge of urban life: a place literally at the border of both city and nation-
state (the shoreline), and one that is at risk of being cleared of its current inhabitants 
in order to make room for more profitable, aesthetically pleasing occupants in 
keeping with the vision of a world-class Colombo.   
 
Eviction Imminent  
 
The first time I came to Mutuwall, I had a sinking feeling in my stomach.  The 
reason was that I had immediately put two and two together: the fishing village is so 
close to the center of Colombo, occupies a place with such a beautiful vista, literally 
right on the water, that I didn’t think the fishermen could be here very long.  With 
the glittering towers of the Colombo World Trade Center visible in the distance, it 
seems quite shocking that they are still there at all.  Remarks like Father’s and 
Sister’s about the government’s determination to use up any bit of coastal land were 
simultaneously a commentary on the aesthetic sensibilities of the new global 
Colombo, and on the financial and economic imperatives of creating more modern, 
efficient connections between the port and the rest of the city. This patch of land was 
likely to be considered very valuable one day - even if currently the neighborhood is 
seen as dilapidated and dangerous - because it offered a pristine ocean view, which 
might be enjoyed by wealthy tourists.  It also might simply need to be “cleared” of 
people in order to facilitate the construction of any number of urban infrastructure 
projects. Once again, it is the place, the location, which is valuable, not the people 
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who occupy it.  The Mutuwall fishermen and land laborers who inhabit the 
ramshackle houses, park their boats and strew their nets are not desirable urban 
residents but are seen rather as a troublesome, backwards form of surplus population 
on valuable Colombo real estate.   
Accounts of Sri Lankan life after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami have 
highlighted the ways that coastal land was seized by the government; in fact this is 
one of the major case studies in Naomi Klein’s popular book The Shock Doctrine in 
which she lays out her theory of “disaster capitalism.” Similarly, in her discussion of 
“the securitization of fear” in eastern Sri Lanka, Jennifer Hyndman  (2007) analyzes 
the government’s buffer zone policy, describing how the rhetoric of safety and 
disaster prevention was actually used to dispossess fishing communities who had 
been living by the sea.  Buffer zones were of different widths in Tamil and Sinhalese 
areas, leading to accusations that Tamil coastal dwellers were being discriminated 
against on ethnic grounds, kept farther away from the water; businesses in both 
Tamil and Sinhalese majority areas however were allowed to rebuild where people 
were not (Hyndman 2007). 
The threat of relocation or eviction for Mutuwall residents is not clearly tied to 
any single project.  Rather, the fishermen and land workers of the area are at risk of 
displacement from a number of different factors, each of which proceeds with its 
own timeline and logics.  The Colombo Port City project, which I discussed in 
Chapter 2, is one possible driver of relocation.  As one young fisherman in Mutuwall 
told me, if “rich people” began occupying a new luxury island so close to the most 
fertile fishing areas, they were likely to “call the police” at the sight of fishermen, 
who were visually marked as lower-class and not proper residents or customers of 
the facilities on the Port City site.   
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However, the Port City might cause or contribute to relocation in other ways; 
many of the fishermen I spoke to were concerned that the ongoing construction and 
dredging of sand would add to already high levels of coastal erosion, literally 
making the land on which their houses were built disappear over time. Combined 
with the anticipated decline in fish populations who would have a harder time laying 
eggs and reproducing in increasingly murky and trafficked waters, many fishermen 
were convinced that even without formal orders to relocate, the very act of 
constructing the Port City would make fishing impossible, thereby pushing Mutuwall 
residents off their land.  The idea of receiving compensation for damages to their 
livelihood was not appealing to most residents, as they were certain it would never 
truly reimburse them for their losses.  No amount of compensation would replace the 
way of life that would be lost.  In the words of Peter, a fisherman in his fifties and 
father to three young girls, “we don’t care what they give, we will never leave this 
area.  Our whole life is here, if they ask us not to fish, how can we live?” 
Because I had initially come to Mutuwall as part of my research on the Port City 
project, I initially assumed that its construction was the main reason for fishers to 
fear eviction.  I framed most of my questions along these lines, incorrectly thinking 
that if the fishers could mobilize successfully against the Port City project, there 
might be a chance for them to keep their land.  I soon learned, however, that this 
assumption was reductive and incorrect.  
A few months into conducting interviews in Mutuwall, I learned that plans for 
relocation were already underway - or at least, they had been underway, before the 
Port City project was green lighted, and before the change in government of January 
2015.  My research assistant and I were speaking with Miss Delilah, a petite, 
attractive woman in her 30s whose husband, a mason, had built them one of the 
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larger and more ornate houses in the enclave. As she swept her floor and then got 
around to the task of preparing lunch packets, which she sold every day to the priests 
and teachers up the hill at the Catholic school, she would periodically urge us 
on,“kiyanne,” (speak), ask your questions.  We got onto the topic of politics - “I 
don’t care, as long as the politicians let us be” was her opinion of the upcoming 
parliamentary election.  And then, almost off-handedly, she said that the previous 
government was going to demolish these houses and move everybody into high rise 
apartment buildings.  “But apartments are crap,” she told us, indicating that this was 
hardly an appealing option.  By now, word had gotten around: the famous high-rises, 
designed precisely for moving low-income people out of Colombo’s central 
neighborhoods to facilitate new, modern structures - often high rises themselves, 
though with different aesthetics and imagined inhabitants - were of low quality and 
their residents were unhappy.  
The potential relocation of the families at Mutuwall was supposedly motivated 
by the desire to create a new road to the port (only a short drive away), but nothing 
actually came of the plan, and after the change in government - and in the state of 
suspense caused by the uncertain political situation - no one appeared to have any 
idea whether this would go ahead or not.  Many of my informants did not have deeds 
for the houses they occupied; one woman told me she didn’t have a deed but brushed 
off concerns about being relocated by saying she possessed a “green card.” 
However, in a separate interview with a NGO worker who specialized in relocation 
and displacement, I was told that these green cards, issued by the local municipal 
council, were not the same as deeds and they would not prevent someone from 
losing their home.    Others told me flat out that they did not have deeds - this 
included Miss Delilah, who lived in the big, beautiful house.  Delilah remarked that 
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“we don’t mind [moving to a high rise] if we can have a quiet, normal life like here,” 
since she pointed out “we do land jobs” and thus her family did not need to be next 
to the water.  However, she also told us that they wouldn’t be offered any 
compensation for moving, and expressed concern over whether a new apartment 
would even be able to accommodate her extended family of eight people.   
The prospect of being relocated was a cause for real concern among other 
Mutuwall residents I spoke to, mainly those who did in fact rely on fishing as a 
primary source of income.  Interviewing Camillus, a fisherman in his 50s, I asked 
about relocation plans for the area.  He told me that yes, he did remember around 
two years ago some government representatives came by to talk about it.  They put a 
sticker on people’s doors, those to be relocated (Hema gedara sticker gatte), and told 
them they would get a new house.  But that was two years ago, he repeated, and they 
weren’t informed about which area they would live in, or any details of where the 
new housing would be.  “Look, you can see it right there,” Camillus said, gesturing 
casually towards his front door, the very one we had just walked through to conduct 
the interview.  I got up and looked for the sticker - it was small, a ragged dirty 
sticker with a letter “P” on it.  It was just one of many stickers on a door littered with 
them images of Pope Francis and Jesus Christ and some phrases and words in Tamil.  
“The only thing I know is fishing,” Camillus said when I came back.  “I didn’t study.  
I need a house somewhere close to the beach.  After all, I have to take care of my 
children.”    
Meera, a housewife in her forties and former fisherman’s wife, now married to a 
land worker, laid out other fears regarding relocation.  Although Camillus had 
described the relocation stickers being put on the houses “two years ago” which 
would indicate sometime in 2013, Meera and Inoka, another friend in the area, stated 
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they remembered the discussions happening in January 2011.  Whereas Delilah said 
the relocation was planned to facilitate the building of a new road, Meera said it was 
going to be for new houses in the area - not, however, for the current residents.  But 
she and Inoka didn’t think this would really happen, not any time soon.  I asked how 
the meetings with the government representatives had gone - were they intimidating 
or threatening? No, the women told me, they just explained they would be given 
“better houses with tiles and better facilities” elsewhere.  Meera was, however, clear 
that high rise living wasn’t something she would enjoy (kaemeti nae).  High rise 
apartments presented an alien mode of living to people here - she was afraid that 
children for example could get lost if they didn’t remember which floor or apartment 
number they lived in.  She also expressed fear of living around strangers and people 
of lower social standing.  Some high rises, she said, were being given to people from 
“shanties” - it might be okay to live there if the entire village of Mutuwall could 
come too, but otherwise people would be afraid, she guessed.  As many as five 
different communities/villages might be transported into one high rise, Meera told 
us, and this mixing of people was a source of anxiety.  She would rather leave 
Colombo altogether and go to her husband’s village if it came down to it. 
 Relocation is an enduring fear that haunts poor communities in Colombo.  The 
relocation of the Mutuwall residents might not have been explicitly linked to the Port 
City, as the evidence from my interviews suggests other motivations, but it becomes 
bound up in the same logic: a project has to be completed, and in order for it to go 
head, people have to be moved.  In other words, displacement becomes a common 
effect with multiple potential causes, all of them related to the persistent, fervent 
efforts to develop, beautify and improve the city of Colombo.           
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 My conversations on potential eviction or relocation revealed the extent to 
which confusion, mixed messages and suspense are part of life in Mutuwall.  No one 
knew why they might be relocated (for a road, or to build other kinds of houses, or 
because of the Port City’s eventual completion, or some combination of the three) 
and of course, no one cared particularly given that eviction meant eviction no matter 
the reason.  No one in Mutuwall seemed aware that the “green cards” they possessed 
for their houses were not the same, legally, as deeds, which might have helped them 
build a legal case to fight eviction.  State institutions benefit from the confusion of 
the urban poor and their uncertainty with regards to official documents, which only 
makes eviction easier to carry out.   
 The liminal, interstitial space occupied by Mutuwall residents - which I have 
termed “on the edge” - allows both for their way of life to continue and sows the 
seeds of that way of life’s eventual destruction in the interest of constructing 
Colombo as a world-class city.  Nikhil Anand (2015) has described ignorance, rather 
than precision and measurement, as a way of maintaining state institutions in urban 
South Asia.  Describing it as “as a praxis that takes effort and deliberateness,” Anand 
states that “ignorance actively participates in the production of knowledge, power, 
and truth” it is “not so much a lack of knowledge as it is a form of not knowing that, 
like knowledge, participates in the production of meanings, materials, persons, and 
institutions” (2015: 309).  In Mutuwall, residents benefit from authorities’ ignorance 
of their ways of life - occupying land and houses without deeds, finding ways to 
illegally access electricity and other utilities, fishing in places they should not be.14 
                                                
14 Mutuwall residents regularly spoke of violent confrontations with the police and with the Sri 
Lankan Navy.  Some of these confrontations were recent, but the majority of these had happened 
during the civil war when a High Security Zone was in place over much of coastal Colombo for fear 
of attack by the LTTE’s naval units.  Mutuwall fishermen, lacking any other viable livelihood, would 
often sneak out to fish despite being formally prohibited from doing so.  This is a subject I am 
exploring in a separate article about fisher mobility in Sri Lanka (Radicati, in preparation). 
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But at the same time, ignorance and lack of clarity surrounding state plans, the Port 
City construction, and the ambiguous legal status of Mutuwall residents is precisely 
what permits their slow but seemingly inevitable dispossession.   
 Delilah had said the relocations were planned to take place in 2015; in other 
words, during the time that I was interviewing her, had the January election gone 
differently - that is, keeping Mahinda Rajapakse in power rather than delivering a 
victory to the opposition - she could easily have been in quite different 
circumstances, maybe not living in Mutuwall at all.  And yet she, like others, kept on 
with her daily activities: making, packing and selling lunches; sweeping her house; 
caring for children and family members; engaging in neighborhood gossip and 
entertaining the questions of a foreign anthropologist.  As Erik Harms observes in his 
work on urban residents awaiting eviction in Vietnam, “residents go about their 
normal lives; yet nothing is normal. Nothing is certain. For the time being everything 
is forever. Someday it will be no more [cf. Yurchak 2003]” (Harms 2013: 352).  My 
ethnographic work in Mutuwall shows that the lived experience of dispossession as 
it unfolds slowly and uncertainly reflects precisely this enduring normality even in 
the face of what would be a momentous, destructive change in residents’ ways of 
life.   
 
Fishing Without Future 
 
 In discussion after discussion, fishermen in Mutuwall repeated the same 
refrain: there was no future in fishing.  While no one wanted to lose their home or be 
evicted from the area as per the government’s original plans, it was clear that many 
of my interlocutors did not see how fishing as a primary form of livelihood could 
continue beyond their own generation.  Several fishermen I interviewed explicitly 
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told me that they didn’t want their children to become fishermen.  Interviewing 
Darius, one of the more senior fishermen in the area and father of two daughters and 
a son, he told me “I wouldn’t allow my son to fish, to become a fisherman. From this 
generation on, it’s over.” Many fishers cited their own lack of formal education as a 
reason to keep fishing, but would then say they hoped for a different life for their 
own children.  The social stigma attached to fishermen’s labor, which I described in 
earlier sections, undoubtedly played a part in this.  But so did the material realities 
associated with fishing, and with living in Mutuwall.  August was supposed to be the 
time of greatest abundance of catches for fishermen on this part of the island.  And 
yet, while I carried out my fieldwork during this period, I was told by numerous 
fishermen that they were not catching much this year - each August seemed to bring 
less and less catch than the one before.  The material realities of fishing’s hardships 
became impossible to disentangle from the discourse of making Colombo a global 
city, which rushes to paint fishing as an outdated and irrelevant form of labor, even 
as people still depend on the practice to make a living.   
 My conversations with William, one of the Mutuwall fishermen, effectively 
illustrate the kinds of struggles Colombo fishers face, and the personal and 
professional trajectories available to them in the context of rapid urban development.  
William is a young man, no more than 35, powerfully built and sure of himself.  
Though quiet, he never appeared to object to speaking with me and my research 
assistant, and in his methodical, thoughtful way, shared with us the vicissitudes of 
his life as a fisherman.   
 One of the few Buddhists in Mutuwall, William was married to one of the 
Catholic women I had initially met through Father Thomas and Sister Jane.  Above 
their door was an image of Lord Buddha in lotus pose; tucked next to it, a cross 
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fashioned from palm leaves.  William and his wife have three children.  The 
youngest one, maybe about four years old, would grab and climb on William as he 
spoke with us.  William dealt with him good naturally, never seeming to mind, even 
though he was often busy with a GPS device, a black object he brought out in its 
plastic case and showed to us before getting to work with it - on my first 
conversation with him, William had numbers scrawled in pen on his hands and 
forearms, coordinates of where other men in the area had been recently and gotten a 
good catch.  William was entering the numbers into his GPS in hopes of having luck 
at the same locations, next time he went out.    
 William’s stories tended to blend together common elements that emerged 
time and time again in my conversations with Mutuwall fishers: the difficulties of 
making ends meet, the effects of the 2004 tsunami, seemingly never-ending cycles of 
debt, and worries about the future of fishing as a viable livelihood. William’s family 
had lost their boat and nets and suffered some damage to their house in the 2004 
Boxing Day Tsunami.  Like many fishers, he expected some form of compensation 
from the state to help with the cost of getting a new boat, but, also like many fishers 
here in Mutuwall, quickly found that he had fallen between the cracks of official aid.  
A man he knew had been given a free boat and was willing to part with it – but only 
for the price of Rs.10,000.  Through a family member, William was put in touch with 
a German expat who was working to raise money for tsunami-affected families in 
Negombo and Colombo; the German man’s fundraising efforts gave William the 
Rs.10,000 he needed for the boat and some extra, so that he was even able to buy 
some jewelry for his wife.  But shortly after, the Sri Lankan Navy implemented the 
maritime High Security Zone around Colombo, meaning suddenly the fishers were 
legally not allowed to go out to sea.  With these restrictions in place, William was 
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left without a viable option for making money, other than selling the boat he had 
only recently procured.  The German donor and William’s relative begged him to 
reconsider, but in the end, he was forced to sell it.  Remembering it with bitterness, 
William tells us that under normal conditions the boat could have easily fetched a 
price of Rs.600,000 but because there was so little demand for vessels of that kind 
due to the Navy’s security protocols, he ended up selling it for only about 
Rs.100,000.  Of course, this money depleted quickly – the High Security Zone 
restrictions were in place for years,15 and as a result William had to sell not only the 
boat, but also the jewelry he’d purchased for his wife.  
 William has also heard of plans to relocate the Mutuwall population, and, like 
others, is skeptical.  He says one version he’s heard of the plan would have the 
fishers moved up to Ragamma, near the Bandaranaike International Airport in 
Katunayake. But, like others, he has also heard of the idea of simply moving the 
community into high-rise buildings somewhere closer to the city.  To William, both 
options are bad.  Why doesn’t the government at least allow them to keep their boats 
here, as a docking station, he wonders? This would be more practical.  They would 
also need reimbursement for the cost of traveling from their new residences to the 
waterfront; while he doesn’t object to the high-rise idea per se, William sees 
mounting costs and financial burdens that will have to be shouldered by the fishers, 
who categorically cannot afford it.  He adds a rumor that even being relocated into 
one of the high rises will incur a charge, of Rs.50,000 (about $300 USD).  “I don’t 
have that,” he tells us flatly.   
                                                
15 Similar to the issue of government relocation, I heard many different accounts of when the HSZ 
was implemented and how long the fishers suffered as a result of these security regulations. One 
conversation with the wives of some fishers in Mutuwall suggested the HSZ had been implemented in 
2002.  However, this would imply that it was already in place before the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami.  
William dated it to 2006, which would make more sense as this places it after the tsunami in keeping 
with his story.  
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 Like others in Mutuwall, William lives through a combination of whatever 
earnings he can scrape together from fishing, loans, and occasional illegal activity.  
With sly pride, he talks about the fact that up until recently he was able to get 
electricity illegally (current-eka horeng-ganne), but was eventually caught and 
forced to pay a Rs.30,000 fine.  He still has an illegal water connection, and will 
keep it until it’s discovered. According to William, some people even have to take 
loans just to pay for these basic utilities, a practice he is trying to avoid. He already 
has two loans, he tells me, one for the boat he had to buy after the tsunami, one for 
work on his house, at interest rates of four and ten percent respectively.   
 On one occasion when speaking with William, we are interrupted by his wife 
who has brought us glass bottles of Coke from the neighborhood kade (small shop) 
and offers them to me and Ashan as a sign of hospitality.  We take a break from the 
official posture of the interview, and as we sit and drink the fizzy sweet liquid, 
William’s younger son, the four year old, comes out to play.  He sits on a small red 
tricycle with wheels that light up as it moves.  All of us are, for a moment, amused 
and transfixed by the toy and by the little boy’s obvious delight in it.  Never taking 
his eyes off the moving, flashing wheels, William comments that when he was little, 
his father would never have been able to afford a plaything like that.  “I don’t want 
my children, my sons, to become fishermen,” he says, heavily.  “I want a better life 
for my kids.” He told us that he fears the death of all the fish.  “One day, my children 
will have to eat imported fish,” (piti rata malu) he says with sad irony. “We used to 
have enough money to enjoy Christmas, now it’s difficult with no more fish to 
catch.”    
 In June 2016, approximately seven months after the conclusion of my 
primary ethnographic fieldwork, I was back in Colombo for a follow-up trip.  My 
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research assistant and I visited Mutuwall several times during that month, and 
though we hoped to talk to William, he was never at home.  The door to his house, 
always recognizable to me because of the combination of Buddhist and Catholic 
imagery, was uncharacteristically shut in the middle of the day, and there was no 
sign of his wife or children.  We asked some others in the area whether they had 
heard anything about how William was doing, and when he might be available for an 
interview.  Eventually, the wife of another fisherman I had interviewed told us that 
the reason for William’s absence was a new job: he was working construction for 
one of the new hotels being built by the Galle Face Green.  As a result, instead of 
following the typical fisherman schedule of going out to sea at night and returning in 
the very early morning, William was not available in the middle of the day, when we 
normally visited the area.  
 On a subsequent visit to Mutuwall, I knew better than to expect to find 
William at home, but the news of his new job weighed on my mind.  Perhaps 
because I was pre-occupied with it, I made one of the worst errors of my fieldwork, 
one that still causes feelings of guilt when I remember it.  I was interviewing a group 
of three traveling fishermen, together with my assistant and my friend from the area, 
Inoka, who is herself married to a fisherman.  Though not from Colombo, the group 
explained that they came to Mutuwall regularly during this time of year in hopes of 
better catches.  They were renting an abandoned shack with a cement floor right by 
the water, where their boats were docked.  Because my assistant was used to helping 
with Sinhala-English translation, often in settings where there was only one speaker 
at a time, we fell back into this familiar routine.  It escaped my notice that one of the 
three men, quieter than the others, spoke fluent English; because my assistant was 
engaged in a lively exchange with one of the other, more talkative men (in Sinhala), 
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I assumed that Sinhala was the preferred language for everyone in the group.  A 
question came up about fishing versus land jobs.  As in so many other discussions, 
the fishermen before us said they wanted to keep fishing as long as possible, and 
looked down on construction jobs.  In an aside to my assistant Ashan I said (too 
loudly) in English, that I assumed this meant they would not consider doing what 
William was doing, and working in construction at one of the Galle Face Hotels? It 
was impossible to judge whether the three new informants heard my question to 
Ashan, but the moment the words left my mouth I noticed Inoka wince with 
embarrassment, and gesture to the fisherman whom I later understood spoke English.  
I had used William’s name, and mentioned that he now worked construction instead 
of fishing full time - Inoka’s reaction immediately showed how shameful this was for 
a man who only months before still supported his family through fishing.16  
 William’s trajectory from fishing to construction underscores that 
experiences of dispossession in this part of Colombo relate to both eviction from 
dwelling places and to occupation and economic activity.  It also illustrates the 
growing sense of futility and lack of opportunity associated with fishing, even as 
residents continued to fish because it was still a job they knew how to do.  Amidst 
swirling rumors and fears of undue foreign influence in Colombo, especially as 
outlined in the previous chapter on the Colombo Port City project, William’s 
statement about his children eating imported fish was especially poignant.  Many 
Mutuwall residents were concerned that relocation would not only mean living in 
housing that would be inadequate for their needs, they did not want to be located far 
away from the ocean, the source of their livelihood.  The dispossession of the 
                                                
16 On my next visits to Mutuwall, I anxiously looked for William’s wife, hoping to greet her and 
gauge through our interactions whether my slip-up had caused harm to their family or any hard 
feelings.  Luckily, though I did not get to see William, I did see her and she greeted Ashan and me 
warmly, thereby implying that my mistake had not impacted them negatively.  
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Mutuwall fishers from both their livelihood and the place they have raised their 
families and developed social ties represents alienation at multiple different levels.  
Inoka’s reaction to my mentioning William’s new work in construction suggests the 
social costs of leaving fishing, even though everyone recognized that fishing hardly 
offered a promising future.   
 William’s story operates as a kind of exception that proves the rule; in this 
case, the exception being that he actually managed to find work that directly related 
to the construction of the infrastructures and spaces designed to make Colombo a 
global destination.  On one level, this might seem to contradict the argument that the 
Mutuwall fishermen are a form of “surplus population” without future in the new 
Colombo.  However, William’s story sticks out precisely because it appears so 
exceptional in the context of my ethnography.  While other fishermen did mention 
occasional work in “land jobs” at times when they could not fish due to the security 
situation, they always emphasized that as soon as they were able to return to the 
water, they did.  Though everyone was in agreement that there had been a noticeable 
decline in fish populations, on my last visit to Mutuwall all of my other informants 
were in fact continuing to go out to sea everyday.  Once again, Inoka’s reaction to 
my mentioning William’s new job suggests that not fishing may have been seen as 
shameful, and thus the refusal to work in construction or other jobs might be 
understood as a “cultural” barrier rather than offering much in the way of an 
economic critique of Colombo’s development.  However, cultural and social 
alienation is one aspect of dispossession - the fact that Colombo fishermen are so 
tied to their identity through longstanding social practices and forms of community 
and now stand to lose this very identity is itself a form of dispossession.      
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All of the people I spoke with about relocation plans for the area reiterated 
their fear of being away from the water, and their lack of education or training to do 
other jobs.  No one mentioned the government officials who had come to speak with 
them raising the possibility of training for other forms of work that might be done far 
from the shoreline.  This omission is reflected in state discourses and planners’ 
brochures and reports, which tend to emphasize, among other things, Colombo’s 
prime real estate offerings and ocean views and its “friendly” “highly educated” 
population, without explaining what role the urban poor have to play in the future of 
the city.  Here again, as Li observes, it is places which are valuable, not people..  
Rather than being incorporated into a new globally-oriented service economy, 
Colombo’s poorer residents are more likely to be relocated to high rises where they 
will need to find creative ways to fend for themselves and adapt to lessened 
economic opportunities.  In the case of the Mutuwall fishermen, this means that their 
training and knowledge of how to fish is rendered useless.  For the fishers, a spatial 
shift away from the shore represents an irreversible act of dispossession.  
 
On Coevality  
 
The Mutuwall fishermen themselves are aware - and they repeatedly told me - 
that no one knew of their existence, “no one cares.” This is doubly a function of their 
low-status occupation and their location.  While traditional social imaginaries of Sri 
Lankan society might locate fishermen in more distant rural settings, there is no 
room for them - metaphorically, but increasingly, literally as well - in contemporary 
Colombo.  The fishers’ repeated assertions that no one cared about them were echoed 
by my middle class friends and acquaintances who tended to not know where 
Mutuwall was located, and expressed surprise when I described the large, active 
community of fishers and other laborers who occupied that particular stretch of 
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Colombo coastline.  The presence of the Mutuwall community represents a 
contradiction at the heart of Colombo’s contemporary development. A “backwards” 
community coeval and simultaneous with the dazzling new high rises and shopping 
malls of the city center.  
In his ethnography of environmental politics in Hong Kong, Tim Choy refers to 
the scientific and popular focus on “endangerment” as “anticipatory nostalgia,” and 
observes that this anticipatory nostalgia “illuminates a great deal when the loss it 
forecasts is remembered to be both spatial and temporal” (Choy 2011, 49).  
Discussing the original meaning of the term nostalgia, Choy points out that its 
exclusively temporal register is in fact not the only way in which the term can be 
understood; the Greek usage of the word means simply longing for home, which can 
be taken as either spatial or temporal in meaning. Interestingly, Choy’s analysis is 
drawn from another urban fishing village, that of Tai O in Hong Kong, which, a bit 
like Mutuwall, is located close to major infrastructure (in this case, the airport) thus 
providing a startling juxtaposition between images of Hong Kong’s global future and 
its supposedly local past.  
However, Choy’s point about nostalgia being both temporal and spatial is 
designed to question this very positioning of his research subjects as belonging to 
some mythical Hong Kong past. Instead, Choy argues for what he calls “coevality”; 
thinking critically about nostalgia, endangerment and preservation, Choy suggests a 
“conceptual shift, one that moves endangered forms of life from a timeline on which 
they occupy the slots of the old and bygone to a field of simultaneous, coeval 
spaces” (Choy 2011, 50).     
Dominant visions of Colombo’s urban development make use of powerful 
temporal and spatial imaginaries to appeal to citizens. The future is a point on a 
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discrete timeline, but it is also currently existing right now in other places far away: 
Singapore, Dubai, Hong Kong, the most often-cited examples of what Colombo 
should aspire to be. The very presence of fishermen is a challenge to both the 
dominant spatial and temporal imaginaries of Colombo as a global hub.  Understood 
as relics of the “past” located uncomfortably close to the sites of Colombo’s future, 
the fishermen provide a spatial and temporal interruption to linear, unified visions of 
the state and of planners.  Thinking about a “new field of political coevality” (Choy 
2011, 50) provides a way to think about the fishermen as citizens with the right to 
their land and livelihood, rather than assuming them to be living anachronisms.     
Fishermen’s lifestyles and rhythms set them apart from typical regimes of 
capitalist time.  Unlike workers in most other professions who might have to 
commute on crowded public transport (buses) through the packed streets of Colombo 
two times a day, morning and evening, working primarily in daylight hours, 
fishermen have a wholly different schedule.  As I have alluded to, most fishermen I 
knew in Mutuwall would go out into the ocean either late at night or in the early 
evening, and return in the very early hours of the morning.  Sometimes I would 
conduct interviews with my friend Inoka while her husband lay sleeping only a few 
feet away, having returned exhausted from his most recent trip out to sea.  At both 
the macro-level, as representatives of premodern or pre-capitalist Sri Lankan life, 
and at the micro-level of their daily habits, fishermen seem to offer a stark contrast 
with the temporalities of state agencies, urban planners and private corporations 
reshaping the Colombo landscape.    
And yet, it bears repeating that Mutuwall is home to people other than fishers - to 
masons, drivers, dockworkers, garment workers and domestic servants who do have 
to abide by the timelines and schedules of more typical capitalist activity.  In this 
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way, Mutuwall itself is not so much an exception to Colombo proper, standing fully 
outside of the larger city’s temporal rhythms, but rather a testament to the multi-
faceted and overlapping social forms and habits which can coexist in a city like 
Colombo.  To proponents of Colombo’s global city trajectory, the existence of 
multiple and coeval temporal rhythms provide just as much anxiety and unease as 
the notion of ethnic and religious hybridity for the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist.  
Neither of these master narratives - liberal capitalism or ethno-nationalism -  can 
properly account for the world of Mutuwall.    
The spatio-temporal imaginary of hubness, as laid out in Chapter 1, is rooted in 
the notion of flexibility, flows and free movement.  But as I made clear, these 
concepts only ever seem to apply to capital, or to the movement of elite subjects.  
However, the urban poor have their own practices of movement and mobility, which 
are too often elided in official state discourses.  The fishermen themselves are hardly 
stationary or static beings.  Not only did my informants in Mutuwall frequently 
reference journeys to and from all parts of Sri Lanka - whether to visit their home 
villages, for holidays, or for religious pilgrimage - many of them had family 
members who had migrated abroad, either permanently or as laborers in the Gulf 
countries.  It was also not uncommon for the older fishermen I spoke with to 
reference formerly nomadic lifestyles in which they had grown up circumnavigating 
the island in search of better catches.  Not only that, but the contemporary, day-to-
day practice of fishing itself involves significant movement in and out of Mutuwall, 
meaning that - contrary to the lifestyles of many poor and middle class residents of 
Colombo - fishermen are by definition mobile, well-practiced in travel and 
navigation of the city on itineraries unimaginable to inland residents.  The slow 
dispossession of the fishers and other residents of Mutuwall makes starkly clear the 
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exclusive, elite nature of the official hubness promoted as the primary aspiration for 
21st century Colombo.          
***   
One afternoon in November 2015, after months of fieldwork in the Mutuwall 
community, I had a chance to interview Lawrence, a well-known media figure and 
an English-speaking member of the Colombo elite whose television network was 
engaged in actively promoting the Colombo Port City project, together with the 
China Harbor Engineering Corporation (CHEC).  I explained to Lawrence that many 
of the fishermen I had come to know in Mutuwall were very worried about the 
project going forward and its eventual effect on their livelihoods.  I said that the Port 
City project was leaving them behind - it seemed as if it was going to mean the end 
of a way of life for a considerable group of people in coastal Colombo. To this he 
casually replied, “Show me one example of progress that doesn’t” and smiled at me, 
expectantly.  Check mate.  There was no possible reply to my interlocutor’s quiet 
assurance that “progress” needed to be valued above the preservation of fishing, 
which, as my own informants made clear, did not seem to offer much of a future. 
This sentiment was echoed by most of the businesspeople, government officials and 
wealthy elites I spoke with during my fieldwork.  To them, like to my Sinhala tutor, 
fishermen represented a backwards social group, not easily integrated with the 
contemporary visions and ambitions for a global Colombo.  But even if they were 
right at least about fishing as a form of labor, I wondered what else my informants 
could reasonably do? What possibilities existed for people whose livelihood and 
lifestyles seemed so clearly to defy the idealized notion of life in a global city? I 
never received a clear answer from any of the businesspeople or state representatives 
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whom I interviewed as to what exactly would be done to provide other forms of 
income and sustenance to people like the Mutuwall fishers.    
On the other end of the spectrum, for social justice activists like Sister and 
Father, fishermen represented a traditional way of life that should be prized and 
valued; like other clergy-members and activists, Father and Sister were proponents 
of people producing their own food, living without most typically “urban” 
commodities,17 and cultivating independence from work in various service 
professions - in other words, they viewed positively the fishers’ ability to largely live 
outside the capitalist forms of labor and production visible elsewhere in Colombo.   
Staunch anti-capitalists like Father and Sister and wealthy businessmen would 
often level critiques at the other in implicitly temporal terms: for someone like 
Lawrence, the fishermen represented a vestige of the past that would naturally die 
out in order to build the Colombo of the future.  “Progress” always moved only in 
one direction, and it naturally had to leave behind those incapable of “catching up.” 
On the other hand, for people like Father and Sister, fishers also represented some 
link to the past, a time before what they viewed as the twin evils of urbanization and 
capitalism - but it was precisely this location in another time which, to them, made 
the fishers valuable and in need of saving, of preservation.  Somewhere between the 
romantic discourses of defending traditional livelihoods from capitalist 
encroachment and neoliberal discourses of modernizing and globalizing the 
cityscape are the fishermen themselves.  As this ethnography has shown, the fishers 
                                                
17 It should be noted that, unsurprisingly, the fishermen themselves were much less inclined to 
live without such commodities.  My field notes from my time in Mutuwall mention several houses as 
having large screen televisions similar to those owned by upper class acquaintances.  Some fishermen 
I knew who were able to earn more money also frequented chain restaurants like Pizza Hut and 
Kentucky Fried Chicken on special occasions or for family outings, which, in Sri Lanka, are 
considered to signal more “urban” tastes and are also quite expensive by local standards.  
Unfortunately, the nuances of the disparities between activists’ expectations and fishers’ lived 
experiences cannot be fully explored here. 
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are not able to view themselves in such reductive or idealized terms - they continue 
to live and work in the place they have inhabited for decades, even as their prospects 
for survival and security seem to be dwindling.    
 
Conclusion 
Marxist concepts of primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession 
assume particular spatial and temporal relationships between the dispossessed and 
the dispossessors, between labor and capital.  Spatially, as in Marx’s own original 
account laid out in Capital, primitive accumulation tends to assume the transfer or 
movement of rural populations to urban areas where, having lost land, former 
peasants must now sell their labor power to capitalists.  Because Marx viewed the 
agents of revolutionary change as industrial, largely urban workers, he did not say 
much on the role of peasants or those whose livelihoods placed them on the 
periphery of capitalist systems (Glassman 2006).  As seemingly rural subjects 
engaged in not-strictly-capitalist forms of labor but living in an obviously urban 
environment like northern Colombo, the Mutuwall fishermen force us to consider 
how we might complicate the taken-for-granted spatial understandings of primitive 
accumulation.  Following urban scholars who have used David Harvey’s (2004) 
influential “accumulation by dispossession” concept (eg., Goldman 2013, Harms 
2012, 2013 and 2016, Elyachar 2005), this chapter has examined ongoing processes 
of dispossession not at the spatial/geographic peripheries of capitalist systems, but in 
the heart of an emerging global city.  Rather than view the Mutuwall inhabitants as 
either peasants or urban proletarians, the ethnography presented in this chapter uses 
the ambiguity of spatial location to examine how dispossession unfolds in a 
community “out of place” (Puwar 2004) in what is supposed to be a modern Asian 
metropolis.   
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Certain strands of Marxist theory, especially those concerned with the Global 
South, have shown that in contemporary capitalism, primitive accumulation is an 
ongoing process, not one that can be relegated to a historical moment before the 
arising of capital (Glassman 2006, Harvey 2004, Sanyal 2007, Luxemburg [1913] 
2003).  My analysis follows in this tradition, showing that the dispossession of the 
Mutuwall fishermen is not a precondition for the construction of a global hub city, 
but rather a process that unfolds alongside and simultaneous with, the capitalist 
development of Colombo.  Rather than view their dispossession as a neat example of 
“proletarianization” or incorporation of labor into new capitalist systems of 
production, my ethnography highlights the fuzzy, unclear nature of the timelines of 
dispossession.  Accumulation by dispossession does not necessarily proceed such 
that the accumulation step is immediately or clearly visible.   
Attention to coevality (Choy 2011) might provide a useful corrective to overly 
neat Marxist accounts which occasionally risk reproducing liberal and capitalist 
arguments about the supposedly linear march of progress.  Rather than suggest that 
the dispossession experienced by the Mutuwall fishers be viewed as a fait accompli, 
this chapter has highlighted their enduring, continued presence despite the many 
factors weighing against them.  As I have shown, the Mutuwall fishers’ presence is 
troubling to many narratives of development on both spatial and temporal levels: 
spatially because it suggests a collapsing of village and urban worlds which contrasts 
with images of a modern, contemporary city.  Temporally, because the fishers are 
often implied to be “pre” modern or “pre” capitalist subjects, a holdover from earlier 
times and living anachronisms in the modern cityscape.  The multi-faceted character 
of Mutuwall – its mixing of occupations and forms of labor, ethnic groups, religions, 
and temporal rhythms – provides an example of an urban setting not fully outside 
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modernity, capital or the city, but rather a powerful challenge to any monolithic 
vision of contemporary Colombo’s urban character.   
As Tania Li’s work on surplus populations shows (2009), in many parts of the 
Global South today, a traditional understanding of dispossession whereby those who 
lose their land are spatially and economically incorporated into systems of capitalist 
production is inaccurate and insufficient.  Instead, Li points out, dispossession and 
accumulation are disjointed, often fragmented processes which take place over 
different timescales and across distant locations.  For example, referring to Southeast 
Asia and colonial labor practices, Li points out that “the people employed…are 
seldom the people who were dispossessed on site” (2009: 73-74). Mutuwall 
fishermen do not necessarily find jobs in more straightforwardly capitalist forms of 
production.  While some, like William, might find work in construction, for most 
others this possibility does not exist.  Following Li, this chapter suggests that any 
understanding of dispossession currently taking place in Colombo today must 
confront the possibility that any accumulation is likely to take place at a considerable 
temporal and spatial distance.  
As I have shown in my ethnographic portrayal of Mutuwall, dispossession in this 
part of coastal Colombo does not proceed in linear fashion; fishers and other 
inhabitants of this enclave are in danger of losing their land and their livelihood and 
are threatened from multiple angles.  Environmental patterns of coastal erosion and 
decline in fish stock, the construction of the Colombo Port City project, murky 
government plans - proposed, abandoned, and potentially taken up again at any time 
- for redevelopment of the area all contribute to the growing sense among my 
informants that one way or another, they must prepare to leave Mutuwall and accept 
that future generations will not be able to make a living through fishing.  The multi-
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faceted nature of their dispossession not only points to the theoretical importance of 
not assuming clean, linear temporalities, it also suggests the challenges to effective 
political organizing against such acts of urban dispossession when it is unclear who 
or what is responsible (Li 2009, 81).  When threats are multiple, unified resistance 
may prove impossible.   
By offering a glimpse into the struggles and multiple forms of dispossession 
facing the fishermen of northern Colombo, this chapter suggests the importance of 
ethnographic engagements for adding depth and nuance to our understanding of how 
global cities are being imagined and constructed today.  In the following chapter, I 
turn to another case of dispossession and relocation of the urban poor, this time at the 
Pettah Floating Market.   
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CHAPTER 4: STATES OF FAILURE, STATES OF DISPOSSESSION: THE PETTAH 
FLOATING MARKET 
 
 Global city narratives are success stories.  Popular accounts of the rise of cities 
like Dubai, Singapore or Bangalore tend to emphasize the rapid development of 
these spaces from sleepy, insignificant or provincial locations to spectacular 
examples of urban wealth and cosmopolitanism.  Critical academic analyses of 
global city-making processes in the social sciences underscore the costs of such 
efforts; scholars have drawn attention to states of confusion, rising inequality, and 
violent dispossession carried out in the name of bringing these urban aspirations to 
life (Ghertner 2015, Ong and Roy 2011, Goldman 2013).  Yet, even critical scholarly 
accounts risk assuming the eventual success of global city-making schemes.  If 
dispossession lays the groundwork for capitalist accumulation (Marx [1887] 2005, 
Harvey 2004) then we are predisposed to assume that dispossession has a purpose or 
an identifiable end goal (Li 2009).  This chapter, by contrast, asks what it might 
mean when global city plans and projects go awry.  How can we productively think 
about failure in the context of building global cities? How might dispossession be 
experienced in the pursuit of these failures, and what forms does it take?  
 Looking at failure helps to displace the global city as the supposedly natural 
end point for all development processes.  The now widely-recognized “global city” 
or “world city” form is a contingent, specific and relatively recent vision of capitalist 
development.  As cities throughout the Global South are marketed and promoted as 
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the next Singapore or the next Dubai, it is worth remembering that the modern, 
efficient metropolis was not always the desired product of decolonization.  As 
Vyjayanthi Rao puts it,  
 
If there is anything normative about the imagination of the modern city in 
South Asia, it is a certain rejection of its specificity as a social space and its 
portrayal purely in relation to the exigencies of modernization and 
development. In the nationalist imagination, there was an inevitable contest 
between a more positive apprehension of the city as an engine of modernity, 
modernization and development and a more negative one projecting the city 
as an inappropriate historical trajectory for Indian modernity (2006,  226).   
 
Rao’s quote comes from her essay, “Slum as theory” in which she interrogates how 
the slum “comes to serve as shorthand” for the disfunction of the South Asian city in 
general.  The abstract figure of the slum, representing disorder, violence, crime, 
disease and dirtiness is a powerful symbol of the failure of urbanization in the Global 
South.  Rao’s intervention reminds us of the perils that might accompany global city-
making.  If the global city form is understood now to be the common aspiration of 
most urban centers, the slum-form can be productively considered its foil.  This 
chapter examines what other forms of urban failure besides slums might be present 
in today’s global cities-in-progress.   
     Failure, disappointment and disillusionment have been salient themes in 
academic writing about development and modernization efforts (eg., Scott 1998, 
Ferguson 1994 and 1999) as well as in discussions on aspiration, class and social 
mobility under neoliberal conditions (e.g., Mains 2007, Jeffrey 2010, Schielke 
2012).  Writing on Zambia following years of structural adjustment policies which 
led to the country’s de-urbanization, James Ferguson (1999) frames his study as an 
“ethnography of decline,” in which his informants cope with the loss of material and 
economic comforts as well as the disappearance of “a certain ethos of hopefulness, 
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self-respect, and optimism that, many seemed sure, was now …simply ‘gone, gone 
never to return again’” (1999: 12).  Craig Jeffrey looks to the “shared culture of 
disappointment” (2012: 639) which characterizes so much of life in urban India for 
young men who are “compelled to wait for years, generations or whole lifetimes, not 
as the result of their voluntary movement through modern spaces but because they 
are perpetually unable to realize their goals” (2012: 639-40).  In much of the world 
today, disappointment, stagnation and decline are themes which structure 
possibilities for individual lives as well as entire communities. This chapter builds on 
these scholarly conversations to examine the way failure played out in the context of 
public space making in Colombo.   
 As preceding chapters of this manuscript have shown, urban development 
efforts in Colombo are far from being straightforwardly successful.  I have 
highlighted in discussions of the Colombo Port City and the fishing community in 
Mutuwall the uncertain, constantly negotiated and ongoing nature of projects to 
make Colombo a global city.  However, while these chapters have dealt primarily 
with the theme of uncertainty, the present chapter looks more closely at outright 
failure, the way in which a project aimed at transforming public space in Colombo 
did not live up to expectations of the state, the public, or the laborers within the 
space.  What happens when people must contend with certain failure, rather than 
uncertainty? What happens when eviction and relocation are carried out in the name 
of a failed project? To what extent might dispossession of the urban poor be 
embedded in the very mechanisms that appear to be forms of compensation for prior 
acts of dispossession?        
 This chapter examines the idea of failure in the making of Colombo as a global 
city by drawing on ethnography conducted at the Pettah Floating Market.  The 
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Floating Market is a public space which opened under the Rajapakse administration 
in August 2014, before the surprising elections of January 2015.  Offering low cost 
food shops and small stalls selling inexpensive items such as shoes, clothing and 
souvenirs, the space was envisioned as a low-cost, friendly and aesthetically pleasing 
alternative to the chaotic shops of the main neighborhood of Pettah, in which tourists 
and Colombo residents alike could purchase similar wares.  Originally intended to be 
Colombo’s version of the vibrant markets of Southeast Asia, in only a matter of 
months the space was devoid of customers, with vendors finding themselves trapped 
in a commercial space which yielded virtually no profits but nonetheless commanded 
high monthly rents.      
 In discussing the Floating Market and its failure to live up to the hype I 
highlight the role played by the state in bringing the Market into being.  By the state 
I refer primarily to the government bodies responsible for urban development efforts 
in Colombo, the Ministry of Defense and Urban Development and its subsidiary 
body, the Urban Development Authority (UDA), which constructed and managed 
the space.  As my ethnographic explorations demonstrate, the failed enterprise of the 
Floating Market traces a shifting relationship between vendors - many of whom were 
staunch supporters of the Rajapakse government - and the state, as relations of 
dependence and allegiance shifted to relations of exploitation, neglect and suspicion.  
The role of centralized state planning in bringing about urban development in 
Colombo is rarely, if ever, questioned.  My ethnography demonstrates the complex 
relations between the urban poor and the state as the very people who form a base of 
political support in one instance are neglected, overlooked and dispossessed in the 
service of global city-building projects.          
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 My ethnographic engagement with the Floating Market revealed that it was a 
disappointment on multiple levels: to the state, to the middle class Colombo public, 
and to the working class vendors who labored in the Market.  The failure of the 
Floating Market, I suggest, is emblematic of both the predatory relationship of state 
institutions to working class and urban poor people in Colombo and of the class 
politics which inhere in Colombo’s global city transformation.  The case of the 
Floating Market speaks to the exclusion of urban working class and poor populations 
from the ideals of hub city-making.           
 
Pettah Stuff: The Spatial and Class Politics of Location 
 
When I asked various acquaintances in Colombo whether they had been to the 
Floating Market, I was surprised to find that while virtually everyone of my English-
speaking, middle class friends had heard of it, very few had actually set foot inside. 
Given the initial enthusiasm that it seemed had accompanied the space’s opening, I 
was curious as to why the Floating Market wasn’t even deemed worthy of a single 
visit by my friends.  What had happened between the opening in August 2014 and 
the start of my visits to the Floating Market only six months later to render the space 
so suddenly unappealing?  
I first learned about the Pettah Floating Market through Yamu.lk, an English-
language website targeted at the city’s middle and upper classes (and tourists) that 
reviews and publicizes restaurants, museums, hotels and other sites of leisure in 
Colombo city and beyond.  Yamu reviewed the Pettah Floating Market shortly after 
it opened in August 2014 and provided a rather glowing account of the space, 
highlighting its cheap prices, the pleasing quality of its architecture, and the beauty 
of the surroundings and ambience:  
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The Pettah Floating Market opened on the 25th of August to a lot of hype, 
and it's worth it. The place is another part of Colombo's fancy urban 
development plan along with Arcade Independence Square, but much more 
accessible to everyone. Colombo has never had such an amazing hangout 
space before, and it's affordable. (Yamu.lk, 2014)  
 
After walking readers through a map of the Market space and detailing its various 
offerings, the review concludes:  
 
The floating market is a combination of Majestic City/Pettah affordability, 
easy snacks, drinks and kottu, tasteful design, and a fantastic location by the 
lake and the railway tracks. To us Sri Lankans, who in Colombo have only 
Viharamahadevi Park and Independence Square as free public hangouts (and 
maybe the Arcade, though the shops there are pricey), the floating market is 
as godayata magic as it gets so far. (Yamu.lk, 2014)  
  
The reference to “godayata magic” is a term infused with class and wealth 
implications.  Goda or gota are suffixes in Sinhala meaning village, as is gama.  To 
call a person gota/goda or game is essentially a way of calling someone village-like, 
essentially: non-elite, non-urban, unsophisticated.  For a young female Colombo 
resident to use this term when writing in English for one of the city’s most popular 
publications is intended as a comical and self-deprecating appropriation.  It also 
signals to readers not to expect that the Market is an elegant, elite space like the 
Arcade she mentions, but more accessible and popular.         
 At some point after the initial review of the Pettah Floating Market, Yamu 
updated its review to include the following sentence, immediately after the glowing 
first paragraph which I highlighted above: “Edit: We dropped in again a few days 
later and this time around the distinct smell of the Beira lake was far too prominent. 
In other words, it smelled pretty awful.” (Yamu, 2014).  This reaction - delayed 
disappointment, gradual lessening of the Floating Market’s charm - mirrors the 
sentiments described by many of my other acquaintances in Colombo when I asked 
them about the space. Yamu’s casual addendum to the first review is fairly damning: 
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it is understood in middle class sensibility that the “prominent” and “awful” smell of 
a space would overshadow any other elements of the Floating Market.  “Godayata 
magic” is curtly transformed into an uncomfortable, too-close-for-comfort 
approximation of the actual smells and sights of poverty.  What could be farther 
away from the dream of a world-class global city? 
I ended up interviewing the Yamu journalist who had written the initial review of 
the space; a young Muslim woman from southern Colombo, I found her to be chatty 
and opinionated - the perfect interlocutor.  Over drinks and snacks at a boutique hotel 
in Bambalapitiya, she surprised me with her candor about the class implications of 
the place, and why it was so unappealing.  She was, after all, the one who had 
written the glowing review, so I was surprised that her tone in person was rather 
cynical. “Why would we go there? You just get Pettah food, Pettah clothes, Pettah 
stuff” she said, dismissively.  If it seems rather obvious that at the Pettah Floating 
market one would get “Pettah stuff” then this comment requires a bit more 
explanation.  What Sara, my interlocutor, was expressing was not a comment on the 
location of the market, but the wider social implications of the goods to be had there.  
What Sara was saying was in fact a value judgment on the quality of the things 
available at the Floating Market.  “Pettah stuff” in this context uses the name of the 
neighborhood as an adjective to describe the items on sale as cheap, low-quality, 
lower-class and undesirable.  As she made clear in the rest of our interview, Sara 
only went to Pettah as a child with her family when they needed to fulfill utilitarian 
tasks like buying something in bulk, or taking a bus to another part of Sri Lanka.  
This relationship to Pettah - viewing it as a site of necessary commercial activity, not 
leisure - was echoed by most of my middle and upper class informants in Colombo.  
Another informant of mine, Ahmed, a young Bora Muslim man who now has a 
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successful job in the luxury real estate business, trafficking in Colombo’s “global 
city” appeal, told me that he grew up in Pettah but when his parents were able to, 
they left and moved to the suburbs.  Almost apologetically, he told me that as a 
consequence of living there as a child, he has “heard the worst kind of filth growing 
up.”    
Pettah is one of the older neighborhoods of Colombo, a holdover from colonial 
times.  The name of the neighborhood derives from the Sinhala word pita meaning 
“outside” in this case pita-Kottuwa or “outside the Fort”; the Colombo Fort, built by 
the Dutch was the center of European Colombo, while Pettah, the area outside of the 
Fort, was the preserve of non-European or “native” trade and commerce (Sunday 
Observer 2007).  But if the native-European divide in South Asian cities is hardly 
new, having determined urban planning and development during the colonial period 
across the region (Kaviraj 1997, Zaidi 2016), the category of “native” itself requires 
some unpacking.  The question of who is “native” in Sri Lanka is fraught with racial, 
ethnic, and political implications.  The “natives” of Pettah are not the “natives” as 
envisioned in a wider Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist imaginary, they are primarily 
Muslim traders of diverse backgrounds, including “Sri Lankan Muslims” and those 
with connections to other minority Muslim groups from India or elsewhere in the 
region.18  Pettah, then, represents something beyond just the “native” in any easy 
sense of the word.  It also represents a zone of ethnic mixing, of non-Sinhala-
Buddhist-ness, of commerce and mercantile sensibility.  While most of Colombo is 
                                                
18 Nile Green’s monograph Bombay Islam (2011) highlights the diversity of Muslim communities in 
Bombay during the colonial period.  Green shows that “Muslim” hardly denoted a homogenous, 
uniform group of people; rather, as a hub city in the western Indian Ocean region, Bombay was home 
to Muslims from a wide range of places throughout the Middle East, Africa and Asia.  A similar point 
could be made about Colombo Islam: Muslims in the city are not necessarily all from one community, 
but rather from a variety of distinct communities including Bohras, Memons, etc. “Muslim” then 
becomes a complex and multi-layered label. 
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populated by minorities, Pettah’s place in the urban imagination as a heterogenous, 
gritty and decidedly non-middle class space is particularly salient.  Paradoxically, 
Pettah is also home to some of the city’s most important architectural and historical 
sights, leftovers from the colonial period.  Pettah represents, then, a kind of “other” 
to the Colombo of the future envisioned by the city’s wealthier residents.      
Even though Pettah is laden with negative implications of dirtiness, filth, and 
urban decay, the area is simultaneously considered a vibrant, exciting and 
“authentic” part of Colombo.  Although the typical tourist itinerary in Sri Lanka 
primarily directs visitors out of Colombo altogether towards the beaches, resorts and 
cultural attractions outside the city, many guides and materials for visitors spending a 
few days in Colombo recommend Pettah as a place to see the “real” character of the 
city.  As one newspaper article put it,  
To feel the pulse of the city, or simply to find an odd souvenir, a visitor need 
only take a walk through Pettah. It's a thrilling experience that gives an 
instant insight into what makes Sri Lanka tick, yielding more fascinating 
glimpses of local life in a morning's walk than does a week's touring the 
country by air-conditioned bus. (Sunday Observer, 2007)  
 
This passage explicitly conjures the touristic value of Pettah for someone new to Sri 
Lanka; the reference to “touring the country by air-conditioned bus” contrasts this 
common mode of interacting with Sri Lanka with the more immediate, intimate and 
“thrilling” experience of immersing oneself in Pettah.  But the article makes another 
important move as well - it posits Pettah (Muslim, non-Sinhalese, non-Buddhist 
Pettah) as a microcosm or index of the country at large, the key to “what makes Sri 
Lanka tick.” Pettah then rhetorically shifts from exceptional to exemplary.       
Pettah is the entrepot for the whole of Sri Lanka. Villagers come here to 
purchase household implements, wholesalers store everything from 
scrubbing brushes to expensive computers, textile traders lurk behind bolts of 
brilliant-hued fabric piled high on wooden counters, jewellers and gem 
merchants quietly conduct deals worth a fortune, while fruitsellers shout 
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about their wares and wayside vendors of junk wait patiently for customers. 
(Sunday Observer, 2007)  
 
In this reading of Pettah, it is the area’s economic importance which is highlighted 
and understood as the basis of its importance for Colombo and Sri Lanka as a whole.  
This Sunday Observer article steers clear of remarking on the fact that 
ethnic/religious minorities form the backbone of this “entrepôt for the whole of Sri 
Lanka” focusing instead on the goods to be purchased there.  But the reference to 
“villagers” traveling to Pettah and the range of items described here, including gems, 
computers, fabrics, fruit and “junk” is suggestive of the centrality of the 
neighborhood as a place of mixing of different social groups (rural and urban) and 
also as the concentration of so wide a range of commodities with different purposes 
and provenances.   
 Part of Pettah’s significance stems from its location within Colombo itself; 
long before the southern neighborhoods of the city became fashionable, even before 
Colombo 7/Cinnamon Gardens represented the preserve of the city’s westernized, 
English-speaking elite, power and status in Colombo had to do with access and 
proximity to the Port.  When this changed, in the early 20th century, Pettah and the 
northern residential neighborhoods of the city gradually fell into disrepair.  Now, 
though Pettah is widely acknowledged as a commercial hub, it is a part of the city in 
which better-off residents would not actively seek to spend their time.   
 Ahmed, my acquaintance who had grown up in Pettah, explained commerce in 
Colombo as a system based on social class and spatial politics.  The same goods 
could be found and purchased in Pettah as in Majestic City or Crescat he said.  But, 
he insisted, a rich person would not choose to go to Pettah to buy a car, or a 
computer.  The rich person, he argued, would choose to go to one of the other retail 
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locations where he or she could park their personal vehicle, maybe even with valet 
parking, select the item they needed from an air-conditioned shop, and not be 
bothered by excessive crowds or unappealing sights.  In Ahmed's view, Pettah's 
ability to provide shoppers with needed/desired commodities was not in question, 
but its symbolic capital, the ability to provide an experience beyond the economic 
transaction at hand, an experience that would be welcoming and appropriate for 
wealthy elites, certainly was.   
It was clear that to my middle class Colombo informants like Sara, Ahmed 
and others, the Floating Market held very little appeal.  The gender dynamics of the 
space, to which I was particularly sensitive as a female ethnographer, only served to 
reinforce class anxieties about well-off women being preyed upon by working class 
men, a dynamic which Anouk De Koning also observes in the context of shifting 
gender politics in Cairo (2009). The ethnic and religious mixing of Pettah also 
suggests its troubling of both nationalist Sinhala-Buddhist narratives, while its 
dilapidation and poverty simultaneously suggests an affront to the future-oriented 
cosmopolitan project of transforming Colombo into a global city.  In what follows, I 
shift from a discussion of how visitors and customers perceived the space to an 
analysis of how the laborers whose livelihood was tied up with the space navigated, 
made sense of and critiqued the Floating Market’s failure in the context of 
Colombo’s global city transformation.    
 
States of Failure 
 "We don't want to be thugs, but we're hungry, we have to think about our 
stomachs," said Dinesh, a middle-aged vendor at the Floating Market.  Dinesh and 
his companion Chathu were vendors who shared a small floating stall selling 
accharu (a snack of spicy pickled vegetables).  Speaking with them one afternoon in 
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June 2015, the market still partly festooned with leftover decorations from the recent 
vesak holiday, Dinesh’s comment was in reference to recent protests against the 
Urban Development Authority (UDA).   Spurred by the disappointment with the 
Floating Market’s lack of customers and disconnection from vehicle and foot traffic, 
a tense situation between merchants and the government agency had boiled over into 
violence, with vendors throwing stones and breaking the UDA’s windows out of 
frustration.  After numerous meetings in which shopkeepers had complained only to 
be met with silence or inaction by the UDA, many felt they had no choice but to 
revert to this kind of protest, Dinesh explained apologetically.  
 The UDA is the implementing agency for urban development projects in 
Colombo.  Reporting to the Ministry of Defense and Urban Development, created 
under the Rajapakse government, the UDA is the government body immediately 
responsible for designing and constructing the Floating Market, as well as managing 
the space once it was completed: collecting rents from shopkeepers, conducting 
maintenance work in the public spaces, etc.  Dinesh, Chathu, and other vendors 
whom I introduce below all understood the UDA as responsible for their situation.  
What had begun as a triumphant state project led by the Rajapakse government to 
beautify and modernize Colombo quickly soured into a prime example of an 
unresponsive state ignoring the economic disasters that could be wrought by the 
project of global city-making.  
 Chathu and Dinesh, like most people, had had very bad business since 
moving to the Floating Market when it opened in August 2014. Initially, business 
had been brisk and they had even had foreign tourists coming by the shop.  But now, 
less than a year later, the situation looked bleak.  Entire days could go by with only a 
handful of customers, making small and inconsequential purchases. The UDA had 
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told merchants initially that there might be a night market, but this had never 
happened.   By dusk the market was generally empty.  Dinesh explained that the 
issue now was that they simply had nowhere else to go.  Relocating to a new spot 
outside the Floating Market would obviously be better for business, but they didn't 
have the capital or connections to find somewhere new.   
 As I got to know them, Dinesh and Chathu clarified that they weren't actually 
in business together; they were just sharing the same floating platform, and splitting 
the rent costs.  In fact, it was four people sharing the platform - Dinesh and Chathu, a 
vegetable seller, and a fourth man whose business was never mentioned.  The 
vegetable seller's presence was made known only by the sacks of onions piled up on 
one side of the platform.  Dinesh explained that he didn't really sell anything here 
anymore, preferring to use the platform as a storage space and selling his wares 
elsewhere.  By the time I met them, it made more sense for vendors like Dinesh and 
Chathu to simply use the physical infrastructure of the Floating Market stall as a 
place to keep their belongings, rather than trying to sell those items in the market 
itself.  
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Image 7 Empty Market Stalls and Walkway at the Pettah Floating Market 
Source: Author Photo 
 
 Like many vendors in the market, Dinesh and Chathu were supporters of the 
former government, and still expressed lukewarm enthusiasm for Rajapakse even as 
they blamed the UDA under his rule for the poor planning of the Floating Market 
space. It quickly became clear to me as I conducted my fieldwork there that the 
Market was more than just an unsuccessful commercial location, it was a powerful 
artifact: material evidence of the failures, poorly laid out plans and oversights of the 
former government.   
 All over the Floating Market, there were powerful reminders of the place’s 
relationship to the Rajapakse regime.  For instance, I couldn’t help but notice that in 
the spring of 2015, the Testa Bakehouse - one of the larger and more corporate 
businesses in the Floating Market - still displayed photographs of Mahinda and 
Gothabaya Rajapakse only, and not the new governing duo of Maithripala Sirisena 
and Ranil Wickremasinghe.  Later, I saw that the pictures of the two newcomers 
were added, but the Rajapakses’ photos were never taken down.  When I was 
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approached by the Bakehouse manager, I was treated to a lengthy monologue about 
the virtues of the former government and the way that the Floating Market 
represented ideals of Buddhism which "the people" simply did not understand and as 
a result, they didn't appreciate the serenity and beauty of the space.     
 My vendor informants were full of ideas on how things could be improved, 
and did not hesitate to make their displeasure at the state of things known, as 
evidenced by the raucous protest Dinesh had described.  Even if they were nominally 
supporters of the former government, most of my interlocutors were very consistent 
when it came to pointing out the space's deficiencies.  Many of the vendors pointed 
out that the Floating Market had been doomed to not attract customers because it 
housed no "known brands." By "known brands" they explained that they meant 
things like Pizza Hut, McDonald's,19 or PG Martin (a Sri Lankan luggage store).  In 
making these connections, the vendors clearly referenced the types of businesses that 
were available at more upscale malls in the city, but which were nowhere to be seen 
here at the Floating Market.  They reasoned that if people saw these types of 
recognized shops at the Floating Market, they would be more tempted to enter the 
space.  In articulating their desire for "known brands" the Floating Market vendors 
not only showed their own business savvy and an awareness of what would work 
better in attracting customers, but their statements also revealed the extent to which 
coding a public space as middle class was important in bolstering its appeal. 
 States, cities, people - all are categories of thing which can and do “fail” on a 
regular basis.  In accounts of development projects gone wrong as in those of James 
Scott (1998) and James Ferguson (1994), the failure encountered is that of state 
                                                
19 McDonald’s in Sri Lanka is considered a relatively upmarket eatery.  The food there is generally 
too expensive for most low-income and working class Colombo residents to afford and the branches 
throughout the city are located accordingly. 
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institutions, international financial bodies and global NGOs.  In Scott and Ferguson’s 
accounts, these failures draw attention to the problems inherent in ideological 
systems - “high modernism” for Scott and mainstream development rhetoric for 
Ferguson - that motivate the projects in question.  Individual people, families and 
communities, however, are those who must most immediately react to and deal with 
the failed projects often implemented by institutions over which they have no power.  
This chapter offers an ethnographic portrayal of this reality, in which individuals 
must navigate the remains of failed state projects.     
Failure and other negative affective states have emerged as important sites of 
theoretical investigation, especially in the domain of queer theory (eg. Cvetkovitch 
2012, Halberstam 2011, Berlant 2011).  Failing is newly reconsidered not only as an 
unfortunate opposite of success, but as a domain of potential and opportunity to defy 
oppressive power structures.  Consider Jack Halberstam’s assertion that failure 
“comes accompanied by a host of negative affects, such as disappointment, 
disillusionment, and despair,” but simultaneously “provides the opportunity to use 
these negative affects to poke holes in the toxic positivity of contemporary life” 
(2011, 3).  Halberstam inverts the usual formula whereby failure of any kind is 
something to be mourned, and instead offers that failure may contain almost 
revolutionary potential to deviate from the normative - the “toxic positivity.”  
Certainly, the failure of a project like the Pettah Floating Market challenges the 
triumphant rhetoric of the Colombo-as-global-city narrative.  It provides a powerful 
affront to the unrealistic, sometimes oppressive visions of rapid development 
championed by elites and policy-makers.  And yet, my informants’ stories suggest 
the enduring importance of unequal power relations and dire financial circumstances.  
Failure or success are, in this context, matters of survival.  Vendors’ stories suggest 
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that in a context of such weakness and vulnerability of regular people vis-a-vis the 
state, there is in fact little to celebrate in failure.      
 Dinesh's comment about "thinking about their stomachs" brought to mind 
what Africanists refer to as "the politics of the belly" (Bayart 1989).  The reference 
to the stomach - one which was made in other contexts in my fieldwork as well - 
speaks to the real life or death nature of the matter at hand.  The Pettah Floating 
Market was not, for the vendors, simply an experiment in urban planning, it had 
become their livelihood and its success or failure meant the literal difference 
between survival and starvation for working class people with very little savings and 
no other streams of income. 
In chapter three, I discussed the situation of the Mutuwall fishermen and their 
spatial and temporal challenge to the world city ethos of 21st century Colombo.  
Highlighting the multiple forms of dispossession that the fishers faced - geographic 
relocation from their neighborhood and environmental destruction of the ecosystem 
upon which they depend - I underscored that dispossession is an ever-present threat, 
one that cannot be combatted precisely because it is experienced as slow, creeping 
and multi-faceted.  Dispossession in the case of Mutuwall is a possible, likely future 
hovering on the horizon. By contrast, this ethnographic engagement with the Pettah 
Floating Market takes as its point of departure the fact that dispossession has already 
occurred.    
The vendors at the Pettah Floating Market are primarily small merchants who 
were relocated from other parts of the Pettah neighborhood and directed by the 
government into the newly constructed space.  Having a stall in the new Floating 
Market was compensation for moving the vendors from other parts of the 
neighborhood to make room for what was supposedly a road construction project.  
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However, Dinesh and Chathu’s stores had already been destroyed by the time I 
encountered them - and they told me the proposed road project had never actually 
taken place.  Both wished they could simply return to their old stores, which had 
been razed for nothing.       
  Dinesh and Chathu's situation speaks to many themes I encountered with 
other vendors across the Floating Market.  In virtually all the conversations we had, 
the state was positioned as a powerful actor whose role in establishing the Market 
was never questioned.  But when things went badly, state institutions like the UDA 
were also roundly blamed for the failure of the space. Stories about a distant, 
unresponsive UDA and rage on the part of vendors were all too common in the 
Floating Market.  These accounts reveal both the dependence of regular people on 
the state and their tense relationship with it spurred by economic hardship.   
 
 
From Caretaker to Predatory State 
 
 The failure of the Pettah Floating Market revealed the relationship between 
vendors and the state to be one based on mutual suspicion, hostility and predation.  
As revealed by the case of Chathu and Dinesh, the accharu sellers, most of the 
merchants at the Floating Market wished to have their old shops back - and were 
frustrated to learn that the road expansion project which had sparked their eviction 
never materialized.  But the tense relationship between vendors and the UDA was 
not only a result of the initial relocation of the shops.  Vendors were being charged 
high monthly rents for their new storefronts, despite the fact that they had virtually 
no customers.  The UDA became a persistent antagonist for vendors due to the 
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collection of monthly rents which, it became clear, most merchants could no longer 
afford to pay.   
 The experiences of Marvin, the manager of Kottu Spot, are illustrative of 
these kinds of challenges.  Marvin is a Sinhala-Buddhist, in his thirties, and married.  
His family comes from Galle, but now live in a suburb on the outskirts of Colombo.  
Marvin’s mother has a “hotel” (colloquial term for food shop) along a busy road in 
northern Colombo.  He had a shop nearby in Pettah before coming to the Floating 
Market.  As a SLFP supporter and admirer of Mahinda Rajapakse, Marvin regularly 
expressed cynicism and disdain for other politicians from different political parties, 
but also expressed hopelessness and cynicism about politics more generally: “can’t 
do anything” was a common refrain when I tried to ask him how things at the Market 
might be improved.   
 By August 2015, I gradually noticed more and more empty shops - a 
testament to the fact that vendors would rather leave than stick around in this quiet 
place, devoid of customers. Marvin, in explaining his frustrations, surprised me one 
afternoon by speaking quite candidly about the money he owed and his financial 
predicament.  By this point, Ashan and I had sat at his shop and conducted casual 
interviews numerous times.  Marvin had often seemed a little bored, or preoccupied 
during our conversations, leading me to worry that my questions were too invasive 
or numerous.  But on this sweltering afternoon in August, I looked on in surprise as 
he brought me invoices and began to break down to me the scale of what he owed 
the UDA for this shop which was barely staying afloat.  He explained that there used 
to be an informal "union" among the vendors which had encouraged them to band 
together and not pay their rent until certain demands were met - but the union 
dissolved, and the main organizers had left, leaving those like Marvin who had 
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participated in the rent strike in a bad position.  The breakdown of the expenses he 
had to contend with was as follows: for the "key money" (the down payment to 
acquire the shop), Marvin was charged 1,000,000 Rs. (about $6,800 USD).  He had 
paid Rs.280,000 of this at the outset leaving a balance of Rs. 720,000 (about $4,900 
USD) to be paid.  This was in addition to the monthly rent of Rs. 6795.60 (about $46 
USD), which he was behind on paying as well because of the rent strike. 
 The first thing that struck me when Marvin explained his finances was how 
out of whack the initial key money and monthly rent seemed - Rs.1,000,000 was a 
very hefty sum in Sri Lankan terms.  The idea that vendors had been relocated here 
due to a government project which never went ahead and had to pay this 
considerable sum for the privilege made their complaints appear all the more urgent.  
The appropriateness of these sums of money being charged to vendors has to be 
understood with reference to the kinds of things they sold and the prices of the goods 
available.  The Floating Market was not the place for fancy, expensive items.  There 
were a few cell phone accessory shops, some places selling clothing and footwear, 
and the rest were primarily food vendors.  For a food vendor like Marvin who might 
sell a soda for Rs.75 or a packet of crackers for Rs.50, it was apparent that even the 
monthly rent of Rs.6795 would be very hard to make, to say nothing of the huge cost 
of his key money debt.  In addition, Marvin told us laughing wryly, there was the 
matter of electricity for the refrigeration units in his food shop: another Rs.11,000 or 
Rs.12,000 ($75 - $80 USD) per month for which he was responsible.  The UDA had 
offered a one year grace period for vendors to settle their debts, and Marvin didn't 
seem to know whether this meant he would be soon facing interest fees on the 
money he owed.  Ashan and I both looked over the invoices as carefully as we could 
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and noticed multiple different dates stamped on them, making it unclear when 
payment was actually due.   
 Seeing Marvin's financial troubles laid out before me in the form of official, 
state-issued invoices crystallized for me the uphill battle facing vendors who 
remained in the Floating Market, but who found no recourse from a largely 
unresponsive set of urban institutions linked to the state.  While the UDA under the 
Rajapakses was authoritarian and occasionally brutal in its re-arranging of urban 
residents to suit the goal of making Colombo "global" the new UDA was perhaps 
even harder to deal with: reeling from the political changes of the past several 
months, in August 2015 the policies and plans of the UDA going forward, and how 
this would impact places like the Floating Market, were totally opaque to people 
average people like Marvin.  All around, the physical and material signs of this state 
of affairs was evident.  I noticed at the end of our session with Marvin that the shop 
next to him was empty - I could not even tell what had once been sold there.  Marvin 
replied that the man running it had left four or five months back, without paying his 
debt or expressing any intention of return.  When I walked closer to peer inside, I 
saw the place was littered with UDA invoices identical to those sent to Marvin.    
 
A Desire to be Elsewhere 
 
If the proximity of the bus and train stations to the Pettah Floating Market 
conjured up images of travel to the rest of Sri Lanka, I found that within the market 
itself, among the vendors I spoke to, imaginings of places much farther away than 
Kandy or Galle were also at work.  One vendor, whom we spoke to as he packed 
bright red jelly sweets into plastic, the color staining his hands, described the market 
as a failure because “this isn’t Hong Kong, or Thailand.” He didn’t stop working as 
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we interviewed him but added that “this [the Pettah Floating Market] would be fine 
for those countries, but not here.” The man’s reference to these other countries is not 
incidental.  The Floating Market’s name is an attempt to conjure in the touristic 
imagination a vision of an attraction similar to the floating market of Bangkok, and 
others in Southeast Asia.  But, as I have made clear, the Floating Market never really 
came close to achieving the same level of density, centrality and sociality imagined 
to be part of these neighboring countries’ versions of “Floating Markets.” The power 
of cross-referencing and comparison in the inter-Asian context (Ong and Roy 2011) 
was so powerful that these transnational comparisons were used by vendors to make 
sense of the dilapidated, decaying space in which they worked.  
Unsurprisingly, given the prevalence of migration from Sri Lanka in general, I 
found that almost every vendor I spoke to had hopes of migrating abroad, and/or 
made reference to family members abroad whose lives they envied and wished to 
emulate themselves.  Various ‘elsewheres’ were thus present in the Market on any 
given day: the elsewhere that the Market itself failed to emulate, and the elsewhere 
that the vendors as individuals would rather be.   
Ajith, one of Marvin’s employees at Kottu Spot, detailed his own itineraries: 
from a small town outside of Kandy, he had come here to Pettah to work in the old 
shop before he and the others had been relocated here to the Floating Market.  
Feeling tricked by the government’s promise and unimpressed with the slow trickle 
of business, Ajith boasted of his own intention to travel abroad to Malaysia, or 
Singapore - “good countries” where he could work illegally and make many times 
what he earned here.  Eventually, we stopped seeing Ajith and Marvin told me he 
had finally decided to try and leave Sri Lanka for Singapore.  A few weeks later, we 
 176 
heard he hadn’t made it: he was now working in his home village again, as a 
carpenter.    
 The overwhelming desire to be elsewhere translated both into big aspirations 
for migrating out of Sri Lanka, but also into the more modest wish to simply be able 
to leave the Floating Market and open a business elsewhere in the city.   The harsh 
terms of the vendors' rental agreements with the UDA, however, made both kinds of 
wishes for mobility and freedom very difficult.  With outstanding sums of money 
still owed to the state, vendors became confined to the site, stuck in an impossible 
situation wherein they were expected to honor their original agreements while seeing 
fewer and fewer customers with each passing month.   
 The issue of mobility in and out of the Market was relevant at multiple 
scales.  Ajith’s dream of traveling abroad where he might earn more money and the 
sweet-seller’s remark that the market failed to live up to the standards of Southeast 
Asia were powerful reminders of the global.  And yet mobility - or lack thereof - was 
also an issue at the most immediate, local level. When I asked Dinesh whether they 
got any business from passengers on the buses which stopped nearby, Dinesh said 
no, without a good walkway from the bus stand to the Floating Market, people 
would not want to take the time to come to their shops and then have to loop back to 
the buses.  Speaking wistfully of the old shops he and Chathu used to have, Dinesh 
described their convenient location right on the street, and said passengers used to 
come there before taking their buses; but this was no longer possible here in the 
Market.  
 
*** 
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 When I returned to the Market in June 2016, I came upon Chathu still 
working on the floating platform, but now there was no sign of Dinesh.  We spoke a 
bit and though she explained she only had to pay monthly rent for half of the 
platform - Rs. 4,500 ($31 USD), I saw no indication of any other vendor using the 
space next to her.  As Chathu brewed tea to serve us, I noticed little improvements 
she had made to her shop - she now sold some other items besides achcharu and had 
set up a glass case to showcase her wares, as well as a small shrine to Lord Buddha.  
She mentioned business had been a little bit better the past few months and as we 
chatted two different customers approached - one to purchase the achcharu, the other 
paying for a single cigarette which she took and gave him from the glass case.  I was 
impressed to see that she looked more settled and established in the shop, but it was 
worrying to notice that her companions had by now deserted the platform. The 
general air of the Floating Market around us was even more disheartening than 
before.   
 Our conversation also revealed lingering disappointments and problems with 
the UDA.  She said definitively that now they knew there would be no bridge or 
walkway constructed to the main road as the vendors had hoped last year.  She 
mentioned that some vendors had gone ahead and set up shops on the other side of 
the water, in front of the Floating Market and closer to the buses.  But their shops 
had been dismantled by the UDA because they didn’t conform to zoning rules and 
the desired aesthetic of the space.  Chathu would rather just go elsewhere where 
there might be more business, but she explained that she still owed Rs.50,000 to the 
UDA.  It was a burden, but she would pay it back little by little.  Chathu was very 
worried about this money because she wanted to stay in the UDA's good graces - 
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they might be able to find her later or track where she opened future businesses, so 
she felt obligated to stay on their good side.    
 I was pleased to find that Marvin at Kottu Spot was still in business in mid-
2016 as well.  Like Chathu, he had made some small improvements to his shop, with 
large new signs in vibrant colors advertising the food and drinks for sale.  When I 
complimented him on the signs he laughed and, in typical self-deprecating fashion, 
told me not to be too impressed, they had only cost Rs.1,700.  He pointed to a picture 
of one of the beverages on the sign, something I'd never heard of, and said he had 
bought crates of these bottles because he heard tourists liked this drink.  By now he 
hadn't sold a single one.  Like Chathu, Marvin confirmed that the UDA wouldn't act 
on the idea of an improved walkway to the main street.  We asked about the UDA 
collecting payments, and initially he seemed to indicate that he had simply stopped 
paying the rent - but when we prodded him, Marvin explained that in fact he was 
doing the best to keep up with the payments, he knew people from the UDA, and 
also like Chathu, he said he felt obligated to pay.  He worried that failing to do so 
might compromise his relationship with them in the future.     
 Mirroring the ambitions of Ajith, his employee, Marvin had always been 
open about his own desire to emigrate to the Gulf, and on my return to the Floating 
Market, I found that his plans had become much firmer.  His wife had given birth to 
a son six months ago and as he showed us pictures of the baby on his phone, he 
explained that when the child was one year old, he planned to emigrate to Dubai.  He 
had gone there earlier in the year for about two weeks, and got the idea to set up a 
Sri Lankan food shop.  Foreigners in Dubai were not allowed to own property or 
businesses he explained, so his plan necessitated connecting with a local sponsor 
who would help him get his visa and set up the shop and he would pay them back.  
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Under such an arrangement Marvin guessed he would be liable for about Rs. 
100,000 per month ($687) to these sponsors, but he hoped that with the better 
economic climate in Dubai, this would be manageable.  When a customer 
approached and Marvin got up to go make him a plate of kottu, Ashan turned to me 
and said mischievously referring to the US elections: "so you guys are going to build 
a wall - need any Sri Lankan workers?"   
 I had been surprised, during my follow-up fieldwork in June 2016, to find 
that Chathu and Marvin were still in business.  I was also newly surprised by how 
grim and uninviting the space appeared, the time away from the site making the 
emptiness, extreme heat and stagnant water appear even more striking.  But as the 
conversations I have related demonstrate, their presence in the Floating Market 
seemed to be more a result of lack of options than improved business prospects.  In 
Chathu's case, she made it clear that fear of some sort of punishment by the UDA 
was what motivated her to remain and try to pay back the money she owed.  Marvin 
appeared less afraid of the UDA than Chathu but still weighed down by feelings of 
obligation to maintain good relations with them, even though paying back the money 
he owed was a serious burden.  The dream of moving to Dubai seemed to be the 
main thing motivating him, and the only source of optimism since the store at the 
Floating Market was clearly a lost cause.  Ashan's sarcastic joke to me about Sri 
Lankan workers emigrating to the United States to build the border wall imagined by 
Donald Trump spoke to the pervasiveness of migration dreams, not only among the 
Floating Market vendors but also among educated English-speakers like Ashan 
himself.  The implication of the joke - and this came up numerous times in the 
course of my working relationship with Ashan - was the idea that almost anywhere at 
all, any type of labor, was better than staying in Sri Lanka.  Needless to say, this 
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perspective differed greatly from the intense optimism which had characterized the 
immediate post-war moment, and which had underpinned the rapid construction of 
new public spaces throughout Colombo, such as the Floating Market itself.  My 
ethnographic research at the Market could not have revealed more clearly the 
difference in the affects and aspirations of the working urban poor and the outlook of 
the elites who had envisioned Colombo as a global destination.   
 
Dispossession and Disappointment in the Making of a Hub City  
 
Throughout my vendor informants’ accounts of the Floating Market, there is 
repeated reference to the loss of shops that they had owned in other parts of Pettah 
before coming to join the Floating Market.  In all cases, the vendors spoke longingly 
of their old businesses and lamented their relocation into a space which was, by 
comparison, far less commercially viable.  Vendors had been given little choice in 
the matter of relocation: the government was intent on destroying the shops they had 
occupied in order to complete a road expansion project.  The compensation given to 
the vendors was not up for discussion: they were given shops in the Floating Market 
and expected to pay rent in accordance with UDA contracts.  
In her analysis of ongoing forms of dispossession in Southeast Asia, Tania Li 
critiques certain Marxist accounts of dispossession which risk being overly neat in 
their temporal and spatial framings.  Li points out that while accumulation by 
dispossession typically assumes the incorporation of the dispossessed into capitalist 
regimes of labor and production, in fact it is increasingly common to observe forms 
of dispossession in which “dispossession is detached from any prospect of labor 
absorption” (69).  Furthermore, she notes that in contemporary examples of 
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dispossession, it is often impossible to identify who is directly responsible for the 
situation of the dispossessed, and thus to resist dispossession.  
Li’s rethinking of the dynamics of dispossession offers some important 
possibilities for conceiving of dispossession in relation to the Pettah Floating 
Market.  While on the surface, the case of the Market does not seem to be one of 
outright “dispossession” because the vendors were compensated with storefronts in 
the newly opened space, the results of this “compensation” are far from adequate in 
replacing their lost businesses and income streams.  Vendors were given no choice in 
the matter of whether to move, and when they did were essentially trapped in a 
poorly accessible, low traffic space.  The state in turn made money off these same 
vendors by collecting exorbitant rents - the mechanism of dispossession was a spatial 
shift/relocation which resulted in the UDA being able to extract value from a 
population of people newly concentrated in a single, state-owned location.   
The case of the Floating Market offers ways to think about contemporary 
situations of primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession differently 
from traditional Marxist models.  Dispossession may in fact be embedded in the very 
mechanisms through which the urban poor appear to be compensated for their losses.  
Not only is the compensation (in this case, the new stores) insufficient for truly 
making up for lost livelihoods, the new businesses themselves become a channel for 
the state to profit off the very people it has just relocated.   
The situation of the vendors in the Floating Market speaks to the complex 
relations between the urban poor and the state in situations of rapid urban 
development.  Writing about urban residents evicted in order to facilitate the building 
of a new urban zone in Vietnam, Erik Harms writes that “When neoliberalism and 
authoritarianism mingle, the production of beautiful urban spaces both masks and 
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reinforces assertions of power” (2012: 742).   Detailing the failure of a new urban 
project promoted for its beauty and aesthetic charm, Harms captures a feeling of 
failure highly similar to what I have described here with regards to the Floating 
Market in Colombo:    
What began as promises of a more beautiful future eventually turned into a 
charade of false promises, bungled bureaucratic procedures, and forced 
eviction. Despite the obvious frustration, in the above statement and 
countless others like it, residents do not critique the “picture of a beautiful 
future” originally described. Their anger is directed at the failure to deliver 
on that promise and, most directly, at the nitty-gritty details of the process—
rising land prices, inappropriate compensation levels, and bureaucratic red 
tape. (2012: 740)  
 
This resonates with the situation of the vendors at the Floating Market.  As Harms 
notes, the object of the evicted residents’ anger is not the initial project or its vision, 
but rather the way in which its construction was mishandled.  The Floating Market 
vendors, too, lament the failure of the state to “deliver on the promise” of the space, 
rather than the idea behind the space itself.  As shown in my ethnography, the 
vendors were in large part supporters of the former government, and entered the 
space with high expectations of the business they could conduct there.  When the 
vendors suggested “known brands” which could be included in order to attract more 
customers, or tried to dress up their shops to appeal to tourists, this was an attempt to 
participate in the transformation of Colombo into a global city. Cooperation, rather 
than resistance, initially characterized the vendors’ attitudes towards the Floating 
Market.  
 Asher Ghertner, writing on Delhi, observes that the practices of world-city 
making rest on shared understandings of the need to improve, beautify and 
streamline urban infrastructures, and specifically to do away with slums. The 
common desire to “improve” serves to “naturalize dispossession” (2015: 90) of those 
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deemed not to belong in a world-class city.  Ghertner suggests that what he terms 
“nuisance talk” is a powerful discursive form, in which urban residents come “to not 
just agree on an abject object, but to initiate a political and material process of 
abjection” (2015: 80).  Ultimately, Ghertner points out that this way of interacting 
with and perceiving slums casts them as causes rather than symptoms of urban decay.   
 The Pettah Floating Market initially started out as a proposed solution to the 
overwhelming messiness and intensity of Pettah, deemed a “problem” for foreign 
visitors and middle class Colombo residents.  However, in a parallel to what 
Ghertner observes about slums, the Floating Market’s failure quickly came to be 
seen as part of the problem it had originally been designed to address.  Despite being 
a symptom of poor state planning and neglect, the Floating Market was eventually 
tarred with the same brush as the rest of the Pettah neighborhood, minus its 
commercial viability: unappealing, lower class, and not meeting cosmopolitan 
standards.  The vendors themselves even had to shoulder some of the blame for their 
own dispossession and precarity, as evidenced by one UDA official’s remark to me 
that if the government could start over from scratch they would “choose better 
people” to staff the Market.  
 Ultimately, the relocation of the vendors from their original shops in Pettah to 
the new stagnant market space was an example of the multi-faceted and complex 
processes of dispossession at play in contemporary Colombo.  Vendors eventually 
heard that the project for which their original shops had been destroyed had never 
gone ahead after all.  Months after concluding my fieldwork, I learned from friends 
in Colombo that the new government was considering closing the market and simply 
moving the vendors out, back to another street in Pettah. Rather than being 
incorporated into a new and different labor force, the Floating Market vendors 
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simply found themselves trapped.  The Market never became a convincing addition 
to the project of reshaping Colombo into a global metropolis; if anything, it became 
a forgotten footnote in the larger story of trying to render Colombo a modern hub 
city. It stands as a powerful reminder that not all forms of dispossession lead to clear 
examples of accumulation, that not all roads to urban development are linear.  Most 
of all, the Floating Market offers stark evidence that the path to global city building 
is littered with errors, failed projects and missed opportunities.    
 
Conclusion: Failed Hubness 
 
In chapter one, I developed the concept of the politics of hubness.  Hubness 
implies mobility.  The movement of capital and people throughout the Indian Ocean 
region is central to the imaginary of Sri Lanka’s future promoted by politicians, 
urban planners and developers.  However, as my ethnographic engagement with the 
Pettah Floating Market revealed, immobility and confinement were more central to 
vendors’ experiences than freedom and mobility.  And yet, much like the fishers I 
introduced in chapter three, I also found the vendors to have their own dreams and 
desires of mobility - dreams that differed somewhat from the elite conceptions of 
mobility made visible in hubness discourse.     
As discussed earlier, Pettah the neighborhood is a hub for Colombo and even Sri 
Lanka as a whole, a mixing pot of ethnicities, religions, commodities and 
commercial activities.  The diversity of Pettah renders it both attractive and repulsive 
to middle class Sinhala-Buddhist social imaginaries. Beyond the symbolism of a 
multi-ethnic urban neighborhood serving as a mini-hub for commerce in Sri Lanka, 
Pettah’s significance also stems from its association with infrastructures of island-
wide transport.  The Fort Railway station and major bus depot with buses departing 
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for points all over Sri Lanka are located in Pettah.  Pettah the neighborhood is 
suffused with associations of domestic travel, transit and movement, a foil to the 
international, trans-oceanic forms of transit championed by the discourse of hubness.  
Given Pettah’s neighborhood-wide link to places beyond Colombo, it was 
surprising to me to notice how many of the vendors’ complaints rested on the lack of 
very simple forms of access and mobility - such as a walkway - which would 
contribute to the commercial success of the Floating Market.  The contours of a hub 
city are being built in contemporary Colombo, but often without attention to 
relatively small items that would make a big difference in the lives of people like the 
Floating Market vendors.  Rather than being a harmonious unified whole, the 
emerging hub city is characterized by tensions, gaps and myriad forms of error and 
failure that pit the needs of the urban poor against the ambitions of planners.    
The rhetoric of hubness, like all global-city making discourse, assumes success.  
The process of transforming Colombo into a hub city is usually portrayed as a 
smooth, straightforward and self-evident sequence of events unfolding such that 
people and spaces are neatly developed from poor to wealthy, from backwards to 
modern.  And yet, as evidenced by my ethnography, the path imagined by state 
agencies and planners are hardly so straightforward.  Instead, as shown by the 
situation of the Floating Market, the urban poor are often subject to complex, multi-
layered forms of dispossession and confinement. Hubness as it is being realized in 
Sri Lanka today includes many examples of exploitation, failure and exclusion 
underneath the dazzling images and triumphant rhetoric of a new Colombo.     
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CHAPTER 5: BUILDING AS IF: THE DREAMWORK OF LUXURY REAL ESTATE 
 
 Speculation is an important part of the work of building global cities.  I 
understand speculation not purely as a financial technique but more broadly as “the 
making present and materializing of uncertain futures” (Bear et al. 2015, 387) in 
diverse arenas.  Present in this formulation of course is relevant on multiple 
registers, signifying both a temporal “now” and a spatial “here.” In Colombo, luxury 
apartments index an uncertain but highly specific, longed-for future.  One of the 
hallmarks of the emerging Asian or global metropolis is its ability to cater to the 
lifestyles of cosmopolitan and highly mobile professionals, especially through the 
provision of suitably exclusive and luxurious housing (Ong 2007).  As I demonstrate 
through the ethnographic details in this chapter, discourses surrounding luxury real 
estate developments speak to labor being done in both spatial and temporal terms.  
The ongoing construction of luxury real estate complexes in Colombo is one part of 
a larger process of building the global city, both materially and symbolically.  
 Arjun Appadurai employs the notion of dreamwork for understanding 
speculation in the contemporary global economy.  Distancing himself from theories 
which would underscore capitalism’s rationality, Appadurai emphasizes instead the 
seemingly irrational, illogical aspects of capitalism, “its magical, spiritual, and 
utopian horizon” (2015, 481).  According to Appadurai, “The idea of dreamwork 
brings together…the space of fantasy, speculation, and the unbridled 
imagination…and the space of productivity, discipline, and instrumentality” (2015, 
483).  My ethnographic research among those who labor in Colombo’s real estate 
industry revealed the extent to which this labor is effectively a combination of both 
of dreamwork’s key elements: fantasy and imagination and its own forms of 
productivity and discipline.  Developers and agents speak in the idiom of global 
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standards of luxury, and employ charts, figures, waiting lists, and other technologies 
designed to make luxury developments appear as good investments.  However, as I 
show in this chapter, alongside these techniques designed to project certainty and 
precision, forms of confusion, uncertainty, anxiety persist: waiting lists for buildings, 
upon closer inspection, offer only incomplete information; the number of actual 
buyers and renters of luxury units remains unclear; developments are proposed and 
marketed, but completion dates hover on an ever-hazier horizon.  Colombo’s luxury 
real estate market is an ongoing form of dreamwork.   
 Studies of global South cities emphasize the importance of changing property 
relations as well as the arrival and spread of new forms of urban and middle class 
housing.  The question of where people live in emerging global cities is one that 
draws together complex issues of class, space, land, aspiration, dispossession and 
speculation (in both its financial and other registers, as above).  The rise of gated 
communities and increasingly securitized middle class forms of dwelling has been a 
major trend across diverse national contexts, and has drawn attention from urban 
scholars (Caldeira 2001, Falzon 2004, Low 2001).  Home interiors are also a key 
lens through which to understand shifting middle class values and modes of self-
presentation, as taste in furnishing and ways of relating to interior space provide an 
important lens through which to understand both global patterns of consumption and 
class aspirations (Schielke 2012, Srivastava 2012, Fehervary 2002). In South Asia, 
the emergence of planned, gated, and luxury residences in cities throughout the 
Global South indexes a new way of relating to the state based more on private 
prosperity than collective, social development.  As Sanjay Srivastava notes with 
regards to India, “the bedroom is a window to the world” (2012: 62).     
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 This chapter builds on these conversations about emergent forms of housing 
(especially in the Global South), however it also departs from them in some ways to 
emphasize the incompleteness and uncertainty of such projects.  Rather than 
understanding gated, luxury or apartment-style living as fixed forms to be analyzed, 
in Colombo I emphasize that these things are works-in-progress, concepts which 
remain aspirational rather than actual.  In her work on Dakar, Senegal, Caroline 
Melly draws an important distinction between “building” and “dwelling”; analyzing 
the unfinished homes built in the city by the Senegalese diaspora, Melly suggests 
that this is a context in which “‘house’ and ‘home’ are often disarticulated” (2010, 
38).  Focusing on building rather than dwelling allows for an understanding of 
housing that takes into account the many divergent actors and temporalities involved 
in these processes of construction: “building is not passive, but rather is an ongoing 
and active engagement with physical materials, abstract hopes, available capital, 
networks of people and spatial constraints” (Melly 2010, 53).   Following Melly, I 
prefer to emphasize the ways in which housing is not exclusively a place in which to 
dwell but might also index broader goals, aspirations and complex relations of 
capital, space and temporality; building becomes a useful lens through which to 
understand luxury real estate in Colombo because it emphasizes the incompleteness 
of such projects.  
 In Colombo, luxury real estate developments are understood to be an important 
part of transforming the city into a global hub.  As built forms, high rise luxury 
buildings “inscribe a calligraphy of global significance” (Ong 2007, 83), allowing 
Colombo to physically resemble other, larger, Asian metropolises.  However, these 
projects are ongoing and far from complete.  While sky scrapers and other world-
famous buildings are the material embodiment of the global city form to which 
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Colombo aspires, it has not yet arrived.  Similarly, the ability to draw the appropriate 
occupants for such structures is not yet fully established, even though real estate 
agents and developers insist that such buildings meet “global” standards of luxury 
and appeal to wealthy Europeans, Asians and Middle Easterners. Writing about the 
already-global situation of cities like Shanghai or Singapore, Aihwa Ong suggests 
that “expatriates can be said to enjoy a “pied-a-terre status.” This status is “one that 
identifies the spatial and temporal limits of their link to the city. Despite the 
turnover, the expatriate community keeps the city in the global game” (2007, 86).  
As I will show in this chapter, in Colombo such pied-a-terre forms of citizenship 
facilitated by a critical mass of expatriates is a reality to which many aspire but 
which has not yet arrived.  This gap between the desire for and actual presence of 
wealthy foreigners is one of the primary sources of uncertainty and speculation 
amidst the current luxury real estate boom.       
As the following sections of this chapter demonstrate, the world of luxury real 
estate in Colombo is a hinge between the material and symbolic aspects of global 
city building.  It requires both the construction of physical buildings and the 
immaterial labor of marketing them to buyers and renters, as well as persuading the 
general public of their value.  In seeking to “make present” a future in which 
Colombo is a global city, developers have hastened to build ever more impressive 
and spectacular luxury units, but the prospects for their success remain unclear at 
best.  Taking seriously both the temporal and spatial registers of global city building, 
this chapter considers the luxury real estate boom as an enterprise influenced both by 
the desire for greater spatial (global) connection as well as one which traffics in 
images and desires for a future that has not yet arrived.   
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Work in Progress 
 
All over Colombo, glossy billboards advertising luxury housing developments, 
along with the sights and sounds of construction, serve as reminders of the city’s 
recent real estate boom.  Offering views of the Indian Ocean, 24-hour security, shiny 
new appliances, air conditioning, and amenities like swimming pools and gyms, 
Colombo’s luxury complexes are envisioned as giving their residents a sanitized, 
comfortable life wholly separate from the traffic jams, heat and headaches of the city 
outside.  Luxury apartments in Colombo are concentrated in the city’s central 
districts, (Colombo 1-5); to the older set of complexes known among the city’s 
wealthy and expats even during the civil war are being added newer even more 
extravagant buildings like the One Galle Face, Cinnamon Life or Havelock City.  
With monthly rents often far beyond what average Sri Lankan families might earn in 
several months to a year, these developments became a source of curiosity to me as I 
conducted my fieldwork.  Who were these buildings for? Why were upscale 
apartments such an important feature of the post-war cityscape? What future might 
these buildings have - to what extent was the surge in construction sustainable in the 
long term? What might these luxury complexes tell us about people’s aspirations and 
hopes for the future?   
Global city making is a process involving both material and symbolic labor.  
Luxury housing is a pivotal facet of Colombo’s global city transformation, as 
developers offer ever more spectacular and impressive forms of urban housing for 
the local and global elites they hope will soon inhabit the inner neighborhoods of 
Colombo.  However, such plans and hopes have still not quite come to fruition.  As 
this chapter makes clear, luxury real estate is a largely speculative enterprise, one 
informed by the hopeful rhetoric of one day attracting critical masses of wealthy 
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foreigners to Sri Lanka, even though they have not yet arrived.  Luxury buildings 
may be better understood as a statement of intent, rather than as a reflection of the 
consumption habits and desires of the actual Colombo population.  
Luxury apartment buildings servicing both wealthy Sri Lankans and foreigners20 
are not a complete novelty in the Colombo cityscape.  Even during wartime, several 
such developments existed in central areas of Colombo.  What is new is the scale 
and quantity of such projects; developments are becoming more ambitious and 
spectacular in design and more of them seem to be under construction throughout the 
city.  Havelock City and Cinnamon Life are examples of particularly ambitious new 
developments.  
 
This digital rendering of the Cinnamon Life complex has been removed as the copyright is 
owned by another organisation 
Image 8 Digital rendering of Cinnamon Life complex. Source: cinnamonlife.lk 
 
Havelock City, the project of a South Korean developer and Cinnamon Life, the 
brainchild of the John Keels Holdings Group, one of Sri Lanka’s largest businesses, 
are compounds in which life can be lived almost entirely separate from the rest of 
Colombo.  Each of these developments boasts luxury residential apartments nestled 
alongside office buildings, a shopping mall, even 5 star hotels.  These are mega 
projects on a scale not seen during the war years.  As I will discuss more in detail 
later in this chapter, while apartments are not new to Colombo they are also far from 
being the standard or “normal” form of housing most Sri Lankans imagine when 
they think of buying a property.  Apartment living is typically seen as either an 
                                                
20 I use the terms “foreigners” and “expats”/“expatriates” somewhat interchangeably in this chapter, reflecting 
the way such terms were used in my discussions with landlords, real estate agents, developers and others I met 
through my research on luxury real estate in Colombo.  In Sri Lanka I would argue that the term “foreigner” has 
overall connotations of wealth and privilege, usually used to denote non-Sri Lankan visitors from North 
America, Europe or Australia, though the term might also apply to Indians and the Chinese. “Expat” tends to 
evoke, in many countries, a person of some privilege who chooses to live abroad. This is how the term was used 
by my interlocutors in Colombo, and it typically did not include Chinese and Indian nationals.  
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example of Sri Lanka’s development towards “modern” or “global” urban forms 
popular throughout the world, or as a practical solution to the need for housing for 
the urban poor.    
Colombo is expensive.  Part of the reason for this is the city’s small size and the 
difficulty of getting around, which only increases the desirability of the cramped 
central neighborhoods.  Districts are defined by numbers.  Colombo 1,2,3,4,5 and 7 
are considered “prime” Colombo and were usually listed by my informants in the 
real estate industry as the hot neighborhoods where more luxury complexes were 
being built, with the bulk of them in Colombo 1,2 and 3.  Though this chapter 
primarily focuses on real estate in these prime areas, luxury apartment buildings 
were also available in some of the city’s nearby suburbs.  And yet, location matters a 
great deal when one considers the poor infrastructure and heavy traffic of a city like 
Colombo.  The appeal of the central neighborhoods had to do not only with the 
cultural cache of proximity to iconic Colombo heritage sites such as the Fort and 
Galle Face Green, but also with the fact that being farther out meant a long, stressful 
commute for those working in the city center.               
When I interviewed local real estate analysts, they confirmed that land prices in 
Colombo had always been going up - even during the war.  I was surprised to learn 
that the high cost of living in the city did not seem to be as impacted by the end of 
the war as much as some promotional materials led me to believe.  As one informant 
working in luxury real estate put it, the Sri Lankan civil war “wasn’t World War II.” 
Because the city was largely insulated from the armed conflict raging in the North 
and East between 1983 and 2009, the property market was not affected to a great 
extent.  Still, the end of the war certainly was a cause for renewed excitement about 
the prospect of attracting more foreign direct investment (FDI), more visitors and 
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tourists, and generally modernizing and beautifying the Colombo cityscape.  
However, the rising cost of owning property in Colombo was certainly not 
something to be discounted: land prices rose on average by 5 percent in the first half 
of 2014, with a higher rate of 7 to 8 percent in the more central neighborhoods 
according to one report (JLL 2014).   
Given the long time horizons required for the construction of large projects like 
apartment complexes (as well as the tendency for projects to take longer than 
initially projected), my informants pointed out the surfeit of projects with projected 
opening dates of 2017-2019.  The time lag between the end of the war (2009) and the 
completion of major projects like the One Galle Face, the Cinnamon Life, was a 
cause of anxiety for some.  The uncertain political situation, with a new government 
elected to power in January 2015, was one source of worry. The other issue was the 
fear of a general economic slow-down arising from new taxes imposed by the 
recently-elected government.  This was mixed with the fact that Sri Lanka is a very 
low-debt market - 90 percent of properties are debt-free, and banks do not give 
mortgages easily (Vox and Co. 2014).  While this is a positive on the one-hand, 
giving many in the real estate sector hope that Sri Lanka would avoid a subprime 
crisis like the one in the United States in 2008, it also meant that for all but the 
wealthiest families, actually purchasing one of the new luxury condos being heavily 
advertised was all but impossible.        
 The presence of foreigners in Sri Lanka and the need to cater to their tastes 
fueled much discussion about luxury real estate in Colombo.  I will turn later to the 
issue of their perceived tastes and needs, but the thirst for foreign tenants and buyers 
on the part of developers and property owners ran into some significant structural 
obstacles.  I was told repeatedly that foreigners faced restrictions in terms of their 
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ability to buy certain kinds of property, most notably anything below the 4th floor 
was either not allowed for sale to non-Sri Lankans, or could be heavily taxed.  
Rumors abounded about the new government “relaxing” these restrictions to make 
purchasing property more attractive to foreigners, but no one could be sure of 
whether this would actually happen.  A staff member of the new Cinnamon Life 
development told me that one worry regarding foreign buyers in Sri Lanka was that 
their purchases wouldn’t be rewarded with citizenship or permanent residency; “they 
are looking to park money overseas, and Sri Lanka’s not making that appealing to 
them,” he explained.  The following flow chart from a report on Colombo real estate 
shows the challenges of buying property as a foreigner:  
This chart has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation 
Image 9: Investing in Sri Lankan Residential Market Source: JLL Research 
 
Essentially as the image makes clear, foreigners face an entirely different property 
market from Sri Lankan citizens.    
As I will explore in the rest of this chapter, the Colombo real estate market is 
complex and multi-faceted, with many elements of uncertainty.  The hopeful, linear 
narratives of progress promoted by developers became complicated when I delved 
more deeply into the luxury apartment phenomenon.  Based on open-ended 
interviews and informal conversations with real estate agents, developers, landlords 
and others in the luxury property market, in addition to my experiences of looking 
for housing and review of reports and documents offering insights into Colombo’s 
real estate market, this chapter considers luxury real estate as one key aspect of the 
speculative work of global city-making.  
 
Global Lifestyles, National Aspirations  
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 “Real real estate comes from the heart, it’s about relationships,” Ahmed told 
me.  It was a weekday evening and we were sitting in the Cheers Pub, one of the bars 
inside of Colombo’s exclusive Cinnamon Grand Hotel.  Amidst the plush 
surroundings designed to mimic a typical British pub with aesthetic and culinary 
touches equally reminiscent of an American-style sports bar, Ahmed and I were 
eating dinner with some of his friends and colleagues discussing their work in the 
Colombo real estate industry.  “Real estate isn’t about the nine to five,” he 
explained: “it’s not typical. It’s fun. You get to go to meetings and not sit in the 
office all day. We’re lifestyle specialists.  We can help you with what kind of 
lifestyle you want to lead.”  
 Ahmed is a Bora Muslim in his early thirties, born and raised in Pettah before 
his family moved to Colombo’s southern suburbs.  His father, who moved to Sri 
Lanka from India as a young man, also worked in real estate, which is how Ahmed 
learned the trade.  But unlike his father, who casually worked as a real estate agent 
alongside other jobs, Ahmed is dedicated to his own small company, which he 
dreams of taking “global” one day.  Ahmed was successful enough that eventually 
he could hire friends from the Muslim high school he attended, as well as his own 
sister, to form a small but competent office staff helping him meet with customers, 
draft contracts and show properties for rent and sale.   
 Always polished and extremely cheerful, Ahmed is keenly devoted to the idea 
of professionalism and to relentless self-improvement.  Both in person and through a 
growing social media presence, he often speaks in corporate buzzwords and self-help 
terminology that would not be out of place in the Silicon Valley.  In our 
conversations, he would regularly refer to well-known business figures from the US 
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like Mark Zuckerberg or Steve Jobs as if they were intimate friends, assuming I 
would know who he was referring to when he called them by first name only.  
 For Ahmed, real estate was more than just a job, but rather an ethical 
orientation towards the world, signaling cosmopolitan values and open-mindedness.  
All of this was juxtaposed with what he viewed as the “backwards” “disappointing” 
and provincial attitudes of the Sri Lankan masses.  In his view, local Sri Lankans 
needed to be educated to appreciate and understand global standards of living.  
Ahmed understood wealth and cosmopolitanism not only as forms of financial or 
symbolic capital wielded by individuals, but rather as markers of an individual’s 
interior life, morality and value.  
 The aspirations tied to luxury real estate span multiple scales, bridging dreams 
of both personal and national improvement.  On the one hand, the idiom of 
“lifestyle” with regards to the property one occupies speaks to the individual client’s 
subjectivity, her choices, values, preferences and identity and how these things are 
expressed through her living space.  But as my conversations with Ahmed made 
clear, talking about luxury real estate also became a way of talking about broader 
issues of urban and national development. Describing himself as “personally 
disappointed” in the attitudes of people around him, Ahmed often evoked the 
mentality of tuk-tuk drivers, convenient go-to figures in many conversations about 
class, when he expressed exasperation with the current political situation in Sri 
Lanka.  Drivers and other working class Sri Lankans, he told me, still preferred the 
“old regime” (the Rajapakse government) to the new governing coalition.  They 
didn’t understand progress or modernity. For Ahmed, the personal preferences and 
tastes of the majority of Sri Lankans were indicative of how far the country still had 
to go on the road to development and prestige.  He referred to Sri Lanka as being “a 
 198 
developing mind, a developing nation.” “If the mind is not developed,” he said 
gravely, “then we are still on square one.”     
 Despite the beautiful images marketing the luxury properties which Ahmed 
himself helped to rent and sell, Sri Lankans often emerged in real estate reports and 
market forecasts as people who had to be convinced, persuaded and educated into 
living in apartments.  The understood standard of housing to which most people 
aspired was still the free-standing house.  This seemed to apply to both the urban 
poor and the most elite sections of the Colombo gentry.  Many of the English-
speaking elites - including but not limited to some of Sri Lanka’s political dynastic 
families who make Colombo their home - lived in rambling old estates in Cinnamon 
Gardens, Colombo 7, one of the most exclusive neighborhoods in the city.  For many 
people from the upper echelons of Colombo society, this was still the ideal form of 
housing.  The Cinnamon Gardens mansion is a trope of Colombo life, indexing the 
lifestyles and values of the upper classes.  How was the 19th and 20th century 
rambling mansion distinct from the 21st century luxury apartment?          
The principle of separation is one of the core tenets of the new luxury 
complexes dotting the Colombo landscape.  New buildings in Colombo seemed to 
promise ever more exclusive, private and lavish lifestyles with each passing month.  
The most ambitious developments were not even stand-alone buildings but entire 
compounds in which the residential apartment buildings would be on the same plot 
of land as hotels, shopping malls and offices.  Entire worlds of luxurious life 
blissfully disconnected from the rest of the city.  This drive to create ever more 
spectacular modes of living for the wealthy seems to fit very well with broad global 
trends of increasing inequality and capitalist urban development.  However, I also 
wish to consider the local roots of these wildly divergent modes of living.  Writing in 
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1989 about coastal fishing communities in Sri Lanka’s Western Province, Rodrick 
Stirrat observed that while spheres of activity such as the actual labor of fishing 
spurred cooperation between different families, the consumption of household 
commodities in the private sphere gave rise to an acute competition between 
families, each trying to outdo their neighbors (Stirrat 1989: 108).  Stirrat argues in 
turn that:  
The material symbols of another social class, the Sinhalese bourgeoisie, were 
usurped, wrenched out of context, and given new meanings. Things such as 
car ports, water tanks and television sets which were becoming integral to the 
life style of the Sinhalese middle class were here taken out of that context 
and given a new significance both in relation to other members of the fishing 
community and to members of the middle class. And the middle classes were 
not unaware of this challenge. For them the message was quite clear: that 
either the fishing community was becoming too rich or that they were 
becoming too poor. A continual refrain on the part of teachers, clerks and 
others was that they were underpaid precisely because the 'lower orders' 
could afford such commodities, and that therefore the markers of status were 
being devalued. (1989, 109)       
 
In this analysis, the internal competitions among much lower class strata actually end 
up impacting the worldview and sense of security of those in entirely different 
spheres of life: the teachers and clerks.  The postwar, 21st century drive to create 
constantly more luxurious spaces in Colombo can be thought of not only as an effort 
to catch up with other global Asian metropolises, but also as a way of maintaining 
local/national class divisions.  
 
Global and Local Imaginaries 
 
 One day when we were deep in conversation about his work in the real estate 
industry, Ahmed observed that, since the end of the civil war “the complexion of 
Colombo is different.” In hearing these words, I was immediately struck by their 
multiple meanings.  Though Ahmed was in fact talking about the materiality of the 
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city - newly paved roads and modern buildings - his words also carried connotations 
about the race and ethnicity of people inhabiting Colombo.  Part of the dreamwork of 
marketing Colombo real estate was entangled with the project of rendering Sri Lanka 
in general an appealing destination for foreign capital. Not only did many in the 
government and private sector wish to attract FDI, but many industries in postwar 
Sri Lanka - not only tourism, but also luxury real estate and property development - 
actively tried to court foreign individuals as visitors or potential residents.  The 
complexion of Colombo was changing indeed, reflecting the symbolic importance of 
foreign-ness in giving the city an image of cosmopolitanism, prestige and value.   
 The desire for emerging cities to attract foreign visitors and investors is a 
clear trend across the Global South, reflecting the enduring appeal of cities like 
Dubai and Singapore, supposedly ‘de-nationalized’ sites of wealth accumulation and 
privileged forms of citizenship.  With regards to emerging cities in East Asia, Aihwa 
Ong notes that “the presence of a significant number of foreign actors is a symbolic 
image of the city itself, as a participant in the creation and exchange of global signs 
and values” (2007, 91).  Writing on Bangalore, Michael Goldman suggests that the 
city is gradually becoming delinked from Delhi and national politics in favor of more 
global linkages: “perhaps more than any time in recent history, what happens in 
Shanghai, Singapore and Dubai matters to small producers and workers in 
Karnataka” (2011, 576).  As I made clear earlier in this chapter, in Colombo such 
tropes of denationalization, of urban spaces flooded with “foreign actors,” are still 
primarily aspirational rather than actual.  The development of luxury real estate 
complexes is an ongoing act of both material and symbolic construction of Colombo 
as a global city.  To paraphrase Goldman’s observations about Bangalore, in 
Colombo urban residents “are being actively dispossessed as part of the effort to 
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build up a world city based on a speculative imaginary for world-city investors who 
may just stay away, and for world-city professionals who have yet to come” (577).
   As I learned through my own experiences of trying to rent an apartment in 
Colombo, foreigners were often treated with a kind of deference that went beyond 
that accorded to Sri Lankan renters, even as they were often expected to pay 
relatively large sums of money for their properties.  The “right” kinds of foreigners 
(Europeans, Australians and North Americans) were thought to add a touch of class 
and elegance to places they might live, thereby making certain properties more 
desirable simply through being there.  The landlady of the apartment Ahmed helped 
me rent thought expats were likely to be cleaner and more responsible.  Ahmed 
seemed to think expats operated in a different moral field from Sri Lankans - “they 
have certain ethics, a certain level of decency,” he explained. Even though he often 
told me stories of unethical or questionable behavior from expat clients of his, these 
never seemed to impact his overall assessment that foreigners were more trustworthy 
and easier to work with.  Ahmed saw it as part of his job to help landlords, owners 
and sellers ensure that the people who lived in their properties were suitable and 
trustworthy.  He wasted no time in telling me how he broke down his customers by 
nationality and religion and used his own theories on their different cultures to help 
decide whether they were legitimate prospects and to guide them towards one 
property or another.        
In Ahmed’s view, European clients were easy to work with, “friendly, 
flexible and polite.” He often told me stories about becoming friends with the clients 
in this group even after the business part of their relationship was over.  Next were 
the Middle Eastern clients – they were harder to work with.  “They’re “fussy” and 
their “culture” isn’t as friendly, they can be very unpleasant to work with,” he 
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explained, musing that perhaps it was due to “their language” which sounded 
“harsh.”  But, he noted, they have a lot of money.  “Asians” were considered less 
fussy than Middle Eastern clients.  Maldivians were a very undesirable category – 
“they are looked down upon” he said matter of factly. He laughed and told me that if 
a Maldivian client called, he would say “yes yes we’ll get back to you sir” and then 
never get back in touch.  He gives landlords a “preferred clients” form they can fill 
out and it will usually say no Maldivians.  When I asked why this would be, Ahmed 
explained that “they are very unclean,” again attributing this to “culture,” and said 
they will often bring 5,7 or 8 people to live in a single apartment.  Chinese and 
Indian clients “require more screening” but they could be OK. He explained it was a 
matter of who they were and their budget – for example, he said, if you have a 
Chinese or Indian family and their budget is Rs. 80,000/month “it can get a little 
dodgy.” (My own apartment, incidentally, was Rs.80,000 per month, and I 
considered it the absolute limit of what I could pay).     
If Ahmed’s ranking of types of people contains some deeply troubling 
assessments of people and their “cultures” I think it also tells us something in that it 
mirrors other trends and ways of thinking in Colombo.  The tourism industry seems 
to make a nearly identical breakdown of desirable clients; Europeans and North 
Americans at the top, Eastern Europeans and Arabs somewhere in the middle, 
“Asians” at the bottom, divisions which can of course be mitigated by other 
considerations like wealth and religion.  The stereotypes and images of different 
groups speak volumes about the political and economic links Sri Lanka has forged to 
the rest of the world in recent years.  Ahmed off-handedly remarked that there were 
“200,000 Chinese in Sri Lanka” a number I found shockingly high (and which I 
suspected mixed residents and visitors per year).  The suspicion with which these 
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Chinese people were met clearly echoed the ambivalence many Sri Lankans felt 
towards Chinese investment in the country and the close ties forged by Mahinda 
Rajapakse’s administration with China.  And yet, despite many misgivings about the 
flow of Chinese money into Sri Lanka, many business people like Ahmed saw these 
newcomers as an important source of new business, even though they did not have 
the glamor or symbolic value of Europeans.     
The everyday casual xenophobia expressed by many people in Colombo 
betrays the deep anxieties that Sri Lankans have towards the outside world and their 
place within it.  In discussions about ideal buyers and renters, Sri Lanka is always 
implicitly positioned as a receiver of foreigners, and it is the job of cosmopolitan, 
well-informed locals - like Ahmed - to sift through them and rank them.  Sri Lanka 
assumes a passive role in a world in which other groups of people are assumed to be 
more mobile and wealthier.          
Ahmed sometimes spoke of foreigners in Sri Lanka as if they were a kind of 
precious commodity, and seemed to believe them to be inherently at risk in what he 
considered the treacherous real estate market of Colombo.  “Expats need to get 
guided into a channel, otherwise they get a bad first impression, they get ripped off,” 
he explained to me once.  This comment stuck with me.  Just as the luxury buildings 
I describe earlier in this chapter thrived because of a sense that they provided 
separation between occupants and the ever-encroaching city outside, Ahmed’s 
remark about “expat channels” implied that foreigners in Sri Lanka needed to be 
separated from the world around them.  But his view of this was much wider in 
scope than mere physical space.  As he made clear to me in various ways, the 
channels he spoke of were social, having to do with much more than just where 
expats lived and worked.  To him, expat values and lifestyles were so completely 
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different from those of “locals” that they needed to be inserted into their own special 
networks.  He was happy to accommodate this, and even turned it into a new 
business opportunity.  When I came back to Colombo in June 2016, Ahmed told me 
with pride that he was now operating an expat relocation service as part of his real 
estate business.  Servicing “high end” clients, including a few CEOs.  For a price of 
$8,000 to $10,000 per client, he would work with these high net worth individuals 
and get a sense of their tastes and preferences then help them get settled in Colombo.   
Through this new facet of his business, Ahmed was now involved in new areas 
of his clients’ lives that went beyond where they lived but came to include their 
personal and family lives as well.  He told me about a recent foreign client who 
worked for an international shipping company.  The client needed to furnish his 
house but ended up “at the wrong place” and was being quoted exorbitant prices by 
the Sri Lankan salespeople.  Ahmed stepped in and took his client to the “right 
place,” Damro (a local store, well-known for its home furnishings) and helped the 
man buy various home appliances for a much more reasonable price.  He also 
became involved in helping clients select an appropriate school for their children, 
usually one of the well-known international or British schools in Colombo.  I 
listened as he riffed for awhile on the differences between the Overseas School and 
the Colombo British School, talking about them as if they were properties he was 
marketing.  “The Overseas School has AC in the classrooms,” he said by way of 
explanation for its appeal.  He considered this new part of his business a way for him 
to “build a good network” with what he termed “the upmarket crowd” of Colombo 
expats.  Through real estate dealings and now through client relocation, Ahmed was 
able to enter new spheres of Colombo society, all of it spurred by the perception that 
foreigners required special treatment, better facilities, and separation from locals.    
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In chapter one, I described how the discourse surrounding Sri Lanka’s post war 
development tends to imply that global flows of capital already exist and need to be 
channeled correctly in order for the country to use its strategic location to its 
advantage; Sri Lanka has to work to “catch” the flows already existing around it.  
The way foreigners were spoken about by Ahmed and others in Colombo’s real 
estate market mirrors this rhetoric to some extent.  People of a specific kind - ideally 
white, or wealthy, or both - are seen as valuable resources who, if catered to 
correctly, can be induced to come to and stay in Colombo.  Cosmopolitan locals like 
Ahmed were able to use their various forms of cultural capital, such as fluent English 
and familiarity with western business concepts, to deepen interpersonal relationships 
which in turn were perceived as markers of Sri Lanka’s general direction, its 
relationship to surrounding countries and to the global economy.  The construction 
and marketing of luxury buildings in Colombo was deeply intertwined with 
imaginaries of the global.  
 
Oversupply and Uncertainty 
 
 In my various conversations with Ahmed and other informants working in 
the real estate industry, I found myself curious about the sheer quantity of new 
buildings that seemed to be springing up around Colombo.  Were all these luxury 
units really necessary? Who would occupy them? My questions sprang from the 
knowledge that the monthly rents and also the purchase prices of such buildings 
were wildly out of reach for most “regular” Sri Lankans.  Furthermore, Colombo is 
not an enormous city and Sri Lanka has a relatively small population.  Was it 
realistic to expect that there would be enough people to come live in these luxurious 
spaces? Based on cursory observation alone - the visual clues as to the quantity and 
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size of the buildings springing up in Colombo - it seemed clear that there was a 
mismatch between developers’ expectations and people to buy and rent properties.  I 
soon learned that the industry term for the problem I had identified was 
“oversupply.”   
 And yet, while nearly everyone seemed to acknowledge that oversupply 
would be a problem, the staff members at different luxury developments always 
cheerfully told me the companies for which they worked wouldn’t be affected by it.  
One marketing professional I interviewed who worked for one of the major new 
compound-style developments (still yet to be completed) told me that his company 
was one of the most reputable in Sri Lanka and that the high name recognition would 
lead more people to invest in their properties - “we should be OK” he assured me.  
On another occasion, I visited a show-unit for yet another glamorous development 
still under construction. The staff member showing me around, a young woman who 
seemed well-practiced in giving these kinds of tours to foreigners, presented me with 
a folder full of documents relating to the units for sale.  One was an Excel 
spreadsheet listing the kinds of units and which ones were already spoken for.  “The 
towers are filling up quickly,” she said sweeping her hand over the table.  But when I 
looked more closely, I noticed that the blocked off parts of the table only said 
“interested” not “purchased”; in other words, part of the promotion of these 
properties rested on displaying potential clients just as much as actual ones.   
 At the end of our tour, my guide passed me off to another staff member of the 
development, who answered my questions rather briskly, as if she had heard them all 
before.  I asked her who the buyers of units like the one I had just seen would be.  
She rattled off the usual reply that it would be “a mix of foreigners and locals.” But 
when I pressed her on the actual proportions of locals versus foreigners, she 
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confessed that she wasn’t “too sure,” and then waved off the question, asking if I had 
anything else I’d like to talk about.              
 Part of the problem seemed to be a general lack of information and clarity as 
to what was going on with regards to foreigners being allowed to buy property at all, 
as well as the general uncertainty of the political situation.  Throughout 2015, it was 
unclear whether or not the new government elected in January would last the year, as 
former President Mahinda Rajapakse hoped to make a comeback through 
parliamentary elections that were continuously delayed.  One young professional 
working for the new Cinnamon Life complex told me that between January and 
August (the month of the long-awaited parliamentary elections) people had not been 
eager to buy property so market activity had been relatively restrained.  He opined 
that with the new government more secure in its position, there would be an uptick 
in buying and selling.  This explanation certainly resonated with the overall sense of 
uncertainty I observed pervading just about every aspect of Colombo life during 
fieldwork, but it assumed that the political situation was merely a disturbance in an 
otherwise steadily growing real estate market.  But what about the issues of supply 
and demand within the market itself?    
 Another pair of analysts I spoke to were surprisingly more candid about the 
issue lying more with the luxury developments themselves rather than political 
uncertainty.  Founders of a website devoted to the luxury real estate market in Sri 
Lanka (which I call LuxuryWeb), these informants suggested that the problem was 
Colombo was now “just as expensive as everywhere else.”  Speaking with some 
pessimism about the prospect of more developers entering the Colombo market, they 
noted that Colombo was now a “saturated market”: “I mean what can you bring in?” 
one of them asked animatedly.  “We have million dollar apartments with all the 
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amenities inside, all the luxuries, what more can you bring into that market?” This 
interview highlighted how, contrary to the rhetoric used in real estate marketing 
materials about Colombo “needing” more luxury developments in order to attract 
foreigners, the issue was in fact a surfeit of new development projects.  Uncertainty 
was not only political, but also internal to the real estate market - with so many 
different developers scrambling to establish new named buildings in the desirable 
parts of Colombo, it was impossible to know whether some project may in  fact be 
rendered superfluous by others finished sooner.    
 The Colombo Port City project, for example, could be a hazard rather than a 
boon to the other developers at work in the city: “the Port City’s unknown so 
suddenly they might come up with 20 different new apartments, so we don’t know 
what’s going to happen…that’s going to flood the market” the LuxuryWeb analysts 
told me.  Too many actors, sometimes working at cross-purposes; too many luxury 
units, “saturation” and “flooding” of the market.  The picture of Colombo that 
seemed to be emerging was of a place in which the potential for great leaps in terms 
of luxury housing was accompanied by the potential for serious economic problems 
to emerge. “It’s the uncomfortable calm before a very bad storm,” one of the 
LuxuryWeb guys said, laughing.   
 Particularly troubling was a a report about the Colombo real estate market 
entitled “Scaling New Heights,” published in August 2014 by Jones Lang Lasalle 
(JLL), an investment management firm.  In a section entitled “How Affordable Is 
Colombo?” the report seems to answer the question, in a roundabout way with: not 
very.  A table showing various household incomes and what they can afford in 
various neighborhoods of the city shows the vast majority of Colombo residents 
priced out of home-owning altogether, with an accompanying text informing readers 
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that “only the top 10 percent income-earning households, I.e., 8.7 percent of the 
resident population in Colombo, can buy a two-bedroom or three-bedroom apartment 
in Colombo” (JLL, 2014: 10).            
 
This chart has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation 
Image 10: “Affordability Heat Map” Source: JLL Research 
  
One of the first striking things to note about this table is the obviously overwhelming 
amount of properties coded as “not affordable” for most of the population.  By the 
metrics used in this report to determine affordability, even the top 10 percent of 
households cannot afford any of the properties - whether “luxury” or “upper mid” in 
central Colombo.  This certainly flies in the face of the more optimistic rhetoric 
promoted by the developers themselves.  Another thing worth noting is the way the 
income brackets themselves are broken down.  The bottom 70 percent is listed as 
earning less than Rs.63,334/month (~$426 USD/month).  This contrasts rather 
uncomfortably with the fact that my own apartment in prime Colombo, which 
Ahmed nonchalantly described as just “normal” (and not “luxury”) was 
Rs.80,000/month, in other words, nearly Rs.20,000 more per month than what the 
bottom 70 percent of the city’s households earned in an entire month.   
 The text of this section of the report concludes that “apartments in the Central 
submarket and upper-mid and luxury projects in the secondary submarket rely only 
on NRSLs, foreigners or HNW RSLs in Colombo.”  NRSLs are “non-resident Sri 
Lankans,” while HNW RSLs are “high net worth resident Sri Lankans.”  Reading 
this is hardly surprising given what we have seen in this chapter so far - the attitude 
and perception that foreigners and Sri Lankans abroad, together with “high net 
worth” locals will be the driving force behind these luxury developments.  However 
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this faith in the power of foreigners, diasporic Sri Lankans and high net worth 
individuals failed to confront two important issues: 1) the relatively limited scope of 
both of these groups and 2) important shifts in the Sri Lankan economy more 
broadly, including an increase in VAT, the introduction of a capital gains tax, and 
the retraction of tax breaks for developers.   
 My acquaintances at LuxuryWeb referred to the combination of new taxes as 
a “triple whammy” impacting developers and buyers alike.  New actors entering the 
market would need “guts” to come to Sri Lanka now.  While VAT had existed in Sri 
Lanka previously, the new government had increased it from 11 percent to 15 
percent.  This 4 percent increase in VAT was a major source of anxiety for my 
informants all over the city when they talked about everyday purchases like 
groceries, and its significance was readily apparent for an industry like real estate 
development where a 4 percent increase on construction costs might translate into 
rising costs of tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars.  What was particularly 
surprising about this, from the point of view of many upper middle class Colombo 
residents including the LuxuryWeb staff, was the fact that these new measures were 
implemented under the new UNP government, which was typically considered more 
“business friendly.” They predicted that the combination of these new costs and less 
friendly tax breaks would lead to a notable slow down in the Colombo real estate 
market. 
 By investigating the dynamics of supply and demand more closely, I was 
able to see that the luxury real estate industry in Colombo was in fact a much less 
straightforwardly successful enterprise than informants like Ahmed would lead me 
to believe.  While those who promoted the lifestyles represented by these structures 
presented luxury buildings as necessities for the new Colombo, a more detailed look 
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at the situation of developers and potential renters/buyers implied that there were 
certain gaps in this narrative - primarily, the lack of people available to actually buy 
enough of these units. The potential problem of oversupply in the Colombo luxury 
real estate landscape underscored the wishful thinking, irrationality and uncertainty 
inherent in the capitalist vision of urban development.    
 
Building As If 
 
Through my interviews and informal conversations with real estate professionals 
in Colombo, I came to understand that the luxury real estate market reflected a great 
deal about Sri Lanka’s place in the world in addition to simply revealing the class 
divisions within Sri Lankan society.  In other words, talking about real estate usually 
involved two conceptual moves on the part of my interlocutors: it broke up Sri 
Lanka itself into a stratified space in which potential buyers and renters of luxury 
real estate were distinct from the rest of the population, and it highlighted Sri 
Lanka’s peripheral, subordinate position vis-à-vis more powerful, wealthier and 
more populous countries in Asia and the Indian Ocean.   
The interplay of these concerns was made clear when it came to questions of 
oversupply: many of the developers and brokers seemed to assume that even if there 
weren’t enough Sri Lankans who could afford luxury units, waves of wealthy 
foreigners would come in and make up for the gap between supply and demand.  
However, there were many indicators that this optimism might not be well-founded, 
such as the following passage from a corporate report on real estate in Colombo:   
However, caution too needs to be exercised with respect to two fundamental 
market determinants. Firstly, there are a finite number of expat Sri Lankans 
living in the west who are in the condominium market and since the end of 
the civil war, this segment has been at the frontline in picking up luxury 
apartments. The peak levels of expat interest in Sri Lankan real estate maybe 
fast approaching or even possibly behind us in which case the rate of demand 
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growth will slowdown.  Secondly, any perceived risks involved with doing 
business in Sri Lanka also tend to play a significant role in the minds of 
potential expat buyers.  (KPMG 2012, 4-5)  
 
This passage highlights many of the uncertainties and potential problems lurking at 
the edge of the Colombo luxury real estate market.  The reminder that there is only a 
“finite number” of expat Sri Lankans living abroad who can buy these apartments 
should be relatively common sense given that Sri Lanka has a relatively small 
population overall, however I came to understand this as a wholly necessary 
corrective to rhetoric in the market that often presumed a virtually infinite demand 
for luxury units.  This passage exposes some of the hesitation and uncertainty at play 
in the observation that the peak levels of expat demand “maybe fast approaching or 
even possibly behind us.” The overall impression is one of caution and lack of 
clarity, rather than boundless optimism.   
 Reminders about the limits of luxury real estate and its potential for turning 
Colombo into a global hub city make clear that the construction of these lavish 
apartment buildings is a highly speculative practice, one which relies on a sense of 
imminent arrival of buyers and renters, but which is not necessarily responding to an 
already-existing or established market.   
Urban scholars working in other parts of Asia have highlighted the importance of 
real estate as one of the facets of new global city-building practices (eg. Ong 2007, 
Goldman 2011).  In accounts such as Aihwa Ong’s writing about Shanghai, the 
presence of expats and the new relations of flexible citizenship/pied-a-terre status of 
foreigners is assumed - it is the foundation upon which the luxury real estate 
developments she describes are built.  In her estimation, “one may say that a 
megacity is in part defined by the number of mobile professionals and entrepreneurs 
who make it a long-term stop in their international itineraries” (2007, 86).  In this 
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chapter, I have sought to emphasize that in Colombo, the mobile professionals and 
itinerant entrepreneurs have yet to be fully secured as buyers or renters of luxury 
property - but the properties are being built anyway.  Rather than already embodying 
Ong’s idea of the global city which exists to service the needs of a burgeoning 
expatriate class, Colombo is being constructed as if these things are already in place.  
 The gap between supply and demand, between aspiration and reality, in 
Colombo’s luxury real estate market reveals the shaky work of speculation - of 
“making present uncertain futures” (Bear et al 2015).  While proponents of 
Colombo’s global city ambitions and mainstream accounts of urban development 
seem to suggest a smoothly unfolding, linear path in which the possibilities for the 
city are virtually limitless, structural limits persist: the lack of clarity on foreigners’ 
rights to buy and own property; the lack of interested foreigners who desire the 
property in the first place; high taxes and an uncertain political situation; a small 
local population with limited financial capital, etc. Rather than ever-increasing 
global city-ness bringing Colombo ever closer to Dubai or Singapore, looking at the 
luxury real estate developments in the city suggests the false starts and interruptions 
inherent in the project of global city making.    
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CONCLUSION: THE ALMOST HUB 
 
Things grasped together: things whole, things not whole; something being brought 
together, something being separated; something consonant, something dissonant. 
Out of all things comes one thing, and out of one thing comes all things. 
 
- Heraclitus, Fragment 10 
 
 This thesis has sought to give readers a snapshot of life in Colombo during a 
tumultuous, hopeful and politically significant moment in the city’s history. Through 
this multi-sited ethnography, I have detailed some of the nuances and on-the-ground 
realities of the attempt to reinvent Colombo as a global hub city in the Indian Ocean 
region.  I conclude by discussing what I believe are the major contributions of this 
work, before delving more deeply into three key concepts which emerge from this 
thesis: the idea of the hub city, the role of futurity and uncertainty, and the politics of 
defining and comparing global cities.  
First, this ethnography makes a contribution to contemporary Sri Lankan 
studies. Particularly in anthropology, Sri Lankanist scholarship has been heavily 
focused on questions of kinship, religion, village life, rural politics and peasant 
economies, witchcraft, ethnicity, violence and nationalism. The urban has been 
remarkably absent from our picture of Sri Lankan life. Strikingly, I am aware of no 
full-length published ethnographies that focus specifically on Colombo. Two 
exceptions spring to mind: a chapter on “Tamil Colombo” in Sharika Thiranagama’s 
masterful ethnography, In My Mother’s House, in which the Thiranagama offers a 
way of thinking of Colombo as a Tamil space, detailing the aspirations of young 
Tamil men hoping to come to Colombo as a means of emigrating to escape the threat 
of violence they face in Sri Lanka. The second is Francesca Bremner’s unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, “"Life of a Street in Sri Lanka: Spatial Practices and Ethnic 
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Conflict” which explores the lives of slum-dwellers in a central Colombo 
neighborhood, and their reasons for participating in anti-Tamil rioting. My hope in 
devoting my research entirely to Colombo has been to build and expand on the work 
of these two scholars, making Colombo itself the most memorable “character” in this 
story.    
Much is to be gained by attending to the rhythms and logics of Colombo life. 
Not only is Colombo a fascinating place in its own right for anyone drawn - as I am-  
to cities, but it affords a vision of multi-ethnic, multi-religious life in a society which 
has been starkly divided by deeply-felt nationalisms. As I have emphasized multiple 
times throughout this ethnography, Colombo’s mixed ethnic and religious character 
place it in contrapuntal relationship to Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist imaginaries. I 
would suggest that if we take Thiranagama’s view of a “Tamil Colombo” seriously, 
then it equally challenges Tamil nationalisms as well. Colombo is often cast as an 
exceptional space for its diversity, but in this exception are real people who daily 
negotiate the everyday dynamics of living in a multi-ethnic society. I believe looking 
at Colombo provides a possibility for understanding Sri Lanka’s ethnic and religious 
conflicts and solidarities in new ways.   
In addition, as many of the chapters in this manuscript have made clear, a 
focus on Colombo is an important avenue for understanding the ways that Sri Lanka 
is embedded in transnational flows of capital, commodities and people. One can 
certainly critique the narratives of government officials and corporate elites who 
would paint a picture of Sri Lanka wherein Colombo comes to stand in for all of Sri 
Lanka; certainly, different places on the island have their own forms of powerful 
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global connection and these should not be overlooked.21 And yet, it is undeniable 
that Colombo is the primary point of exit and entry to and from Sri Lanka, that its 
material and financial ties to China, India, the Gulf and other cities and regions 
makes it quite central to comprehending contemporary questions of political 
economy, globalization and migration. I hope my thesis makes some progress 
towards showing how we can use the experience of specific sites within Sri Lanka – 
such as various neighborhoods of Colombo – to think more carefully about the 
island’s global connections. By attending to the politics of and affective investments 
in Colombo’s development, I not only provide a timely ethnography of post-war Sri 
Lankan development, I have sought to offer a way of thinking Sri Lanka through the 
urban.  
The second contribution of my research is its showcasing the potential of 
ethnography for grasping the complex processes of global-city making. Throughout 
this thesis, I have emphasized incompleteness and uncertainty as primary thematic 
threads, connecting all of the seemingly disparate sites introduced in this text. In this 
sense, method and argument have been intertwined: my ethnographic approach, as I 
discussed in the introduction, placed me in the same confusing circumstances as my 
own interlocutors, and that very sense of confusion and uncertainty is one of the 
main points this research has sought to make about the process of urban 
transformation.  
If the notion of hubness is a vision of futurity and flow, each chapter in this 
manuscript has trained attention on the present - and on that which drags, weighs 
down and complicates seemingly inevitable or natural processes of urban 
                                                
21 One particular form of global connection that comes to mind outside of Colombo is the powerful 
link between Jaffna and Toronto.  
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development. From the protests against the Colombo Port City project to the 
anxieties over excessive taxation in the luxury real estate industry, my ethnography 
has offered a counterpoint to the optimistic proclamations of state officials and 
corporations about the glittering future of post-war Colombo. I highlight these 
moments of interruption and delay in Colombo’s urban development not only to 
critique the planners and politicians, but to suggest that these moments of frustration, 
disappointment, failure and anxiety are in fact central to the very process of global-
city building.     
Finally, this thesis offers an entry point for thinking through the dynamics of 
urban comparison and cross-referencing, not only in the practice of city planning but 
also in scholarly discussions of urban theory. I have highlighted in my ethnography 
how central imaginings of other places are to Colombo life, and the link between 
spatial and temporal understandings of development. While urban scholars have paid 
attention to this (eg. Bunnell et al. 2017, Ong and Roy 2011), this research adds 
needed ethnographic depth to discussions of the power of cross-referencing. As I 
explain below, I believe this thesis also opens a possibility not for viewing Colombo 
merely as a “case” of the wider phenomenon of global city-making, but for 
considering how the dynamics I describe in Colombo might in fact help us 
understand global cities in general.     
 
Hub City 
This dissertation has argued that aspirations for Colombo’s future are primarily 
articulated through the language of the “hub.” Discussions about Colombo’s future 
tend to foreground its “locational advantage” and strategic positioning between East 
Asia and the Gulf.  Promotional materials for urban development projects, including 
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the Western Region Megapolis Project, the official city development plan of the 
current government, emphasize the idea that Colombo will become a regional hub 
city, often highlighting the importance of its port, airport and other forms of 
infrastructure that speak to the potential for Colombo to build connections to other 
places.  These assertions and aspirations to what I refer to as “hubness” stem from 
particular ways of reading and understanding Sri Lanka’s recent history which tend 
to present the time of the civil war as one of disconnection and isolation from the 
outside world.  By contrast, the contemporary post-war moment is framed as one of 
possibility and potential.  That potential is often articulated in terms of what Sri 
Lanka can offer “the outside world” through the connections forged by tourism and 
foreign direct investment (FDI).  Much has been made of Sri Lanka’s location; 
different actors, for a variety of reasons, have an interest in representing the island as 
a unique, bounded, exceptional entity (Jazeel 2009, Sivasundaram 2013), while 
others, like the current government, seek to present it as a connected, cosmopolitan 
place, another stop along the way from Singapore to Dubai.  What I suggest through 
a discussion of what I term “the politics of hubness” is that such claims are not ever 
“just” about simple geography, but that they speak to particular political, historical 
and economic imaginaries.          
Through language that depicts Sri Lanka “emerging” as a new tourist-friendly 
destination, the country now features in much global media as a kind of 
undiscovered gem, a rare treasure offering many pleasures for the senses (beaches, 
picturesque hillsides, exotic wildlife), as well as friendly locals and high standards of 
luxury.  The implied starting point for most of these descriptions of Sri Lanka as 
tourist destination is the idea that the western reader has no idea about the civil war 
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and is only now hearing about this island paradise for the first time.  An article on 
travel to Sri Lanka from a 2017 entry in the fashion magazine Vogue is typical:  
So why is this exotic paradise just now seeping into the jet set’s collective 
conscious? Because from 1983 until 2009, the mostly Buddhist island off the 
southeastern tip of India was embroiled in one of the longest civil wars in 
recent history, which saw atrocities on both sides during fighting between the 
Tamil Tigers group—hoping to win independence for the Hindu Tamil-
speaking population—and Sri Lanka’s mostly Sinhalese military, 
representing the majority ethnic group and language. There was also a 
massive 2004 tsunami to contend with, killing more than 30,000. But ever 
resilient, in the last half-dozen years Sri Lanka has gone into overdrive re-
establishing itself as a mecca for luxury-minded travelers whose interests are 
far from run of the mill. (Romeyn, 2017)   
 
Note how this excerpt manages to sandwich descriptions of war, violence and 
tremendous loss of human life between gushing language about the island as an 
“exotic paradise” and “mecca for luxury-minded travelers.” In the first line, readers 
are asked to consider why the country is “just now seeping into the jet set’s collective 
conscious” (italics mine); this framing manages to lend the passage a certain sense of 
urgency: Sri Lanka is raw, undiscovered and new.  Even though the passage goes on 
to explain the reason for this oversight among “the jet set,” the point of departure for 
this paragraph is the idea that this moment is particularly important.  The reference to 
how Sri Lanka has allegedly “gone into overdrive re-establishing itself as a Mecca 
for luxury-minded travelers” not only glosses over the human, political and social 
costs of this work (which I will explain more in detail in subsequent sections), its 
reference to re-establishing the luxury sector suggests that this post-war moment is 
an echo of the past.  The language of this article, like countless others written since 
the end of the civil conflict, traffics in images of death and destruction made better 
by luxury and sensuous natural beauty, but it also subtly shifts from describing Sri 
Lanka as “emerging” to “re-establishing” its tourism industry.   
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 Pieces like the Vogue article conjure a specific temporality when speaking of 
Sri Lanka’s novelty in the international tourism market.  The post-war moment is 
framed not as arrival, but as return.  Though easy to dismiss this as a piece of writing 
aimed at an international audience with very little knowledge about Sri Lanka, in 
discussion after discussion my Sri Lankan informants tended to also draw a link 
between the post-war and pre-war periods.  Both figured as times of connectedness, 
cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism.  By contrast, the war itself was presented as a 
moment of disconnection and isolation.  The conflict was responsible for huge 
numbers of Tamils and Burghers22 (the latter often considered emblematic of Sri 
Lanka’s cosmopolitan, multicultural identity) as well as other ethnic groups leaving 
the country for Australia, Canada, and Great Britain.  In discussion after discussion, 
my middle class informants tended to ask the rhetorical question of what Sri Lanka 
would be like had the civil war not happened.  A regular feature of these discussions 
was to imagine how the country might have been “like Singapore”; clean, orderly, 
with a well-educated population and world-class infrastructure.  What is fascinating 
about the constant Sri Lanka/Singapore comparisons is that they elide some 
important questions of scale and size: how exactly could Sri Lanka be like 
Singapore? What parts of Sri Lanka?  
 Aspirations for Colombo becoming a global hub city are simultaneously 
deeply entangled with, but also manage to obscure, questions of how the city is 
related to the rest of the island of Sri Lanka.  At what scale is Colombo’s hubness to 
be realized? Is it a national hub for the flow of goods and people within Sri Lanka, 
or a global hub on par with Singapore, Dubai and Hong Kong? Of course, the 
answer is that many optimistic government officials and business people in Colombo 
                                                
22 Sri Lankans of mixed European and Tamil or Sinhalese ancestry. 
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would like for the city to be both, the capital city for Sri Lankan trade and commerce 
while also becoming globally competitive with major Asian and Middle Eastern 
centers.  But in practice, it often seems that the work of imagining Colombo as a 
global hub tends to paper over how this transformation would benefit other Sri 
Lankans, what the future looks like for those far away from the state of the art 
buildings and modern infrastructure of the capital.   
 Questions of scale and domestic versus global aspirations often lead to 
disjointed comparisons and mixed metaphors.  Is it significant that champions of 
market-driven development most frequently compare Colombo to Dubai and 
Singapore, two places which are often described as city-states, in other words - urban 
entities with a high degree of autonomy, whose hinterlands are either insignificant or 
non-existent? This dissertation argues that it is significant.  I take seriously these 
comparisons and cross-references and ask not only what they say about dreams for 
Colombo’s future, but about what they tell us about how that future deals with 
Colombo’s relationship to the rest of Sri Lanka.  Ultimately, I suggest that such 
comparisons actually serve to mask the inequalities that endure in Sri Lanka - 
between rural and urban, and between classes within Colombo itself.   
 One of my aims in this dissertation has been to delve more deeply into what 
seems like a perfectly “natural” desire, that of becoming a hub city.  The ambition of 
being a global hub is seemingly so obvious, so normal for a growing city in the 
Global South, that the idea itself has not been sufficiently interrogated. Becoming a 
“hub city” offers a very specific vision of the future that hinges on constant 
movement and circulation.  The image of Colombo as hub is reiterated in the rhetoric 
of state agencies, in city plans, in corporate promotional materials, and in news 
media.  All of these platforms, whether implicitly or explicitly, conjure a world in 
 222 
which Colombo becomes, in effect, a sort of infrastructure, facilitating the flow of 
capital and commodities between some places and other places.  If we take seriously 
the idea that “infrastructures are built networks that facilitate the flow of goods, 
people, or ideas and allow for their exchange over space” (Larkin 2013: 328) this 
allows for seeing infrastructure as more than material; infrastructure facilitates many 
kinds of flows.  Indeed, Colombo currently (and historically) has served as an 
important physical point in space, allowing for the flow of material goods through its 
port.   
 Today, ambitions for the city extend not only to the material services it can 
provide, but to making it an important infrastructure on the global scale facilitating 
the flow of capital and knowledge through its ability to offer financial incentives and 
access to its highly educated population of workers.  Once again, comparison is key, 
as in this recent article by a foreign reporter detailing Sri Lanka’s post-war efforts at 
becoming a global hub, in a piece entitled “Sri Lanka: A dream of becoming India’s 
Hong Kong”:     
The large island south-east of the foot of India is capable of becoming to the 
subcontinent what Hong Kong is to mainland China. Sri Lanka’s government 
is easing trading conditions to encourage investment in the hope that 
following “a new path” could reap dividends. (Mills 2017) 
 
In some ways, the dream of becoming a hub city is actually quite a modest one.  
Hopeful rhetoric about Sri Lanka gaining importance in maritime shipping and 
aviation tends to highlight the island as a place facilitating flows, not a destination in 
its own right.  The “new path” this reporter identifies applies, in the context of this 
article, to the new path taken by the country.  But it might equally apply to the paths 
of capital and power in the contemporary global economy.  The path, like the hub, is 
an image suggesting movement and flow.  For Colombo to become a “hub city” in 
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the Indian Ocean region, new paths must be carved out, which would connect and 
more deeply entangle Sri Lanka in the web of the global economy.  This is the 
central concern in urban development in Colombo today.   
 
Uncertain Futures 
Global city rhetoric is inherently future-oriented.  Governments, urban planning 
bodies, real estate developers and city residents throughout the world are engaged in 
different urban spaces in the project of bringing about global cities which are 
inherently/always understood to be a thing of the future, entities that often do not 
exist yet but might if everything goes well. As Asher Ghertner observes, “the world-
class city thus operates as a future-oriented technology, shifting collective horizons 
toward the long run and projecting the norms of appearance and civility of the future 
city across the existing landscape” (2015, 8).   
Daily conversations in Colombo often scanned between the city’s potential future 
and its recent past, especially the time of the civil war.  I observed that the distinction 
between these two temporal frames was made especially vivid in my conversations 
with middle class informants and friends, most of whom would take great pleasure in 
contrasting the security, prosperity and cleanliness of the contemporary post-war 
moment with the danger of the civil war years.  Speaking in this comparative 
temporal register, many English-speaking elites whom I encountered in Colombo’s 
central neighborhoods would often blend nostalgia for the way things used to be with 
a certain admiration and excitement for the city’s future. For people from other 
walks of life, however, the sharp distinction between wartime and post-war, between 
past and future, was less evident even as the urban poor and working class too 
affirmed their relief at the end of the conflict. For the fishermen in Mutuwall whom I 
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introduced in Chapter 3, for example, while the end of the civil war had the effect of 
lifting restrictions on their movement around coastal areas and fishing practices, the 
legacy of intense violence and intimidation they suffered at the hands of the Sri 
Lankan Navy remained a vivid memory.  When discussing potential protests against 
the Port City project construction, fishers still expressed a fear of the security forces 
based on their experiences before 2009.  Others in Mutuwall spoke in hushed tones 
about family members abducted by the Rajapakse regime or killed by street gangs 
thought to be tied to political parties.  While the threat of LTTE terrorism was gone, 
the potential for violence to seep into daily life was very vivid for those who 
benefitted the least from the glitzy new shopping malls and improved roads of the 
emerging global Colombo.   
As I explained in Chapter 2, hubness is both a spatial and temporal claim.  Part 
of what I mean by this is that, seen from Colombo, the future looks a lot like 
somewhere else.  The future of Colombo is usually explicitly or implicitly framed as 
the city “becoming” Dubai or Singapore or Hong Kong; the present state of other 
places is the tomorrow to which Colombo aspires.  In a forthcoming article on “the 
prospect of elsewhere” in Asia, Tim Bunnell and his colleagues observe that 
throughout the region, “the prospect of being elsewhere gives rise to aspirational 
futures” (Bunnel et al. Forthcoming, 5). Drawing from various urban sites in Asia, 
their analysis suggests that “geographies of uneven development are bound up with 
shifting senses of where the future lies” (13).  In Colombo, it is virtually impossible 
to distinguish the temporal register of futurity from its spatial connotations, as new 
urban projects are relentlessly promoted through references to the (better) realities of 
other cities, elsewhere.    
 225 
 My understanding of the project of making Colombo a global hub city is 
suffused at every level with the importance of futurity, but also with the uncertainty 
and shakiness of future-oriented projects.  By definition, the future is unknowable.  
Colombo residents, planners and developers fill in the unknown with specific 
anxieties about the global and national economic situation (see Chapter 5), the 
potentially disastrous nature of foreign influence on Sri Lankan politics (see Chapter 
2) and the yet-to-be-realized possibility of losing land and access to livelihoods (see 
Chapter 3).   
 The speculative nature of the projects and plans I present in this manuscript is 
an example of what Arjun Appadurai terms “dreamwork,” which he defines as 
bringing “together (in its two key elements) the space of fantasy, speculation, and the 
unbridled imagination (key semantic associations with the notion of dreaming) and 
the space of productivity, discipline, and instrumentality (essential elements of the 
modern conception of work)” (2015, 483).  I find the idea of dreamwork helpful for 
comprehending contemporary Colombo, where seemingly improbable projects are 
justified, and marketed, based on supposedly “rational” bases of what is good for 
economic growth and other indicators of capitalist development.  Dreamwork helps 
to make sense of why a small city such as Colombo is teeming with dazzling new 
apartment complexes which seem disproportionate to the amount of people capable 
of filling them (see Chapter 5).  Equally, it helps shed light on why labor is directed 
at the construction of new public spaces which fail to live up to either the aesthetic 
or economic goals originally envisioned (see Chapter 4). Appadurai’s intervention 
provides an analytical thread for understanding the relevance of Global South cities 
to capitalism in general, as he wishes to “dispel the notion that speculation, primitive 
accumulation, and dreamwork are to be found only on the capitalist periphery” 
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(2015, 485).  Indeed, as this thesis shows, forms of primitive accumulation and 
speculation take place in the very heart of Colombo, the core of Sri Lanka’s capitalist 
system.   
The uncertainty of global city-making processes is one of its key features.  
Rather than proceeding smoothly, in many cities especially in the Global South the 
attempt to achieve global city status is one fraught with interruptions, delays and 
setbacks.  While the work of scholars like Aihwa Ong highlights the new formations 
of neoliberal capitalism being actively brought into being in cities such as Shanghai 
and Singapore - models of the global city to the rest of the world - the view looks 
quite different from other locations.  Urban residents often find themselves caught up 
in lengthy periods of uncertainty and suspense as they navigate the perils of eviction, 
the disruptions of partially constructed infrastructure projects and other 
inconveniences and disturbances (Melly 2013, Harms 2012, Goldman 2011, Mitchell 
2010, Zeiderman 2016).  As Michael Goldman poignantly observes in relation to 
Bangalore - one of the emerging but not-quite-yet global cities of the South Asian 
region: “Indeed, many Bangaloreans are being actively dispossessed as part of the 
effort to build up a world city based on a speculative imaginary for world-city 
investors who may just stay away, and for world-city professionals who have yet to 
come” (2011, 577).    
 The uncertain temporality of global city building, to be sure, leaves much 
room for government and corporate abuses.  The urban poor are frequently exploited 
and dispossessed through the very mechanisms of delay and uncertainty which also 
impact capitalist efforts (see Harms 2012).  The future in many soon-to-be-global 
locations is at once a highly uniform project, typically catering to elites, and 
simultaneously a zone of possibility and experimentation.  These two poles of 
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futurity are described by Ananya Roy in her article “When is Asia” in which she 
suggests that “futurity itself is a mode of governing” (2016, 318). The promises of 
the future can be a very effective tool for regulating populations.  On the other hand, 
Roy also observes that “what is at work is a politics of futurity, one that imagines the 
future as better than the past and present and that frames such an imagination as a 
democratic aspiration, an inclusive identity” (2016, 319).  The future can be both a 
mechanism of control and offer the promise of improved conditions and better lives, 
no matter how far away these ideals may seem.  
 This ethnography has detailed the gaps between the imagined future and the 
present.  Against the sometimes relentlessly positive accounts of Colombo’s future 
presented in the official discourses of developers and government officials which 
suggest the future will look and feel a certain way, I have emphasized the ongoing, 
incomplete nature of the projects aimed at improving Colombo.  The future has not 
yet happened and remains open, even as some groups of people have less ability to 
influence its outcome than others.  Ethnography as a method allows for deep 
engagement with the present, even though the “present” moment of the text is past 
by the time of writing. Acknowledging these temporal gaps, I nonetheless hope that 
my thesis has offered an important glimpse into the constantly negotiated, debated 
and imperfect present, which is too often elided in elite visions of a future global 
city.  
 
An Almost Global City 
Throughout this manuscript, I have referred to the concept of the “global city” as 
a way of indexing the collection of aspirations, dreams and goals laid out by many of 
Colombo’s planners, politicians and residents.  The term “global city,” as I use it, 
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indicates a modern, efficient, clean metropolis which fits with contemporary 
capitalist visions of cities’ roles as centers of consumption, luxury and wealth.  
Ideally, in the global city paradigm, cities that aspire to become “global” offer some 
form of benefit or appeal to an elite class of people from all over the world.  In a nod 
to the importance of mobility and transnational flows of capital, “global city” 
aspirations throughout the Global South usually include projects that attract Foreign 
Direct Investment; forms of housing that meet “international” standards of comfort 
and security for wealthy professionals in fields such as finance, law and engineering; 
and infrastructure such as airports, roads and highways which provide connection to 
other critical centers of the global economy.  Urban scholars have generated a vast 
archive of examples, experiences and imaginaries associated with the global city 
(Ong 2007, Ghertner 2015, Sassen 2001, Goldman 2011, Melly 2013).  And yet, a 
concrete indicator or benchmark for evaluating what counts as a global city remains 
somewhat elusive.  I will return to this below.  
In thinking through contemporary urban development in Sri Lanka, I have 
suggested that “hubness” or the “hub city” is the central desire expressed in the 
projects and plans I detail in my ethnography.  Though at times I may use the terms 
“hub city” and “global city” interchangeably, they are slightly different concepts.  
For the purposes of this thesis, I suggest that the hub city ambition is a subset of 
global city aspirations.  The global city can be located anywhere in the world, and 
has certain attributes which are readily identifiable but not readily measured. The 
hub city, I maintain, is Colombo’s specific answer to the broader phenomenon of 
global city making.  The hub city, is the particularly Sri Lankan dream of a global 
city, spurred by the focus on the island’s strategic geographic location. While the hub 
city concept is, in a sense, subordinate to the broader concept of the global city, I 
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offer here that the development of the hub city idea itself may help us find new 
understandings of the global city model in general.    
In studying the transformations aimed at helping Colombo to become a global 
hub city, I have found it critical to decouple “global cities” as an academic category 
of analysis from “global cities” as an aspirational trope invoked by urban residents 
and policy-makers.  This leaves us with a rather important question: are global cities 
real? Is Shanghai, often cited as one of the most successful Asian cities to reach 
“global” status really more meaningfully global than Colombo, Phnom Penh, or 
Bangalore?  
The contemporary academic literature on cities is littered with references to 
places attempting to become global. In this sense, Colombo is hardly exceptional 
among developing-country cities in its ambition.  One meaningful and important 
reaction to this global-city rhetoric on the part of many academics who are sensitive 
to colonial pasts and uneven relations of power is to point to the fact that many of 
these striving urban centers are in many ways already global.  That is, emphasizing 
their attempts to become global cities elides already-existing forms of connection 
and cosmopolitanism that exist in these spaces.      
 However, while scholars do not wish to be ahistorical in their analyses of cities, 
or to overlook the important forms of interconnection that stem from precolonial and 
colonial times, it is important to think about why certain cities appear time and time 
again as figures of aspiration/desire; we have to contend with the fact that while it 
might seem wrong to say Dubai is “more global” than Dakar, or Colombo, for that 
matter, it is nonetheless undeniable that Dubai (a) actually figures repeatedly in the 
urban planning discourses of other locations and (b) commands a certain power in 
the global economy.    
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This takes us back to what we mean by “global cities.”  While the literature 
certainly provides us some key examples and ways of thinking about the concept of 
the global city at the theoretical level, I wish to suggest that for understanding 
Colombo, the most productive approach is not to see it as a place that either is/is not 
a global city but rather to think of the global city as aspiration, as ongoing, as a 
process requiring labor.  The global city, I would suggest, exists in the attempts to 
make it happen.  
Saskia Sassen has famously written about global cities as being the command 
and control centers of the global economy.  In her book titled The Global City: New 
York, London, Tokyo, we are offered in the title itself three concrete examples of 
what (and where) she is talking about.  But where might this leave other cities, other 
places? What room is there for a city like Colombo, not a command-and-control 
center, but an aspiring newcomer to the global scene?      
In his study of Delhi, Asher Ghertner provides a slightly different take on global 
cities.  Unlike Sassen he emphasizes the term world-class city rather than “global 
city.” He provides a more practice-based idea of what constitutes a world-class city:   
“The project of world-class city making in Delhi, as in other emerging 
market contexts, is marked by a strong normative drive to reach globally 
indexed targets of development: to host prestigious international events, to 
house Fortune 500 companies, and to offer lifestyles capable of attracting 
global consumer classes.” (2015, 8)   
 
I call this a practice based definition of global or world-class city because unlike 
Sassen’s interpretation, Ghertner’s analysis focuses on what it is people think or 
expect a global city should offer, rather than suggesting a functional relationship 
between the world-class city and the global economy.  His understanding is less 
rooted in the political economy of the developing city, but relies on a more 
ephemeral sense of what a city ought to be like.  Ghertner’s analysis is deeply 
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relevant for a context like Colombo, in which such aspirations often outrun clear 
benchmarks or concrete goals. There are very clear notions in Colombo of what a 
better capital city would do, look like and provide.  And yet, in the very act of 
explaining these aspirations they seem to evaporate under the weight of their own 
circularity (Harms 2012).  How to account for this?  
While Ghertner’s definition of a world-class city risks seeming circular - “a 
world class city tries to reach globally indexed standards” - he actually explains this 
problem in the framing of his study.  According to Ghertner, “it is precisely this 
vague sense of an improved, more beautiful urban future, without planning 
benchmarks or even mutually agreeable definitional criteria, that gives the world-
class city its efficacy” (9).  According to Ghertner, consensus around what 
constitutes a world-class city is built around aesthetic principles rather than solid 
quantitative benchmarks.  These implicitly agreed-upon value judgments about what 
makes Delhi a world-class city, “give world-classness a sensory self-evidence” 
(2015, 9). The ethnographic data in this thesis supports Ghertner’s point in countless 
ways. In each chapter we see how “vagueness” - and the confusion and occasional 
disappointment this causes - is characteristic of efforts to improve Colombo across 
numerous scales and sites. Benchmarks may be in short supply, but a clear idea, a 
“self-evident” quality is present all the same.   
Thinking Colombo as a global city is an inherently comparative move.  The 
global city model is one that essentially relies on the idea of comparing and 
contrasting models of urban life across national borders.  Whether the implicit point 
of comparison is the London-New York-Tokyo axis described by Sassen or an 
alternate constellation of Dubai-Singapore-Hong Kong, the fact remains that global 
city theorizing implies an urban model simply iterated across different locations. 
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Where does that leave room for us to understand Colombo more specifically? In her 
essay on thinking comparatively across cities, Jennifer Robinson suggests that 
Rather than starting with territorialized cases, imagined as composed of 
wider processes hitting the ground differently, comparative practices could 
engage with urban outcomes through tracing their genesis by means of 
specific connections, influences, actions, compositions, alliances, 
experiences, across the full array of possible elements of urban life: material-
social-lived-imaginative-institutional. (2016, 15)  
 
What Robinson is arguing here is that rather than thinking “cases” as things which 
happen in specific places and only serve as examples of a “wider” phenomenon we 
want to explain, comparative gestures call for greater attention to the implicit 
assumptions we make about what concepts, categories and forms can be compared, 
what is viewed as a “case” of what phenomenon.  According to Robinson, we should 
think more specifically about how things came to be the way they are - what she 
terms thinking “genetically” - and what is meaningful and unique in each context. In 
this study of Colombo I try to take in the city in its “material-social-lived-
imaginative-institutional” levels, with different levels of emphasis on each 
throughout my chapters.   
 The arguments and observations about Colombo advanced in this thesis can 
certainly be read in one comparative register as simply relating cases to support or 
refute a “broader” phenomenon of global city making projects across the world.  I 
would not object if my readers took this as the primary message of the ethnography. 
However, following Robinson’s intervention, I would suggest that much as we can 
look at Colombo (in its specificity) through the lens of the global city (in its 
generality), the dynamic can be flipped: Colombo can also be a lens through which 
we turn back attention on the global city model in all its broadness and think a bit 
differently about global cities themselves.  
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 Throughout this thesis, I have advanced the idea of “hubness” as a concept.  
On one level, Colombo is a specific “case” of global city projects in which hubness 
is a core component or ideal for orienting aspirations.  Robinson suggests about 
cases that “they can be seen as distinctive outcomes on their own terms, not already 
interpreted as specific instances of a wider process, or a universal category” (2016, 
14).  She avers that looking at cases in this way can lead to generative thinking.  Part 
of what I attempt to do with the hub city/hubness concept is precisely this - to 
advance an idea that might be generative in nature. In one respect, my case examines 
the specificity of Colombo’s global city aspirations, in part because no one in 
Colombo actually talked about or used the term “global cities”- instead they 
articulated the dream of a better future city through the idiom of the “hub.”  But in 
looking at hubness and centering hubness as one of the cornerstones of Colombo’s 
aspirations, I in turn suggest that hubness might have more to tell us about other 
global cities beyond Colombo and Sri Lanka.  More than ever, the notion of hubness 
is in fact fundamental to all global city aspirations, whether these belong to 
Bangalore, Paris or Dubai. What might seem natural - the desire to be 
infrastructurally, socially and financially connected to other places– is in fact a 
highly specific way of understanding what a city should be. And what are the 
already-global cities of today if not hub cities that happened to be successful, that 
managed to insert themselves into the correct networks and systems of flow? In 
theorizing from Colombo (the case), a place that is not-quite-yet a global city, I am 
in fact able to help us think generatively about the very concept of the global city.  
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